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I. INTRODUCTION
Following changes in U.S. immigration law through the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),1 the Illegal Immigration Re-
form and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),2 and implementation
of enforcement measures such as Secure Communities,3 the number of
individuals removed from the United States has swelled dramatically.
During the ten-year period from fiscal year 1997 through the end of fiscal
year 2006, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and its suc-
1. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214.
2. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),
Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
3. The Secure Communities program began in March 2008 under the George W. Bush
administration and continues under the Barack Obama administration. AARTI KOHLI ET
AL., THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW AND SOC. POLICY, SECURE COM-
MUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 1 (Oct.
2011).  Similar to the earlier program under 287(g), Secure Communities links local law
enforcement agencies with the Department of Homeland Security and has increased the
number of individuals placed in removal proceedings. Id.; Michelle Mittelstadt et al., MI-
GRATION POL’Y INST., Through the Prism of National Security: Major Immigration Policy
and Program Changes in the Decade since 9/11, at 11 (Aug. 2011), available at http://
www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/FS23_Post-9-11policy.pdf.
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cessor agency, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),4 removed
1,994,188 individuals from the United States.5  In fiscal year 2010, the
number removed totaled 387,242,6 and thirty-four percent were removed
under the expanded authority of the government to reinstate prior orders
of deportation or removal.7
4. Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, federal agencies were restructured.  Im-
migration enforcement was combined with customs enforcement and then re-divided.
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified at 6 U.S.C.
§ 101).  The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) became part of the new Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, and the functions of the legacy INS—both service and en-
forcement—were divided between three sub-agencies: Citizenship and Immigration
Services (CIS), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and Immigration and Customs En-
forcement (ICE). T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:
PROCESS AND POLICY 270 (6th ed. 2008) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP];
accord Homeland Security Act of 2002.
5. This is nearly a 400 percent increase in removals from the previous decade’s yearly
average (FY1987–FY1996). OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., 2010 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 94 (Aug. 2011), available at http://
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2010/ois_yb_2010.pdf [hereinafter 2010
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS] (tallying number of removals broken down by
year as follows [YR: # individuals removed]: 1987: 24,336; 1988: 25,829; 1989: 34,427; 1990:
30,039; 1991: 33,189; 1992: 43,671; 1993: 42,542; 1994: 45,674; 1995: 50,924; 1996: 69,680;
1997: 114,432; 1998: 174,813; 1999: 183,114; 2000: 188,467; 2001: 189,026; 2002: 165,168;
2003: 211,098; 2004: 240,665; 2005: 246,431; 2006: 280,974; 2007: 319,382; 2008: 359,795;
2009: 395,165).  The number of removals does not include individuals that left the United
States under a voluntary departure program offered by DHS; this number varies consider-
ably but from FY1990 through FY2006 the average number of returns per year exceeded 1
million people. Id. This number has since been decreasing beginning in FY2007. Id (tally-
ing number of returns broken down by year as follows [YR: # individuals returned]: 1990:
1,022,533; 1991: 1,061,105; 1992: 1,105,829; 1993: 1,243,410; 1994: 1,029,107; 1995: 1,313,764;
1996: 1,573,428; 1997: 1,440,684; 1998: 1,570,127; 1999: 1,574,863; 2000: 1,675,876; 2001:
1,349,371; 2002: 1,012,116; 2003: 945,294; 2004: 1,166,576; 2005: 1,096,920; 2006: 1,043,381;
2007: 891,390; 2008: 811,263; 2009: 586,164; 2010: 476,405).
6. Id.
7. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRA-
TION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010, at 1 (June 2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement-ar-2010.pdf [hereinafter IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010] (identifying that out of the 387,000 orders of removals in
year 2010, 131,000 were from reinstatements of final orders); accord Morales-Izquierdo v.
Gonzalez, 486 F.3d 484, 487–88 (9th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging that until 1997 only immi-
gration judges could reinstate removal orders, but upholding the Attorney General’s ex-
tension of this authority to low-level immigration officers).  Federal regulation states that:
An alien who illegally reenters the United States after having been removed, or hav-
ing departed voluntarily, while under an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal
shall be removed from the United States by reinstating the prior order.  The alien has
no right to a hearing before an immigration judge in such circumstances.
8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a) (2006).
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This campaign against non-citizens has led to the removal of United
States citizens.8  Particularly vulnerable to removal are individuals who
were born abroad but claim citizenship through a U.S. citizen parent.9
Termed “second class citizens” by one Supreme Court justice in a re-
sponse to their protections under the law,10 these individuals rely on U.S.
8. A U.S. citizen, regardless of the manner by which the individual became a citizen
and regardless of any past misconduct, should never be subject to removal.  6 CHARLES
GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 71.03(2) (Matthew Bender, rev.
ed. 2011).  Notwithstanding, reports have surfaced of U.S. citizens having been detained
and removed. See Problems with ICE Interrogation, Detention, and Removal Procedures:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., and Int’l
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 4–34 (2008) (testimony of Rep. Zoe
Lofgren (D-Cal.)), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/
40742.PDF [hereinafter Hearing] (providing testimony of a DHS officer and attorneys re-
garding the detention and removal by DHS of U.S. citizens); KOHLI ET AL., supra note 3, at
2; Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S. Citizens
as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606, 608 (2011); Marisa Taylor, Feds Admit Mistakenly
Jailing Citizens as Illegal Immigrants, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 14, 2008, at A8.
9. The government has failed to implement screening and notice provisions that
would detect individuals who have acquired citizenship through a U.S. parent.  Further-
more, the government frequently treats acquired citizens as non-citizens due to their birth
abroad even when they have evidence of the acquisition of citizenship. See Hearing, supra
note 8, at 40–66 (testimony of Kara Hartzler, an attorney with the Florence Immigrant and
Refugee Rights Project, who sees forty to fifty cases per month of individuals with poten-
tial claims to citizenship); see Lauren Etter, Immigration Twist Gives a Laborer a Fresh
Beginning, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2006, at A1 (describing narrative of Wilfredo Garza, who
acquired citizenship through his U.S. citizen father; he was deported under the govern-
ment’s authority to reinstate prior orders of deportation even after filing an application for
certificate of citizenship); see also Cara Anna, Deported Man Was Actually U.S. Citizen,
WASH. POST, August 23, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2006/08/23/AR2006082300277_p (sharing the story of Duarnis Perez who was not informed
of his U.S. citizenship until after his deportation); see also infra Part IV.C for a discussion
of cases of individuals who acquired U.S. citizenship and were removed.  Many cases are
similar to that of Wilfredo Garza and are discovered by federal public defenders during
prosecutions for federal immigration related criminal offenses.  Some are able to then ob-
tain recognition of their acquired citizenship.
10. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 839 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).  Justice Black
opined that the majority opinion imposed a lesser status to acquired citizens than on citi-
zens born in the United States. Id. The term “second class citizens” has also been used to
describe denial of rights to certain classes of citizens throughout American history.  Linda
Bosniak, Constitutional Citizenship Through the Prism of Alienage, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1285,
1305–06 (2002).  For example, after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, African-
Americans remained disadvantaged in nearly every socio-economic sphere. Id.  Further-
more, in removal cases involving non-citizen parents, their U.S. citizen children are gener-
ally not considered to meet the hardship standards required to avoid the parents’ removal,
which raises the question of the constitutional protections afforded U.S. citizen children.
See generally Bill Piatt, Born as Second Class Citizens in the U.S.A.: Children of Undocu-
mented Parents, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 35 (1988) (arguing that the United States may
have gone too far in some of its attempts to control illegal immigration); John Castro,
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nationality laws that are based on the principle of jus sanguinas,11 the
transmission of citizenship from a U.S. citizen parent to a child born
abroad.12
In this Article, I will focus on Mexicans who have a U.S. parent and a
claim to acquired U.S. citizenship.  Their experiences will be illustrated
by referencing cases that have arisen on the border between the United
States and Mexico and have been handled by law students and Federal
Public Defenders.13  Frequently, individuals who claim to have acquired
citizenship in the United States can trace their family background to the
early twentieth century and their narratives take us through a long and
continuous history of Mexican migrations to the United States, the U.S.
government’s mass deportations of Mexicans during the Great Depres-
sion, and the plight of the U.S.-born children who accompanied the mi-
grants to Mexico.14  Many of the children who were born in the United
Note, Second-Class Citizens: The Schism Between Immigration Policy and Children’s
Health Care, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L. R. 199 (2009) (illustrating how children’s health care
is an indirect method used by the government to discourage the flow of undocumented
immigrants).
11. “Jus Sanguinas [Latin ‘right of blood’]: the rule that a child’s citizenship is deter-
mined by the parents’ citizenship.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 880 (8th ed. 2004); see infra
note 34.
12. Under U.S. law Congress retains the power to confer U.S. citizenship to children
born abroad to U.S. citizen parents. See infra Part III.A.  Beginning in 1790 Congress
enacted a series of statutes which set the terms and conditions for transmission of citizen-
ship.  The present statutes governing acquisition of citizenship at birth through U.S. citizen
parents, and the focus of this article, are found in the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 (INA) §§ 301(c), (g), and (h), 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (c), (a), and (h), and INA § 309, U.S.C.
§ 1409. Id.  There are also statutes providing for transmission of citizenship through par-
ents who are U.S. nationals and for citizenship of individuals and their children born in
territories and possessions.  Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No.
82-414, §§ 301–309, 66 Stat. 163, 235–239 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1409).  Addition-
ally, citizenship may be transmitted to the children after birth (derivative citizenship).  INA
§§ 320, 322, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1431, 1433. See infra note 119.
13. Many of the cases cited in this Article were handled by law students enrolled in
the Immigration and Human Rights Clinic of St. Mary’s University School of Law located
in San Antonio, Texas.  The law school’s proximity to the U.S.–Mexico border provides
faculty and students with multiple opportunities to represent individuals with claims to
U.S. citizenship and an understanding of the significant obstacles these claimants now face
following the 1996 legislation. See The Center for Legal and Social Justice: The Immigra-
tion and Human Rights Clinic Course, ST. MARY’S UNIV., http://www.stmarytx.edu/law/
index.php?site=centerForLegalAndSocialJustice#immigrationHumanRightsClinic (last vis-
ited Jan. 23, 2012) (homepage of the Center for Legal and Social Justice).  The names of
the Clinic clients discussed in this Article are represented by initials to maintain confidenti-
ality and all information regarding these cases can be obtained by contacting the Clinic
directly.
14. Kevin Johnson, The Forgotten “Repatriation” of Persons of Mexican Ancestry and
Lessons for the “War on Terror,” 26 PACE L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2005).
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States were raised in Mexico and then became the parents of another
generation of U.S. citizens by acquisition.15
There are both historic and current challenges faced by these individu-
als.  This Article addresses the claims presented under statutes, which set
the conditions for these children born abroad and the challenges
presented in proving the claims.  Transmission of citizenship from a U.S.
citizen parent is determined by the statute which was in effect at the time
of birth of the child,16 and the child can either be born abroad 1) to two
U.S. citizen parents,17 2) to one U.S. parent and one non-citizen parent,18
15. Children who are born in Mexico to a U.S. citizen parent and who acquire U.S.
citizenship under U.S. law are dual citizens.  They are citizens of Mexico by birth and also
citizens of the United States through their parents.  Many of their U.S. citizen parents are
also dual citizens. They obtained U.S. citizenship by birth in the United States and under
Mexican law they also acquired Mexican citizenship through their Mexican-citizen par-
ent(s).  Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 147 (1963); Manuel Becerra Ramirez,
Nationality in Mexico, in FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING
WORLD 316 & n.6 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2000) (identifying
that under the Mexican Constitution of 1857, Mexican nationality is established under both
principles of jus soli and jus sanguinas).  Large-scale migration of Mexicans to the United
States and the citizenship laws in Mexico and the United States led to this complicated
dual-citizenship phenomena.  T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Between Principles and Politics:
U.S. Citizenship Policy, in FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP IN THE CHANGING
WORLD, supra, at 120 [hereinafter Aleinikoff]; Peter Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Mean-
ing of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411, 1418 (1997).
16. Drodz v. INS, 155 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1998).  Since 1790, Congress has passed a
number of statutes setting the terms and conditions for transmitting citizenship from a U.S.
citizen parent to a child born abroad. See DANIEL LEVY, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND NATURAL-
IZATION HANDBOOK 2011-2012 § 2:1 (Charles Roth ed., 2011) (outlining the historical de-
velopment of immigration laws as they apply to acquired citizenship). See also 7 GORDON,
supra note 8, at § 99.04 (providing a detailed presentation of the requirements for acquisi-
tion of citizenship under each of the statutes); IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION
LAW SOURCEBOOK 1499 app. B (12th ed. 2010) (providing tables listing the statutory re-
quirements for acquisition of citizenship).
17. The present statute at INA § 301(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c), provides:
The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:
. . . .
(c) a person born outside of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents
both of whom are citizens of the United States and one of whom has had a residence
in the United States or one of its outlying possessions, prior to the birth of such
person . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (2006).
18. Children of one U.S. parent and one non-citizen parent apply under INA
§§ 301(g) and (h), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401 (g) and (h), which provides:
[t]he following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:
. . . .
(g) a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying
possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United
States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United
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or 3) out of wedlock to one U.S. citizen parent.19  At a minimum, each
States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than five
years, at least two of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years: [p]rovided,
that any periods of honorable service in the Armed Forces of the United States, or
periods of employment with the United States Government or with an international
organization as that term is defined in section 288 of title 22 by such citizen parent, or
any periods during which such citizen parent is physically present abroad as the de-
pendent son or daughter and a member of the household of a person (A) honorably
serving with the Armed Forces of the United States, or (B) employed by the United
States Government or an international organization as defined in section 288 of title
22, may be included in order to satisfy the physical present requirement of this para-
graph.  This proviso shall be applicable to persons born on or after December 24, 1952,
to the same extent as if it had become effective in its present form on that date; and
(h) a person born before noon (Eastern Standard Time) May 24, 1934, outside the
limits and jurisdiction of the United States of an alien father and a mother who is a
citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, had resided in the
United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1401(g), (h) (2006).
19. INA § 309 provides the requirements for a child born abroad and out of wedlock
to one U.S. citizen parent and a non-citizen parent.  INA § 309, 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2006).  A
U.S. citizen father of a child born out of wedlock must first meet the requirements of INA
§ 301(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), and then must meet the following additional requirements
established under INA § 309(a) as listed below:
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is established by clear and
convincing evidence,
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the person’s
birth,
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial support for
the person until the person reaches the age of 18 years, and
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years—
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person’s residence or domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath,
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a competent
court.
INA § 309, 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2006). U.S.C. § 1409 also reduces the physical presence re-
quirement for a U.S. citizen mother of a child born abroad and out of wedlock. Id. The
statute states the following:
(c) [n]otwithstanding the provision of subsection (a) of this section, a person born
after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and out of wedlock shall be held to
have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother, if the mother had the na-
tionality of the United States at the time of such person’s birth, and if the mother had
previously been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying posses-
sions for a continuous period of one year.
Id. 8 U.S.C. § 1409 has been subject to challenge because the requirements placed on the
child born out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen father differs from those born out of wedlock to
a U.S. citizen mother. See Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 70 (2001) (ruling that the
requirements of the statute imposed on U.S. fathers to establish paternity and legitimacy
met a standard substantially related to a government interest; and therefore, did not vio-
late the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment).  The Court also affirmed the
Ninth Circuit’s determination that the statute was valid when challenged on equal protec-
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statute requires that the child who asserts a claim to acquired citizenship
present evidence that the U.S. parent was a U.S. citizen at the time of
birth, and maintained the required residence/presence in the United
States prior to the birth of the child.20  For many Mexicans who claim
acquisition to U.S. citizenship, these two elements present complex fac-
tual questions and evidentiary challenges21 that have been difficult to
prove on the fluid border between the United States and Mexico.22
The agencies charged with adjudication of citizenship claims in the
United States, the DHS and the immigration courts under the Depart-
ment of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), are
over-burdened with cases and ill equipped to handle the claims.23  Some
government officials are unreceptive or hostile to claimants who have
sparse documentary evidence.24  Even though many U.S. parents and
their children born abroad are unaware of laws regulating acquired citi-
zenship status, the government has taken few affirmative steps to advise
likely candidates for citizenship.  The statute and regulations governing
removal procedures provide no guarantee that individuals with possible
claims to acquisition of U.S. citizenship will be discovered or advised of a
tion grounds.  United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 564
U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam).  In Flores-Villar, petitioner argued that the
physical presence requirements that the father must meet prior to the birth of the out of
wedlock child, a total of five years at least two of which must be after the age of fourteen,
was a requirement which exceeds the one-year physical presence an out of wedlock mother
must establish. Id. at 995.  The Ninth Circuit ruled that the requirements imposed on fa-
thers were rationally related to the government’s interest in establishing a relationship be-
tween the U.S. citizen parent and child. Id. at 996–97.
20. INA §§ 301(g) and (h), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(g) and (h).
21. See infra Parts II.B, IV.A.  Besides issues involving the U.S. parent’s citizenship
and residence/presence in the United States, questions of paternity and legitimacy arise in
cases concerning a child born abroad and out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen father. Tuan
Ahn Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57.  Additionally, early statutes contained retention provisions
which required that the child come to the United States and maintain residence for a pe-
riod of time. See LEVY, supra note 16, at § 4:13 (discussing how the retention require-
ments, conditions subsequent, were upheld because of concerns with dual citizenship and
loyalty to the United States).  The retention requirements have since been repealed. See
infra. Part III.A.I.
22. The burden of proof is on the child born abroad to establish that he or she meets
the conditions precedent to acquiring citizenship at birth by preponderance of the evi-
dence.  8 C.F.R. § 341.2(c) (2010); In re Tijerina-Villareal, 13 I&N Dec. 327, 330 (B.I.A.
1969).
23. See Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595, 597 (2009) (describing the problems with the civil immigration
adjudication system).  During fiscal year 2008, approximately 230 immigration judges pre-
sided over 350,000 matters. Id. at 599. See infra Part V.
24. See infra Part IV.
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claim.25  Consequently, it is not uncommon that children born abroad to
U.S. parents are deported or removed26 from the United States, some-
times repeatedly, despite the fact that they are U.S. citizens.
Amendments to the immigration statutes in 1996 brought about a dra-
matic increase in removals and instituted new systemic obstacles for indi-
viduals born abroad with claims to U.S. citizenship.27  In combination,
AEDPA and IIRIRA created the following changes: increased the
grounds of removal particularly for non-citizens with criminal offenses,28
mandated detention of criminal non-citizens,29 and authorized govern-
ment officers to reinstate prior orders of deportation and removal.30  Dif-
ficulties that the purported U.S. citizen had historically in establishing a
claim to acquired citizenship became compounded by the heightened de-
mands of the AEDPA and IIRIRA.  Furthermore, AEDPA and IRRIRA
narrowed the availability of federal court review of removal orders31 and
in 2005 Congress passed the REAL-ID Act which purports to eliminate
25. The government has no authority to deport or remove a U.S. citizen, so to order a
deportation or removal without clarifying the status of an individual with a claim to U.S.
citizenship “is thus a denial of an essential jurisdictional fact.” Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259
U.S. 276, 284 (1922); accord Rivera v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 2005).  How-
ever, the INA and the regulations do not require that the immigration judge ask the re-
spondent in removal proceedings whether he or she has a United States citizen parent or
grandparent. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10 (laying out the requirements of the immigration judge
in a removal proceeding).  EOIR only advises immigration judges to inquire of unrepre-
sented respondents whether they have U.S.-citizen parents or grandparents. See also
EOIR Immigration Court Bench Book, Master Calendar Checklist for the Immigration
Judge, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/tools/Script%20MC%20Checklist.htm
(last visited Feb. 23, 2012) (providing directions on the proper way to conduct an immigra-
tion hearing, including a question about U.S. parents or grandparents). See infra Part V.A.
26. IIRIRA marked the shift from the term “deport” to the term “remove.”  Lenni
Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration
Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1441–42 (1997).  Prior to 1997, legacy INS instituted
exclusion and deportation proceedings, depending on whether the grounds of inadmissibil-
ity or deportability applied. Id.  IIRIRA consolidated the two forms of proceedings into
one category: removal proceedings.  Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 104-208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009.
27. In 1996, there were 69,680 individuals removed from the U.S., then in 1997 that
number jumped to 114,432 individuals. 2010 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS,
supra note 5, at 94.
28. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. 104-
132, §§ 435, 440, 110 Stat. 121; IIRIRA, §§  321, 322, 344, 347, 350 (codified within INA
§ 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) and INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)).
29. IIRIRA § 305 (codified at INA § 236(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1) (2006) (in-
structing that certain individuals who are inadmissible and deportable on crime-based
grounds shall be taken into custody).
30. IIRIRA § 305 (codified at INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)).
31. AEDPA, §§ 440-442 (modified former INA § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a); IIRIRA
§ 306 (repealed INA § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a and established INA § 242, 8 U.S.C § 1252).
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access to habeas corpus proceedings for review of removal orders.32  Ac-
quired citizenship claimants find themselves unable to obtain judicial re-
view of reinstatement of prior deportation and removal orders when they
seek to assert previously unresolved citizenship claims.
Part II of this Article outlines the patterns and continuity of Mexican
migration and will discuss in more detail the cases that illustrate the
problems faced by many Mexicans with viable claims to U.S. citizenship.
Part III discusses the history of and substantive requirements for the ac-
quisition of citizenship through a U.S. citizen parent and describes the
provisions for judicial review.  Part IV details the obstacles encountered
by individuals seeking to assert claims to citizenship before the govern-
ment agencies authorized to adjudicate applications asserting citizenship
claims.  Part V outlines problems faced by citizenship claimants in re-
moval proceedings, particularly following the changes occasioned by
AEDPA and IIRIRA.  Part IV discusses the dangers of reinstatement of
removal for citizenship claimants and the limitations placed on judicial
review of removal orders by the REAL ID Act.  In the Conclusion, I will
make recommendations for change to ensure full protections for individ-
uals born abroad who present non-frivolous claims to U.S. citizenship.
II. EXTRAORDINARY MIGRATION AND PITFALLS FOR
MEXICAN APPLICANTS
Citizenship by birth is generally based on one of two principles.  Citi-
zenship can be conferred under jus soli (law of land, or birth on land) to
those born within the boundaries of a nation.33  Alternatively, under the
principle of jus sanguinas (law of blood or descent) citizenship is inher-
ited from a parent who is a citizen.34  The United States has adopted both
principles to support citizenship at birth.35  In his article concerning fam-
ily influence on immigration, Professor Motomura discussed the impact
of U.S. born children of immigrants and how “immigration is a matter of
32. REAL-ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (codified at various sec-
tions within INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252).
33. Jus soli is based on the English common law principle of nationality, which “em-
braced all persons born within the king’s allegiance and subject to his protection.” United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 655 (1898).
34. Jus sanguinas is of European origin. LEVY, supra note 16, at § 4.1.  Nationality by
descent was adopted in France following the French Revolution and was the norm in a
number of other countries including Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, and Norway. Id.
35. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 665–66; cf. IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, supra
note 4, at 15 (the principle of jus solis is a foundation for Anglo-American nationality law,
but both jus solis and jus sanguinas are basic principles for obtaining citizenship at birth).
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multiple generations.”36  Citizenship is also a matter of multiple genera-
tions, and the two principles of citizenship at birth, jus soli and jus
sanguinas, have a profound and continuing influence on U.S. law and
policy.37
The extraordinary migration of Mexicans to the United States gives
some historic foundation for many jus soli and jus sanguinas citizens of
the United States.38  For over one hundred years, Mexican workers and
their families, including their U.S.-born children, have migrated between
Mexico and the United States.39  They have also been the subject of re-
peated episodes of mass deportations from the United States to Mexico.40
New generations of Mexican children with U.S. citizen parents often
trace their ancestry from the circular migration patterns of these families.
However, for many of the children born in Mexico to a U.S. citizen
parent, establishing a claim to the acquisition of U.S. citizenship poses
36. Hiroshi Motomura, We Asked for Workers, But Families Came: Time, Law, and
the Family in Immigration and Citizenship, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 103, 108 (2006).
37. Aleinikoff, supra note 15.  The jus soli citizenship of children born in the United
States to undocumented individuals has become a source of controversy in recent years.
Id.  Proposals to amend the Constitution to limit U.S. citizenship to the children of lawfully
admitted non-citizens have been argued but rejected.  Motomura, supra note 36, at 111–12;
Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
54, 54–56 (1997).
38. See DAVID SPENER, CLANDESTINE CROSSINGS: MIGRANTS AND COYOTES ON THE
TEXAS-MEXICO BORDER 26 (2009) (“[T]he sheer scale of Mexican migration to the United
States sets it apart from migration from all other nations” and the populations of Mexicans
in the U.S. and former migrants living in Mexico combine to form “the largest contempo-
rary migration between any two countries in the world.”); MARC R. ROSENBLUM, OBSTA-
CLES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION: THE US-MEXICO CASE 6 (Apr.
2011), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/USMexico-cooperation.pdf (exam-
ining the idea of collaboration regarding the immigration issues with the United States and
Mexico, but noting the problems that may arise).
39. See Jorge Durand, From Traitors to Heroes: 100 Years of Mexican Migration Poli-
cies, MIGRATION INFORMATION SOURCE, available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/
feature/display.cfm?ID=203 (last visited Apr. 25, 2012), (noting that the massive migration
of Mexicans to the United States as well as the counter migration by Mexicans returning to
Mexico in the 19th century following the U.S. annexation of southwest territories once part
of Mexico and in the 20th century following expulsions during U.S. economic crisis). See
also MARC R. ROSENBLUM & KATE BRICK, REG’L MIGRATION STUDY GRP., US IMMIGRA-
TION POLICY AND MEXICAN/CENTRAL AMERICAN MIGRATION FLOWS: THEN AND NOW 1
(Aug. 2011) (discussing how the migrant flow between the United States and Mexico is
deeply established and how illegal migration became the primary movement from Mexico
into the United States).
40. Durand, supra note 39.  The United States conducted massive expulsions of mi-
grant workers during the economic crises of 1907, 1921, 1929, and 1939. Id.
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significant obstacles.41  The first challenge concerns the ability of appli-
cants to gather evidence of their claim that at the time of their birth, the
transmitting parent was a U.S. citizen and had lived in the United States
for the required period of time.42  Many of the U.S. citizen parents were
like the previous generation of migrants; they traveled between Mexico
and far-flung regions of the United States and often lacked the kind and
volume of records that readily established U.S. birth and presence.
A. Mexican Migration Patterns
The proximity of Mexico to the United States and the close ties be-
tween the two nations contribute to Mexicans representing the largest
immigrant group in the United States.43  The patterns and continuity of
migration from the end of the nineteenth century to the present also con-
tribute to the formation of what is believed to be the largest group of
individuals who acquire citizenship at birth, Mexicans with a U.S. citizen
parent.44
41. See Herna´n Rozemberg, Citizenship Cases Complex, Trying, SAN ANTONIO EX-
PRESS NEWS, July 5, 2005, at 1B, 4B (illustrating how an applicant for acquisition of citizen-
ship spent a decade trying to prove his case to DHS).
42. Alcarez-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002); see also infra Part
II.B.
43. The ties of Mexico to the United States have a long and complicated history—
unlike other immigrant groups, Mexicans occupied territory that was annexed by the
United States. CAREY MCWILLIAMS, NORTH FROM MEXICO: THE SPANISH-SPEAKING PEO-
PLE OF THE UNITED STATES 207 (1968); SPENER, supra note 38, at 32–33.  Under every
category, Mexicans represent the largest of immigrant groups in the United States. 2010
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 5.  Mexicans are the dominant group
facing enforcement under immigration laws; more Mexicans than any other group are re-
moved from the United States. Id.  In FY 2010, 387,242 individuals were removed from
the United States and 282,003 (almost seventy-three percent) of them were Mexicans. Id.
at 94, 103.  In FY 2010, Mexicans accounted for eighty-three percent of the individuals
apprehended by DHS. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010, supra note 7, at 1.
And, more Mexicans than any other nationality are subject to removal proceedings in im-
migration court. 2010 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 5, at B2.
44. The application form, the N-600, is used by those individuals applying under INA
§ 301(c) and (g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) and (g), and INA § 309, 8 U.S.C. § 1409.  It is required
for applicants to list both their country of birth and their country of prior nationality on the
N-600 form. N-600, Application for Certificate of Citizenship, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS., available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/n-600.pdf (last updated Feb. 2, 2012).
However, currently DHS does not track statistics from filed N-600s, although new filing
procedures for N-600s were initiated in Oct. 2011 and the data from the N-600s, including
the applicant’s place of birth, will be recorded by DHS. See Email from Albert W. Blake-
way, CIS Field Office Dir., to Lee Tera´n, Clinical Professor of Law, St. Mary’s Univ. Sch.
of Law (Sept. 21, 2011) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority
Issues).  Although currently unsupported by statistical evidence, given that Mexican na-
tionality is identified as the overwhelming majority in most immigration statistics that are
currently being tracked, it is likely that Mexicans are the majority of acquired citizens in
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The modern migration of Mexicans to the United States began in the
late 1800s when U.S. employers sought Mexican labor as part of the de-
velopment of the southwest United States.45  Mexican workers were re-
cruited for the construction of railroads and in the mining industry, and
agricultural development in the southwest was largely dependent on
Mexican labor.46  During World War I, the need for Mexican labor inten-
sified, and workers continued to fill jobs in the agricultural and railroad
industries and also moved into industrial jobs in the urban centers of the
United States.47
The migration of Mexicans continued in earnest when revolution and
economic instability drove hundreds of thousands of Mexicans to the
United States.  Beginning in approximately 1910, over one million Mexi-
cans, ten percent of the population in that country, settled in the United
States where they found jobs in the growing industries of the Southwest.48
The Mexican migrants were encouraged and welcomed not only by em-
ployers but by religious groups.  The Catholic Church in particular op-
posed the anti-clericalism of the Mexican revolutionaries and favored
large scale Mexican immigration to strengthen and expand the church in
sparsely populated areas of the southwest.49
Not all Americans supported the Mexican migrants.  Hostility toward
Mexicans grew in concert with opposition to other immigrant groups in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  The nativist movement
grew from those who advocated for racial and ethnic purity. They favored
restrictions on new immigrant groups that the nativists considered infer-
ior to northern European Protestants and unwilling to assimilate to the
the United States. See supra note 43.  However, the N-600 form is also used by applicants
who are derivative citizens applying under INA §§ 320, 322, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1431, 1433. See
infra note 119.  The Child Citizenship Act of 2000 liberalized the requirements for ob-
taining derivative citizenship through a U.S. parent and has caused a substantial increase in
the number of children now eligible for derivative citizenship under INA §§ 320, 322.
Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1431–33 (2006)).
45. See MCWILLIAMS, supra note 43, at 168–73 (stating that early migrants were re-
cruited to work in areas such as railroad construction and cotton production); SPENER,
supra note 38, at 28–33, 37–38 (explaining how and why the South Texas border became a
vital migratory corridor between the United States and Mexico).
46. Richard D. Vogel, Stolen Birthright: The U.S. Conquest and Exploitation of the
Mexican People, HOUS. INST. FOR CULTURE, http://www.houstonculture.org/hispanic/con-
quest5.html (last visited Feb.18, 2012).
47. SPENER, supra note 38, at 38 (2009); Vogel, supra note 46.
48. LAWRENCE A. CARDOSO, MEXICAN EMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES
1897–1931: SOCIO-ECONOMIC PATTERNS 38 (1980); MCWILLIAMS, supra note 43, at 163.
49. CARDOSO, supra note 48, at 131.  Protestants also welcomed Mexican migrants, as
the missionaries saw the migration of Mexicans as an opportunity for additional converts.
Id.
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American culture.  Mexicans received the same treatment and criticism
that other minority and immigrant groups endured.50  In response to pub-
lic pressure to limit immigration, Congress acted to impose new restric-
tions.  In 1882 Congress targeted Asians with the enactment of the
virulently racist Chinese Exclusion Act.51  After several attempts to limit
the entry of illiterate migrants, Congress passed the Immigration Act of
1917 that imposed a head tax on immigrant workers and a literacy test to
exclude unskilled laborers from the United States.52  Then, to restrict im-
migration to ethnic and national levels of the nineteenth century, Con-
gress passed legislation to establish fixed immigration quotas which
favored immigration of Northern Europeans.53  In 1921, the first statute
was passed as a temporary legislation to prevent Europeans from flood-
ing the United States after World War I.54  A few years later Congress
adopted the Immigration Act of 1924, which set a quota of two percent
for each country of origin based on the census of 1890.55  The result was
the virtual elimination of unskilled laborers from Southern Europe and
Asia.56
Western Hemisphere immigrants, including Mexicans, were exempt
from the quota laws.57 Nativists continued to call for limits on Mexican
immigration, and each year from 1926 to 1930 they introduced legislation
in Congress to include Mexicans in the quota laws.58  But, their efforts
were largely unsuccessful due to the strong support of Mexican laborers
by employers and religious groups.  In fact, the restrictions on immigra-
50. See MCWILLIAMS, supra note 43, at 169–173 (recounting the discrimination
against and mistreatment of Mexican workers); FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND
RODRIGUEZ, DECADE OF BETRAYAL: MEXICAN REPATRIATION IN THE 1930S at 10–12
(2006) (discussing the negative treatment encountered by the Mexican immigrants).
51. See Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, 58–61 (excluding Chinese
immigrants). See also Act of Mar. 3 1875, ch. 140, 18 Stat. 477 (criminalizing the importa-
tion of Asians to the United States); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581,
582–83 (1889) (denying entry to a Chinese laborer who returned to the United States after
the passage of the Act of 1882); 2 GORDON, supra note 8, at § 17.02(2) (providing a legisla-
tive background on the Chinese Exclusion Acts).
52. CARDOSO, supra note 48, at 46; SPENER, supra note 38, at 38.
53. 3 GORDON, supra note 8, at § 31.01(1).
54. Pub. L. 67-6, ch.8, § 2, 42 Stat. 5 (1921) (often referred to as the Emergency Quota
Act, capping immigration at three percent of a nation’s population); 3 GORDON, supra note
8, at § 31.01(1); CARDOSO, supra note 48, at 83.
55. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, ch. 8, 43 Stat. 153; 3 GORDON, supra
note 8, at § 31.01(1).
56. CARDOSO, supra note 48, at 83; Jennifer Chacon, Unsecured Borders: Immigration
Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1836–37 (2007).
57. Chacon, supra note 56, at 1837.  However, Mexicans were targeted for enforce-
ment of other grounds of inadmissibility, such as the literacy and head taxes. Id. at 1837 n.
38.
58. CARDOSO, supra note 48, at 137.
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tion of Asian and Southern European workers depleted the supply of
workers and bolstered the need for Mexican labor.  Employers represent-
ing a range of interests, such as farming, ranching, mining, and tourism,
actively lobbied Congress to prevent inclusion of Mexicans within the
quota legislation and argued that the economy of the Southwest de-
pended on Mexican labor.59
The federal government sided with the employers and the religious or-
ganizations that supported the migrants from Mexico.60  In 1915, the U.S.
government determined Mexicans to be refugees and allowed thousands
to enter the United States without restrictions.61  Mexican workers were
exempt from the tax and literacy test restrictions issued by the 1917 Act
during World War I because employers argued that the labor shortages
would hurt the U.S. economy at a critical time.62  Despite public support
for nativist laws, the federal government sided with business interests
seeking to recruit more workers and stalled the enforcement of restric-
tions against Mexicans.63
Even though the 1924 Act prohibited the entry of individuals who were
more than fifty percent of indigenous blood, the government determined
that Mexicans were White in order to prevent the exclusion of Mexi-
cans.64  The Act of 1924 created the Border Patrol, but there were very
few officers and their assignments restricted them to enforcing customs
and prohibition laws.65  Immigration officials also permitted employers to
bring workers from Mexico illegally and when the Border Patrol encoun-
59. Id. at 126–27.  While U.S. businessmen favored Mexican migration, they were by
no means kind to Mexican workers.  See id. (quoting businessmen who denied wanting
Mexicans, but knew they needed them). To assuage the fears of nativist Americans, they
portrayed Mexicans as non-threatening and docile. Id. Employers stated that Mexicans
were apolitical, “content to live under the rule of American political bosses,” and were
physically suited to “withstand high temperatures and carry out stoop labor.” Id. at 125.
John Nance Garner, a Texas representative, stated that while Mexicans were inferior to
whites they were not a threat because of a genetic disposition to return to their home
country. Id.
60. Id. at 47.  The border during the 1920s was “fairly porous . . . [f]amilies often
walked across the border without stopping at the immigration office.” YOLANDA CHAVEZ
LEYVA, CHILDREN ON THE BORDER 1880–1930, at 3 (2001).
61. CARDOSO, supra note 48, at 44.
62. Id. at 47.  Also, it is reported that “for every Mexican who entered the United
States with proper documents during the 1920s, as many as five entered without them.”
SPENER, supra note 38, at 38.
63. CARDOSO, supra note 48, at 127–29.
64. Id. at 129.
65. Id. at 84; SPENER, supra note 38, at 39; Gloria Valencia-Weber & Antoinette
Sedillo Lopez, Stories in Mexico and the United States about the Border: The Rhetoric and
the Realities, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 241, 267–68 (2010).  In the early 20th
century “control at the Mexico-U.S. border was episodic and informal.” Id. at 267.
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tered Mexicans who entered the U.S. illegally, they were not deported if
an employer paid for the worker’s visa.66
By 1910, approximately 200,000 Mexicans resided in the United States,
double the number from ten years before, and there were over 100,000
children of Mexicans born in the United States.67  By 1930, the census
recorded 1,422,533 Mexicans living in the United States, most in rural
areas in the five Southwest states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Cali-
fornia and Colorado.68  But, the Depression and massive unemployment
caused a sharp change in federal and local policy toward Mexican
immigration.
B. Mass “Repatriations”
The exact number of Mexicans and their U.S.-born children who were
“repatriated” to Mexico during the Great Depression is not known.69
Some historians argue that as many as one million Mexicans and their
U.S. born children were repatriated to Mexico by 1935.70  Other scholars
have concluded that the number of repatriated Mexicans and Mexican-
Americans is around 415,000 individuals.71  The most conservative esti-
mate is that 355,000 individuals repatriated to Mexico of which about
66. CARDOSO, supra note 48, at 129.  The Commissioner for Immigration, Harry Hull
stated that because of the “heavy dependence on Mexican labor, the strict enforcement of
federal laws would only produce acute shortages of manpower and result in serious harm
to the local economy.” Id.
67. Id. at 35.  Most of the early immigrants throughout the 1920s were young males,
but later, women and children followed. Id. at 82. “[M]igration is in large part a social
process of network building, so it shouldn’t surprise anyone that immigrants are husbands
and wives, and sons and daughters . . . .”  Motomura, supra note 36, at 103 (internal cita-
tions omitted).
68. CARDOSO, supra note 48, at 91; MCWILLIAMS, supra note 43, at 163.
69. ROSENBLUM, supra note 38, at 8 & 8 n.29.  “Repatriation” is used to describe the
efforts to force Mexicans and their families from the United States during the Great De-
pression.  Johnson, supra note 14, at 4.  It is, as Dean Kevin Johnson states, not “entirely
accurate.  Federal, state, and local governments worked together to involuntarily remove
many U.S. citizens of Mexican ancestry.” Id.
70. ROSENBLUM, supra note 38, at 8 n.29.
71. ABRAHAM HOFFMAN, UNWANTED MEXICAN AMERICANS IN THE GREAT DEPRES-
SION: REPATRIATION PRESSURES 1929–1939, at 126 (1974) (using data from the Mexican
government sources, he places the total return to Mexico from 1929–1935 at in excess of
415,000); see also SPENER, supra note 38, at 39 (identifying that between half a million and
a million “Mexican immigrants and their U.S. citizen children were ‘repatriated’ to Mex-
ico”).  “With the deterioration of the United States economy after 1929, between 400,000
and 500,000 Mexicans and their American-born children returned to Mexico.  More than
half of these departed from Texas.”  Robert R. McKay, Mexican Americans and Repatria-
tion, TEX. STATE HISTORICAL ASS’N, http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/
pqmyk (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
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forty percent were U.S. citizen children.72  Some migrants and their fami-
lies returned to Mexico following a common pattern of circular migra-
tion.73  The Mexican government, which had long opposed the mass
exodus of young Mexicans to the United States, encouraged Mexican
families to return.74  Mexico established self-help groups and expanded
its consular offices in the United States to assist Mexican workers,75 and
during the Depression, these organizations provided aid to the migrants
to return to Mexico.76  However, without question, many of the Mexican
workers and their U.S. children were coerced to leave the United States
by the federal government, which sharply increased deportations of Mex-
icans during the 1930s,77 and by local authorities that rounded up Mexi-
cans and their families and forced them to leave the United States.78
72. See Brian Gratton & Emily Merchant, Mexican Repatriation: New Estimates of
Total and Excess Return in the 1930s, at 10, 16 (Population Assn. of Am. Draft Paper
2011), available at http://paa2011.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=110199 (not-
ing that Prof. Gratton and Prof. Merchant are critical of the methodology used in earlier
studies which resulted in higher estimates of repatriations and support their estimate on
data from the U.S. Census).
73. See HOFFMAN, supra note 71, at 33–38 (identifying that when the Depression hit,
Mexicans were often the first to lose their jobs and, unable to make a living, returned to
Mexico); Gratton & Merchant, supra note 72, at 16.
74. On the one hand, Mexico opposed the emigration of its workers to the United
States. CARDOSO, supra note 48, at 30, 55–57.  The Mexican government also recognized
the benefits the country enjoyed financially from Mexicans workers in the United States
and strongly opposed inclusion of Mexicans in the U.S. quota laws.  Id. at 139; POPULA-
TION ASS’N OF AM., MEXICAN REPATRIATION: NEW ESTIMATES OF TOTAL AND EXCESS
RETURN IN THE 1930S, at 5 (2011), available at http://paa2011.princeton.edu/
download.aspx?submissionId=110199.
75. CARDOSO, supra note 48, at 113–14.  The Mexican government promoted the es-
tablishment of organizations such as the Comisiones Honorificas (honorary commissions)
to assist Mexicans in the United States who were subject to discriminatory treatment, and
also expanded consular offices to accommodate the needs of Mexican workers. Id.
76. Id. at 148–49.  While publicly supporting the return of Mexicans to the homeland,
the Mexican economy was unprepared for an influx of families and “[p]rivately consuls
were admonished to do all in their power to keep as many workers in the United States as
possible.” Id. at 148.
77. CARDOSO, supra note 48, at 147–48; HOFFMAN, supra note 71, at 38–66 (focusing
on federal deportation campaign in Los Angeles); POPULATION ASS’N OF AM., supra note
74, at 8–9; McKay, supra note 71.  “Deportation raids were carried out in both urban and
rural areas.  The most intense activity was conducted near the Texas-Mexico border.”  Mc-
Kay, supra note 71.
78. See CARDOSO, supra note 48, at 147 (explaining how Mexicans taking advantage
of welfare were specifically targeted); LUZ MARI´A GORDILLO, MEXICAN WOMEN AND THE
OTHER SIDE OF IMMIGRATION: ENGENDERING TRANSNATIONAL TIES 93–94 (2010)
(describing repatriation of Mexicans from the Detroit area); HOFFMAN, supra note 71, at
83–90 (discussing the repatriation that took place in Los Angeles); MCWILLIAMS, supra
note 43, at 193 (recounting her memories of the repatriation of Mexicans in Los Angeles);
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Early twentieth century migration and mass deportations during the
Great Depression did not end the Mexican migration to the United
States.  Mexican migration patterns were repeated after the Depression,
through World War II, and up to the present with similar results.  Mi-
grants from Mexico responded to economic and labor needs in both
countries and settled in the United States.79  Relaxed U.S. policies toward
immigration, both authorized and unauthorized,80 contribute to the con-
tinued growth of Mexican migrants in the United States and another gen-
eration of U.S. citizen children.81  Political and economic changes in the
United States create greater restrictions and enforcement, and Mexican
immigrants are forced to return to Mexico, often accompanied by U.S.
citizen children.82  The proximity of Mexico to the United States, the size
see also Johnson, supra note 14, at 6–7 (referencing testimonies of U.S. citizens given in the
2003 hearings before the California Senate Select Committee on Citizen Participation).
79. Following the Depression, Mexican migrants again returned to the United States
to supply labor needs during and after World War II.  Vogel, supra note 46.  The Bracero
Program was instituted in 1942 and about five million Mexicans were recruited to work in
the United States. Id.  “Over time and with extensive movement back and forth, commu-
nities of origin and destination increasingly come to comprise transnational circuits—social
and geographic spaces that arise through the constant circulation of people, money, goods,
and information.”  Douglas Massey, et. al., Continuities in Transnational Migration: An
Analysis of Nineteen Mexican Communities, 99 AM. J. SOC. 1492, 1500 (1994) (internal
citations omitted).  Migration from Mexico begins with young males, then diversifies to
include women and children, and grows to form sizeable communities in the United States.
Id. at 1500–01.
80. Unauthorized migration went hand in hand with authorized braceros, and in the
1940s and 1950s, South Texas was home for hundreds of thousands of Mexican workers,
with the north corridor serving as a mode of transportation into the U.S. interior. SPENER,
supra note 38, at 40.  The Border Patrol continued to deport many migrants, but there was
also selective enforcement in support of the agricultural industry. Id. at 40–41.
81. It is estimated that there are presently 10.8 million unauthorized individuals in the
United States, of which sixty-two percent are Mexican. MICHAEL HOEFER ET. AL., OFFICE
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2010, at 1 (Feb.
2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2010.
pdf.  It is believed that thirty-nine percent of all illegal immigrants currently in the United
States entered after 2000. Id. Most unauthorized migrants are young and of child bearing
age. PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN BOOM: BIRTHS OVERTAKE IMMIGRA-
TION 2 (July 2011), available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/144.pdf.
82. The government launched other efforts following the repatriations of the 1930s
which resulted in mass deportations of Mexicans.  Johnson, supra note 14, at 1–2, 10.  “Op-
eration Wetback” was one such campaign that targeted hundreds of thousands of Mexicans
and forced their U.S.-born children to accompany them to Mexico. Id. at 10.  The INS
claimed to have removed over one million Mexicans during Operation Wetback; this is
more people than were removed during the entire Great Depression.  Vogel, supra note 46.
Some restraint in immigration enforcement was seen during the Civil Rights era in the
1960s and 1970s, but that has been replaced since the 1980s by new enforcement goals tied
to concerns over crime, and after September 11, 2001, over threats to national security.
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of the border region stretching from California to Texas, and the circular
migration of Mexicans and their children, whether voluntary or forced by
deportation or removal,83 has created a border society of mixed-status
families.84  On both sides of the U.S. and Mexico border reside families
with ties to U.S. citizenship law, and the ties continue within each new
generation.85
C. Immigration History
What happened to the Mexican migrants and their children has been
documented in recent accounts chronicling the hardships endured by the
Chacon, supra note 56, at 1838–40; Teresa Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigra-
tion Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 615 (2003).  This intense
increase in enforcement has driven many thousand Mexicans and their families to Mexico
from the 1990s to the present. Id. at 1840.  Notwithstanding, efforts to fortify the border
appear to have limited effect on migration of Mexicans: “[t]he circumstances that drive
their migration—lack of job opportunities with decent wages, benefits, and working condi-
tions and lack of adequate social welfare programs” maintain a continued movement
north. SPENER, supra note 38, at 19.  During the Clinton administration, concerted efforts
were made by the U.S. and Mexican authorities to seek cooperative approaches on migra-
tion.  ROSENBLUM, supra note 38, at 12.  “Presidents George W. Bush and Vicente Fox,
both bilingual border-state governors with business backgrounds” succeeded on building
the framework for an agreement that would have included legalization of unauthorized
migrants, a temporary worker program and border enforcement. Id. However, these co-
operative efforts were undermined by the attacks on September 11, 2001. Id.
83. The patterns of migration and of mass deportations of today remind some of
events during the Great Depression. Dianne Solis, Experts Compare Current Immigration
Situation to Deportation of Mexicans in 1930s, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 12, 2008,
2008 WLNR 19671568; see also KOHLI ET AL., supra note 3, at 2 (reviewing records under
Secure Community program indicates 39 percent of individuals identified for removal have
U.S. citizen children).
84. See Jennifer Chacon, Citizenship and Family: Revising Dred Scott, 27 WASH. U. J.
L. & POL’Y 45, 64 (2008) (“[M]illions of people in the United States live in mixed-status
families, in which one [or] more members of the family are undocumented noncitizens.”);
Victor Romero, The Child Citizenship Act and the Family Reunification Act: Valuing the
Citizen Child as Well as the Citizen Parent, 55 FLA. L. REV. 489, 504 (2003) (identifying
that reports show that one in ten families with children in the United States have mixed
immigration status).
85. “[I]ncreasing numbers of children are born while parents reside in a state other
than their own.  The world’s mix of jus sanguinas and jus soli rules quite often results in
children having multiple nationality at birth.”  David Martin, New Rules on Dual National-
ity for a Democratizing Globe: Between Rejection and Embrace, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 1, 5
(1999) (internal citations omitted).  The migration of Mexicans between Mexico and the
United States and the citizenship laws of both countries have led to multiple generations of
dual citizens, children born in the United States of Mexican parents, and the children born
in Mexico of U.S. parents.  See Spiro, supra note 15, at 1418–19 (discussing the role of
birthright citizenship as it pertains to dual nationality).
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families after the repatriations.86  There is little known about the immi-
gration history of the families who were subject to the repatriations dur-
ing the Depression.87  How many of the U.S. citizen children remained in
Mexico, the number who returned to the United States, and when they
returned to the United States has not been established.88  However, in
cases where a U.S. citizen sought to prove birth in the United States to
assist their children in proving acquired citizenship, we learn that U.S.
citizens eventually returned to the United States where they could work
to support their families.89  Some adopted the circular migration patterns
of their parents, traveling to the United States for work, and to Mexico to
visit family members.90  Many of the children born in the United States to
Mexican migrants and forced to accompany their deported parents main-
tained strong ties to Mexico which led many to form families there.91  It is
this next generation of children born in Mexico to the U.S.-born children
86. The repatriations affected the entire family, for the deportation of an undocu-
mented parent “results in the constructive deportation of citizen children” and presents
challenges for the whole family.  Chacon, supra note 84, at 65; see also BALDERRAMA &
RODRIGUEZ, supra note 50, at 267–71 (recounting the stories of families who were forced
to the leave the United States during the 1930s); ROSENBLUM, supra note 38, at 2
(“[M]igration enforcement disrupt emigrant employment, eliminating potential remittance
flows, and deportations often return migrants into the same saturated labor markets that
contributed to illegal outflows in the first place.”).
87. The repatriation of Mexicans has been at best “a footnote in most immigration
histories” and otherwise ignored in scholarship.  Johnson, supra note 14, at 4.
88. BALDERRAMA & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 50, at 265.
89. Ignacio Pina recalled when he and his family were forced to move to Mexico and
stated that he and his siblings, all U.S. citizens, were not allowed to take their birth certifi-
cates with them.  Wendy Koch, U.S. urged to apologize for 1930s deportation, USA TODAY,
Apr. 5, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-04-04-1930s-depor-
tees-cover_x.htm.  Mr. Pina endured sixteen years in Mexico until he was able to obtain his
birth certificate and return to the United States. Id.
90. Abraham Hoffman reports that many of the U.S.-born children could not find
employment in Mexico and as soon as they were old enough they returned to the United
States. HOFFMAN, supra note 71, at 148–50.  The migration and employment patterns and
the location of family of the U.S. children were like many transnational migrants based on
a number of factors, including the “complex connections to two different and at times
contradictory cultural, social, and geopolitical sites.” GORDILLO, supra note 78, at 126.
91. Stevens, supra note 8, at 641.  Professors Valencia-Weber and Sedillo Lopez aptly
refer to those who live at or near the Mexico–U.S. border as “cross border people.”  Valen-
cia-Weber & Lopez, supra note 65, at 288–89.  Many residents from the border region of
the United States and Mexico are often dual citizens of Mexico and the United States. See
supra note 15.  The loyalties of U.S. citizens of Mexican descent to the “old country” are
common. Martin, supra note 85, at 9.  “[P]angs of regret or wonder, emotional ties to the
old country, and especially continuing relations with family still residing there make it im-
possible to accomplish a full and complete break.” Id.
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of Mexican migrants repatriated during the Great Depression who lay
claim to acquired U.S. citizenship.92
1. Birth and Citizenship
We know that U.S. citizens who resided in Mexico struggled to prove
their U.S. citizenship and their children’s citizenship as they returned to
the United States.  They faced a variety of obstacles including lack of
documents, conflicting evidence of birth, and denationalization.93
Consider the case of J.Z.94  He was born in 1928 in a barn near Big
Spring, Texas, where his Mexican-citizen parents were working in cotton
fields, and J.Z. later sought to establish the acquired citizenship of his
four children.  He did not obtain a Texas birth certificate until 1986.  His
father, however, had registered him in Mexico in 1939 and that hand writ-
ten registration recorded J.Z. as having been born in “Viges Prin, Texas,”
a misspelled, albeit phonetic version of “Big Spring, Texas.”  The children
of Mexican migrants residing in the United States were often born at
home and attended by a mid-wife or family members rather than a physi-
cian.  The birth may not have been immediately registered with the local
authorities and evidence of the birth may consist of incomplete, or in
some cases, conflicting records.95  Some parents registered their U.S.-citi-
zen child’s birth in Mexico, but unlike J.Z.’s registration, the record states
that the birth occurred in Mexico.  The motivations for registering a U.S.-
citizen child as having been born in Mexico are varied.  This practice may
92. Accounts that illustrate the U.S.-citizen parent’s background and efforts to estab-
lish citizenship for their children are found in In re Navarrette and In re Yanez-Carrillo. In
re Navarrette, 12 I&N Dec. 138 (B.I.A. 1967); In re Yanez-Carrillo, 10 I&N Dec. 366
(B.I.A. 1963).  In Alcarez-Garcia v. Ashcroft, the petitioner’s father was born in the United
States in 1920.  Alcarez-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002).
In 1943, Petitioner’s father obtained employment on a farm in Texas.  Petitioner’s fa-
ther worked on the same farm in the United States from 1943 [to] 1952, generally
living [nine] months . . . each of these years in Texas and spending the remaining
[three] months with his family in Mexico.  The only exception occurred in 1947, when
he spent more time in Mexico than in Texas during to a bad crop season.  His wife
lived with his parents in Mexico until approximately 1948 or 1949 . . . .
Id. at 1156.
93. BALDERRAMA & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 50, at 274–75.
94. This case was handled by the St. Mary’s Immigration & Human Rights Clinic and
is on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues.
95. Home birth is common and yet causes problems for populations “outside the ur-
ban style of childbirthing and government documentation.” See Gloria Valencia Weber &
Antonia Sedillo Lopez, supra note 65, 296–97 (addressing the challenges of the Tohono
O’odham tribes that reside in Mexico and the U.S. and the customs of home birth); Jacque-
line Bhabha, Arendt’s Children: Do Today’s Migrant Children Have a Right to Have
Rights?, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 410, 412 (2009) (reporting that the forty percent of births world-
wide are unregistered births, resulting in millions of children without a legal identity).
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be explained as an effort to obtain some form of identification for the
U.S.-born child or to facilitate enrolling the child in a Mexican school.96
Nevertheless, it presents a serious impediment to proving U.S.
citizenship.
The children of Mexican migrants who were born at home frequently
have birth certificates signed by midwives.97  The State of Texas, for in-
stance, issues birth certificates based on attestations of mid-wives and
other witnesses other than hospital staff and physicians.98  U.S.-born chil-
dren whose birth was never recorded may carry delayed certificates of
birth obtained sometimes many years after their birth when they returned
to the United States as adults.  Texas also provides for registration of
births at any time after the event.99  The issuance of a delayed certificate
is based on a broad range of evidence supporting the Texas birth includ-
ing baptismal certificates, school records, and affidavits from family
members.100
96. See LISA S. BRODYAGA, MIDWIFE BIRTHS, DELAYED BIRTH CERTIFICATES, AND
FEDERAL COURT REMEDIES FOR REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE ONE’S UNITED STATES CITI-
ZENSHIP (2011) (providing a discussion about the varying motivations for registering a
child’s birth in Mexico, even though the birth technically occurred in the United States).
In a series of emails with Lisa S. Brodyaga, she states that the practice of dual registration
has subsided since the Mexican government introduced procedures for recognizing a U.S.-
child’s Mexican citizenship.  Email from Lisa S. Brodyaga, Att’y, to Lee Tera´n, Clinical
Professor of Law, St. Mary’s Univ. Sch. of Law (Sept. 11, 2011) (on file with The Scholar:
St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues).
97. See Miriam Jordan, They Say They Were Born in the USA.  The State Department
Says Prove It, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12184205853302
8907.html (stating that midwives were forging birth certificates for children born in Mex-
ico, which has caused the U.S. government to require additional proof for citizenship
purposes).
98. The Texas statutes require each child in the state to be registered. TEX. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 192.001 (West 2010).  Birth certificates should be filed with the
local registrar in the district where the birth occurred by a physician, midwife or “person
acting as a midwife in attendance at a birth.” Id. at § 192.003(a).  The statute also provides
for obtaining a birth certificate in the absence of a record by the previously mentioned
people and when the birth is not in a hospital or birthing center. Id. at § 192.003(c).  In
such cases, a birth certificate may be obtained from the local registrar at the request of the
child’s parent or the owner/householder of the place where the birth occurred. Id.  Blank
birth certificate forms may even be handed out to midwives, people acting as midwives,
and other individuals in reasonable amounts, although these blank forms are closely
guarded.  TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 181.26 (i) (West 2010).  Additionally, the specific
proof required to register a non-institutional birth certificate includes “(1) proof of preg-
nancy; (2) proof that there was an infant born alive; (3) proof that the birth occurred in the
registration district; and (4) proof that the infant’s birth occurred on the date stated.” Id.
§ 181.26(c).
99. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 192.021 et. seq.
100. See Delayed Certificate of Birth Registration, TEX. DEP’T OF STATE HEALTH
SERV., http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/vs/delayed/default.shtm (last updated Jan. 2, 2012) (list-
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It is evident that some of the U.S.-born children of Mexican migrants
cannot prove their U.S. citizenship.  They lack evidence that they were
born in the United States or the documents they have conflict with other
evidence; most notably Mexican birth records, which U.S. federal author-
ities argue establishes birth in Mexico and not the United States.101  Fur-
thermore, some actions taken by U.S. citizens while residing in Mexico
can result in their loss of citizenship.  U.S. law has established denational-
ization for such acts as desertion form the military,102 draft evasion,103
and voting in foreign elections.104  In Perez v. Brownell,105 the Supreme
Court ruled that a man born in Texas to Mexican parents who moved to
Mexico shortly after his birth lost his citizenship when he voted in a Mexi-
can election.106  While these provisions were subsequently held unconsti-
ing suggested types of supporting documentation for obtaining delayed birth certificates
which includes: the birth certificate(s) of any adult children, school enrollment record or
transcript, a military discharge record (DD214), marriage or divorce records, a Social Se-
curity application, an original baptismal certificate, a selective service record, any hospital
records, an application for a driver’s license, an application for a state-issued identification
card, and/or an affidavit of birth facts signed by either a parent, grandparent, or older
sibling).  Each document submitted needs to be at least five years old and be an original or
certified copy. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 192.024.
101. See Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 107, 108 (5th Cir. 2009) (concerning a case where a
mother had registered her children’s births in Mexico, but later claimed they were actually
born in the United States); De Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 18 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 1994)
(illustrating that an uncertified California birth certificate and witness testimony was con-
tradicted by a certified Mexican birth record); BRODYAGA, supra note 96, at 3 (regarding
the practice of registering a child’s birth in both the United States and Mexico). See also In
re Cantu, 17 I&N Dec. 190, 191 (B.I.A. 1978) (ruling in favor of a claimant who was born in
an area known as the “Horcan Tract” on the border between Texas and Mexico).  The
“Horcan Tract” parcel was created in 1906 when a private company unlawfully changed the
course of the Rio Grande River and Mexico assumed control of the land. Id.  In 1972 the
United States ceded this tract to Mexico in a treaty, but the Board ruled that the respon-
dent who was born on the Horcan Tract in 1935 was, in fact, a U.S. citizen. Id. at 191, 198;
see also MCWILLIAMS, supra note 43, at 60–61 (stating that “[w]hile the border was at least
visible along the Rio Grande, it was by no means permanent.  For the river has constantly
changed its channel; islands formerly in Mexico have passed over to the American side;
and new islands have been formed”).
102. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, ch. 876, § 401(g), 54 Stat. 1137, 1169.
103. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA),  ch. 3, § 349(a)(10), 66 Stat. 163,
268.
104. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401(e).
105. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
106. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 62 (1958).  In a sharply divided opinion, the Court
upheld the authority of Congress, under its power to deal with foreign affairs, to strip U.S.
citizens of their status when engaging in political activities in other countries. Id.
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tutional,107 an undetermined number of U.S. citizens and their children
born abroad were affected.108
2. Accounts of Presence or Residence
What is also known from the U.S.-citizen children raised in Mexico af-
ter their parents were deported is that the children received little educa-
tion or professional training in Mexico or the United States.109  Thus,
many U.S.-citizen children of Mexican migrants followed in their parents’
footsteps once they reached adulthood and returned to the United States
to work in unskilled labor common to migrants—farm and ranch labor,
domestic work, construction projects, and hotel and restaurant work.
In the case of B.V. who applied to assert his acquired citizenship, his
U.S.-citizen father began working in the United States when he was a
teenager, and he worked continuously in the United States until his death
at age of fifty-six.  In the case of S.R. who also claimed acquired citizen-
ship, his U.S.-citizen father worked throughout the United States in farm
and ranch labor from the age of seventeen until he retired.  However, the
social security earnings records for both fathers did not fully reflect their
earnings from farm and ranch employers who did not deduct social secur-
ity payments.  Consequently, their earnings reports for key years before
their sons’ births show little or no income making it difficult to establish
the presence required to transmit citizenship.
U.S.-citizen women who were present in the United States often have
less documentation than male U.S. citizens.  P.H. and C.J. sought to as-
sert acquired U.S. citizenship through their U.S.-citizen mothers who had
not attended school in the United States and worked only in housekeep-
ing and farm labor that provided no earnings record.
107. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267 (1967); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 163 (1963).
108. Children born abroad after the expatriation of a U.S. parent do not acquire U.S.
citizenship. In re M., 6 I&N Dec. 70, 72 (B.I.A. 1953).  However, if the parent’s loss of
citizenship preceded Afroyim, it can be argued the parent was a U.S. citizen at the time the
children were born abroad. LEVY, supra note 16, at § 4:10.  These cases continue to sur-
face. See Email from Barbara Hines, Clinical Professor of Law, Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law,
to Lee Tera´n, Clinical Professor of Law, St. Mary’s Univ. Sch. of Law (Aug. 29, 2011) (on
file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues) (regarding her case of a
child born in Mexico to a U.S.-citizen father subsequent to the father’s order of expatria-
tion which was based on draft evasion).
109. See BALDERRAMA & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 50, at 21–22 (identifying that U.S.
born children were deprived of an education in Mexico and the United States); LEYVA,
supra note 60, at 14–19 (stating that Mexican-American children in the United States suf-
fered under school segregation policies and Mexico lacked the resources to provide public
education to all children).
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The U.S. citizens report that they worked hard and steadily in the
United States to support growing families left behind in Mexico, and their
family members, employers, and other migrant co-workers provide de-
tails of long ago regarding the U.S. citizen’s presence in the United
States.  But, the continuity of their presence in the United States was fre-
quently interrupted by trips to Mexico to visit family and due to the na-
ture of their employment the documentation of their presence is
scattered and incomplete.
III. SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP
A. Constitutional and Statutory Basis for U.S. Citizenship
Citizenship is defined as the full membership in a given state, which
guarantees all the rights, entitlements, and protections offered by the
state.110 The benefits of U.S. citizenship—stability, mobility, political
rights, employment, education, and importantly, a defense from deporta-
tion—are fundamental, viewed as “one of the most valuable rights in the
world today.”111
The United States provides two means of obtaining citizenship—by
statute and under the Constitution112—but in spite of the importance
given to citizenship, it is surprising that the U.S. Constitution, when
adopted, did not define citizenship and made only oblique references to
the term.113  The Naturalization Clause in Article I, Section 8, Clause 4
gives Congress authority to set terms for obtaining citizenship by stat-
ute.114  A complete framework for U.S. citizenship was not established in
the Constitution until after the Civil War when the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, enacted in response to the pre-Civil War case, Dred Scott v. San-
ford,115 established that “all persons born or naturalized in the United
110. IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, supra note 4, at 2.
111. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 160; see Perez, 356 U.S. at 64 (Warren, C.J., dissenting)
(stating “[c]itizenship is man’s basic right for it is nothing less than the right to have rights.
Remove this priceless possession and their remains a stateless person . . .”).
112. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 828–29 (1971); LEVY, supra note 16, at § 2:1; Ann
K. Wooster, Validity, Construction, and Application of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1401(c)-(g), Providing
for American Citizenship in Certain Circumstances of Child Born Outside United States, or
Found Within United States and of Unknown Parentage, and Predecessor Statutes, 175
A.L.R. FED. 67, *2a (2002).
113. IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, supra note 4, at 9.
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see Rogers, 401 U.S. at 828–29.  The U.S. Constitu-
tion stipulates that the President of the United States be a “natural born Citizen,” and
guarantees that “[c]itizens of each state shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States.” U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl .5, art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
115. 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (holding that African-American slaves are not citizens of the
United States).
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States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” were citizens of the United
States.116
Congress has developed a complex set of rules and procedures for as-
serting and maintaining U.S. citizenship by birth, adopting the two princi-
ples of jus solis and jus sanguinas,117 and U.S. citizenship by
naturalization.118  This Article focuses on individuals who claim citizen-
ship by birth under jus sanguinas and the barriers they face in asserting
their clams.119  The statutes enacted by Congress for transmission of citi-
zenship from a U.S. citizen parent to a child are particularly elaborate
and require a comprehensive knowledge of all forms of U.S. citizenship
law.  First, transmission occurs only if the parent is a U.S. citizen so the
rules for obtaining U.S. citizenship by birth or naturalization apply.120
Second, Congress has enacted many statutes providing for the terms for
acquisition of citizenship, and some provisions are determined to be ret-
roactive and others are not.121  At one time, children born outside the
United States could only acquire U.S. citizenship at birth from a U.S.-
citizen father;122 and in 1940, Congress amended the statute to permit the
116. Rogers, 401 U.S. at 827.
117. Motomura, supra note 36, at 107–08.
118. Citizenship Through Naturalization, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://
www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (select “Citizenship Through Naturalization”) (last updated
June 3, 2011) (explaining the process of naturalization and how to apply).
119. There is a similar set of rules governing derivative citizenship that also benefit
the children of U.S. citizens, but these provisions transmit citizenship after birth and are
more appropriately tied to citizenship by naturalization, rather than by birth.  INA §§ 320,
322, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1431, 1433 (2006).  Congress amended the derivative citizenship statutes in
the Child Citizenship Act of 2000 in what is considered the “most radical amendment to
derivative citizenship since the provision was introduced in 1790.”  Daniel Levy, The Child
Citizenship Act of 2000, 6 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 293 (2001).  A child, including those
adopted, automatically derives citizenship when (1) at least one parent is a citizen of the
United States, (2) the child is under the age of 18, and (3) the child is a legal resident and in
the custody of the U.S. citizen parent. INA § 320, 8 U.S.C. § 1431.  The benefits of deriva-
tive citizenship also apply to a child residing outside the United States. INA § 322, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1433.  In this Article I focus my discussion and examples on citizenship acquired at birth.
Notwithstanding, derivative citizenship is an important form of citizenship and a significant
benefit to children.  Increasingly, when the government ignores evidence of citizenship,
derivative citizens also find themselves caught in removal proceedings. See, e.g., Millie
Lapidario, Pro Bono Attorneys Fight for Client Trapped in Immigration Black Hole, THE
RECORDER, July 19, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1184749597071 (describing
removal case of Yuttasak Simma, a claimant of derivative citizenship from his naturalized
mother); infra Part V.C.
120. INA § 320, 8 U.S.C. § 1431 (stating definitively that one parent must be a U.S.
citizen, whether by birth or by naturalization).
121. LEVY, supra note 16, at § 4:18.  There have been four different statutes enacted
between 1790 and 1934 that governed the acquisition of citizenship to persons born abroad.
Id.
122. Id.
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out of wedlock children of U.S. citizen mothers to acquire citizenship.123
There are different statutory requirements for transmitting citizenship to
children born to two U.S. citizens,124 children born to one U. S.-citizen
parent and one non-citizen parent,125 and children born out of wed-
lock,126 and requirements that the U.S. parent has established some ties
to the United States before the birth of the child.  For some time, the law
also imposed retention requirements on children born abroad to a U.S.-
citizen parent and a non-citizen parent, and the child was required to re-
side in the United States for a specified time in order to maintain or re-
tain citizenship.127
The cases concerning transmitted citizenship are legally challenging
and involve complicated factual determinations with evidentiary
problems, as are illustrated in the examples cited in Part III below.  Ques-
tions concerning the power of Congress over U.S. citizenship, a long de-
bate by an often divided Supreme Court, add to the complexity of
identifying and presenting these cases.128  The issues raised in the various
court decisions concern the extent to which Congress can dominate in
setting the terms and conditions by which citizenship is acquired, but
more importantly here, the authority over the procedures for asserting
and reviewing decisions relating to citizenship.
1. Statutory Provisions for Acquisition of Citizenship at Birth
In 1790, the first U.S. Congress passed a statute that transmitted citi-
zenship to a child born abroad to a U.S.-citizen father, but not a U.S.-
citizen mother, who had resided in the United States before the child’s
birth.129  The gender restriction was eliminated in 1934 to allow children
123. Id. § 4:20.  In 1994, Congress enacted a statute which provides citizenship retro-
actively to the children who were born abroad prior to 1934 to U.S. citizen mothers. Id.
§ 4:18.
124. INA § 301(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (2006).
125. INA § 301(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g).
126. INA § 309, 8 U.S.C. § 1409; Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 58–59 (2001).
127. LEVY, supra note 16, at § 4:13.  Congress gradually relaxed the conditions subse-
quent for acquisition of citizenship, and in 1978 repealed all retention requirements. See
infra notes 147-150.
128. See Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 826–27 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (Court
divided on whether Congress can “enact a law stripping an American of his citizenship”);
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268–69 (1967) (disagreed as to whether a person loses
citizenship if he or she has voted in a foreign political election); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S.
44, 62–63 (1958) (split on the issue of loss of citizenship and the power of Congress to set
terms by which a citizen’s status is relinquished); see also IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP,
supra note 4, at 270 (showing a divided Supreme Court as to whether a person can be
voluntary deprived of citizenship).
129. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (1795).  The statute defined the
terms for naturalization of some aliens and further provided that “the children of citizens
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born abroad to U.S.-citizen mothers to also acquire U.S. citizenship at
birth.130  The 1994 Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections
Act (INTCA) retroactively granted citizenship to the children born
abroad prior to 1934 to U.S.-citizen mothers.131
Each statute enacted since 1790 requires that the child be the natural
child of the U.S. parent132 and that the parent have some connection to
the United States prior to the birth of the child.133  A child born abroad
to two U.S. parents acquires citizenship when at least one parent resided
in the U.S. prior to the birth of the child.134  There is no minimum period
for which one of the U.S. parents must have been present.135
Until 1940, the child born abroad to one U.S. parent and one non-citi-
zen parent also acquired citizenship as long as the U.S. parent had re-
sided in the United States.136  The Act of 1940 dramatically changed the
requirements for acquisition of citizenship,137 and the new law estab-
lished a more stringent requirement for residence in the United States for
of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States,
shall be considered as natural born citizens: [p]rovided, [t]hat the right of citizenship shall
not descend to [a] person whose fathers have never been resident in the United
States. . . . ” Id.; LEVY, supra note 16, at § 4:1.
130. Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-250, § 1993, 48 Stat. 797.
131. Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-416,
108 Stat. 4305 (codified at INA § 301(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(h) (2006)).
132. The State Department emphasizes the importance of actual blood ties, for “being
born in wedlock is not sufficient to establish U.S. citizenship through a U.S. citizen father.”
LEVY, supra note 16, at § 4:4.
133. Congress set terms for transmission, including rules for presence or residence of
the U.S. parent, so that the child would likely have some tie to the United States.  Weedin
v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 666–67 (1927).
134. Act of May 24, 1934, § 1993.  The statute as written stated that:
Any child hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose
father or mother or both at the time of birth of such child is a citizen of the United
States, is declared to be a citizen of the United States; but the rights of citizenship shall
not descend to any such child unless the citizen father or citizen mother, as the case
may be, has resided in the United States previous to the birth of such child.
Id.
135. Id.  Any form of physical presence, other than a brief presence while in transit to
another country, meets the definition of “residence.” LEVY, supra note 16, at §  4:29.  The
Immigration Act of 1940 defined the term “residence” as “the place of general abode.”
Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, ch. 876, § 10454 Stat. 1137, 1169.  The statute
now provides that “the place of general abode of a person means his principal, actual
dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent.”  INA § 101(a)(33),  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(33)
(2006); accord Interpretation § 301.1 United States Citizenship, USCIS.GOV, http://
www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-45104/0-0-0-45113.html (last
visited Feb. 18, 2012).
136. LEVY, supra note 16, at § 4:29.
137. Nationality Act of 1940, § 201(g).
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the transmitting parent.138  He or she had to have resided in the United
States for at least ten years prior to the birth of the child of which five of
those years were after the parent attained sixteen years of age.139  The
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 liberalized the prior parental
connection in cases of children of mixed-citizenship parents to ten years
physical presence, five of which were after the parent reached the of age
of fourteen.140
The current statute, effective November 14, 1986, provides that a child
born abroad acquires U.S. citizenship at birth if one parent is a U.S. citi-
zen and the other is a non-citizen and the citizen parent was, prior to the
birth of the child, physically present in the United States for five years,
two which were after the age of fourteen.141
The statute also provides for acquisition of citizenship to children who
are born out of wedlock.142 The child born to an unmarried U.S.-citizen
mother acquires citizenship if the mother was physically present in the
United States for at least one continuous year.143  The acquisition of citi-
zenship to a child born out of wedlock to a U.S.-citizen father is governed
by a different set of standards.144  The child who is born out of wedlock to
a U.S.-citizen father must establish that there is a blood relationship be-
tween the father and child, and that prior to the child’s eighteenth birth-
day, the father agreed in writing to support the child, and the child’s
legitimacy or paternity was established.145  However, even when the fa-
ther meets the paternity requirements in INA Section 309, he still must
establish the prior presence requirements set in INA Section 301(g).146
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Compare Id., with Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No.
82–414, § 301(a)(7), 66 Stat. 163.
141. INA § 301(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2000).
142. INA § 309, 8 U.S.C. § 1409.
143. INA § 309(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c); see supra note 19.
144. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 53 (2001) (upholding the requirements for
transmission of citizenship to children born out of wedlock to U.S. fathers as not violating
the equal protection clause).
145. INA § 309(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1994); see supra note 19.  The Supreme Court
ruled that the standards for legitimization required by the U.S. father are non-discrimina-
tory. Tuan Anh Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73; M. Isabel Medina, Real Differences and Stereo-
types-Two Visions of Gender, Citizenship, and International Law, 7 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 315,
337 (2004).
146. INA § 309, 8 U.S.C. § 1409; INA § 301(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g); United States v.
Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 564 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011)
(per curiam).
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In the Act of May 24, 1934, Congress imposed a retention requirement
on the children born to one U.S. parent and one non-citizen parent.147
The law set a condition subsequent for acquisition of citizenship in that
the child was required to reside continuously in the United States for five
years and take an oath of allegiance to the United States.148  In successive
statutes the requirements were liberalized.149  Then in 1978, Congress re-
pealed the retention requirements and in 1994, Congress enacted a law
that restored citizenship to those individuals who lost status after failing
to meet prior retention requirements.150
2. Constitutional Foundation
Acquired citizenship is by nature statutory and based upon congres-
sional power to establish a “uniform Rule of Naturalization.”151  Con-
gress sets conditions, both precedent and subsequent, for the transmission
of citizenship from the parent to the child born outside the United States.
Because Congress exercises control over this area of law, federal courts
have limited authority to determine the acquisition of citizenship “on a
basis other than that prescribed by Congress.”152  The plenary power doc-
trine, a tradition which began in the Chinese Exclusion Case,153 estab-
lished congressional domination in the area of the admission and
deportation of non-citizens.154  However, the Court has also extended the
147. Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-250, 48 Stat. 797.  The Act of March 2, 1907
(Pub. L. No. 59-194, § 6, 34 stat 1229) imposed a requirement that at age eighteen the child
“record at the American consulate their intention to become residents and remain citizens
of the United States . . . .”  Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 824 (1971).  However, non-
compliance resulted in loss of diplomatic protection and not a loss of citizenship. Id.
148. Rogers, 401 U.S. at 816.
149. Statutes enacted in 1940, 1952, and 1972 gradually eased the retention require-
ments. LEVY, supra note 16, at § 4:3.
150. INA § 324, 8 U.S.C. § 1435 (2006).  Immigration and Naturalization Technical
Corrections of 1994, Pub. L. 103-416, § 103(a), 108 Stat. 4305; Alexander v. INS, 74 F.3d
367, 370 (1st Cir. 1996); LEVY, supra note 16, at § 4:3.
151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
152. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73(2001).
153. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the
government of the United States as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the
constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the govern-
ment; the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on
behalf of any one.
Id.
154. Chae Chan Ping, Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 653–54 (1892)
and Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729–31 (1893), represent a “trio of cases
infected by more than a little racism” that laid the foundation for the plenary power doc-
trine.  Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control and Punishment: Some Thoughts
About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1899 (2000); accord
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plenary power doctrine to limit application of Constitutional guarantees
to questions of statutory citizenship.155  In Weedin v. Chin Bow,156 the
Supreme Court ruled that the ability of a child who is born abroad to
claim acquired citizenship is determined solely by reference to the federal
statute.157
In contrast, Congress lacks the same power to regulate terms and con-
ditions for citizenship as defined under the Fourteenth Amendment.158
The distinction between constitutional and statutory forms of citizenship
was the subject of the 1971 Supreme Court case Rogers v. Bellei.159
There, the Court decided the scope of constitutional protections afforded
to individuals with a claim to acquisition of U.S. citizenship by descent.
In Bellei, the Court determined whether the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended to include individuals who acquire citizenship
through a parent within the parameters of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.160  The Court also addressed the extent that the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause limited congressional powers to establish conditions
subsequent to the birth of the child, in particular the retention
requirements.161
The statute in effect at the time of Mr. Bellei’s birth provided that a
child born abroad to one U.S. citizen and one non-citizen parent lost citi-
zenship unless the child accumulated five years of physical presence in
the United States between the ages of fourteen and twenty-eight.162  Mr.
Bellei failed to meet the requirement, and argued that a child who ac-
quired citizenship through one parent is—like a child born in the United
States—a U.S. citizen at birth, and enjoys the protections of the Four-
teenth Amendment.163  Thus, Bellei maintained that he could not be
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210–11 (1953); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 595–96 (1952); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 97–98 (1903).
155. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (holding that Congress retains “broad
power over immigration and naturalization”); United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 474
(1917) (stating “[c]ourts are without authority to sanction changes or modifications” of
legislative actions in the area of naturalization); see also Derek Ludwin, Can Courts Confer
Citizenship?  Plenary Power and Equal Protection, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1376, 1382 (1999)
(illustrating Congress’s “plenary power over the naturalization process”).
156. 274 U.S. 657 (1927).
157. Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 659 (1927).
158. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 653–55 (1898).
159. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
160. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 816 (1971).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 816 n.1.
163. Id. at 820.
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stripped of his already acquired citizenship by failing to meet the condi-
tion subsequent retention requirements.164
The Court ruled that Mr. Bellei’s failure to comply with the statute was
not an unconstitutional loss of citizenship since Congress properly exer-
cised its authority to impose a condition subsequent to acquisition of citi-
zenship and retained the power to deny citizenship once bestowed.165
The Court distinguished between the native born and naturalized citizens,
and the child born abroad to a U.S.-citizen parent.166  The Fourteenth
Amendment describes persons “born or naturalized in the United
States.”167  The Court found that Mr. Bellei’s birth abroad did not entitle
him to protection from the Fourteenth Amendment and his claim “thus
must center in the statutory power of Congress and in the appropriate
exercise of that power.”168  The Court then addressed application of Fifth
Amendment.  Applying a standard as to whether the retention require-
ments were “unreasonable, arbitrary, or unlawful,” the Court ruled that
Congress did not exceed its authority as a matter of due process.  The
retention requirements were considered reasonable in that they pro-
moted attachment of the child to the United States.169
164. Id. at 826–27.
165. Rogers, 401 U.S. at 827.
166. Id. at 830.
167. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
168. Rogers, 401 U.S. at 828 (1971); accord Medina, supra note 145, at 330–31.
169. Rogers, 401 U.S. at 831–32.  Congress, the Court said, “has an appropriate con-
cern with problems attendant on dual nationality.” Id. at 831.  The Bellei case was decided
in the midst of a series of cases in which the Supreme Court struggled with the extent of
congressional power over questions of loss of citizenship.  Spiro, supra note 15, at 1415.
Congress’ hostility to dual nationality led to legislation that established grounds for loss of
citizenship.  Id. In Perez v. Brownell, the Court upheld a statute providing for the loss of
citizenship to a U.S. citizen who voted in a foreign election.  Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S 44,
62 (1958).  Then, in Trop v. Dulles, the Court ruled against a statute that denationalized
citizens who deserted the armed forces during a time of war.  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958).  Finally, in Afroyim v. Rusk, the Court overruled the Perez decision and found
that a citizen who voted in a foreign election did not lose citizenship “unless he voluntarily
relinquishes it.”  Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 262 (1967).  In the dissenting opinion in
Rogers, Justice Black considered the majority decision to have overruled Afroyim, but in
Vance v. Terrazas, the Court reaffirmed Afroyim and held that “expatriation depends upon
the will of the citizen rather than on the will of Congress and its assessment of his con-
duct.”  T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1471,
1471 (1986) (citing Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 260 (1980)).  While the Court often
used the term “expatriation” in these cases, the proper term for statutory loss of citizenship
is “denationalization.” See Gary Endelman, Renunciation of U.S. Citizenship: An Update,
IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS, July, 1996, at 4.  Expatriation is a voluntary renunciation of citi-
zenship. Id.
Concerns with dual nationality persist.  In a 2011 revision to personnel regulations, the
U.S. Army announced that dual citizens were no longer eligible to enlist into jobs that
required security clearances unless they already held such clearances.  Margaret Stock,
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In his dissent Justice Black argued that it was unacceptable that “the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the citizenship of some Americans and
not others”170 and rejected the “concept of a hierarchy of citizenship.”171
To Black, Bellei conferred “second-class citizenship, subject to revocation
at will of Congress” on individuals who were born abroad and whose citi-
zenship is based on transmission from a U.S. parent.172
Following Bellei, Congress repealed the retention requirements alto-
gether.173  The extent to which Congress retains unrestrained power in
the citizenship arena is subject to debate.  The plenary power doctrine has
received broad and sustained criticism,174 and the Court has at times
moderated application of the principle.175  Most recently, in Nguyen v.
U.S. Army Bars Dual U.S. Citizens From Most Jobs, IMMIGR. EDGE (Oct. 26, 2011), availa-
ble at http://www.immigrationedge.com/2011/10/26/us-army-bars-dual-us-citizens-from-
most-jobs/.  Interestingly, this policy permits other countries to have a say in who can serve
within the U.S. Armed forces, because dual-citizenship is determined by the laws of the
other country, and not all allow for their citizens to expatriate. Id.  This rule could poten-
tially bar millions of individuals from serving in the military. Id.
170. Rogers, 401 U.S. at 839.
171. Id.
172. Id.  Justice Black argued that the Fourteenth Amendment compels protection to
a child who acquires citizenship at birth and relied on United States v. Wong Kim Ark. Id.
There the Court held, with regard to a child born in the United States of non-citizen par-
ents, that the Fourteenth Amendment “contemplates two sources of citizenship and two
only, birth and naturalization.”  United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 649 (1898).
173. The Court in Rogers v. Bellei anticipated the liberal trend in Congress regarding
acquired citizenship statutes. Rogers, 401 U.S. at 826.  “[I]t may be said fairly that, for the
most part, each successive statute, as applied to a foreign-born child of one United States
citizen parent, moved in a direction of leniency for the child.” Id. The trend continued
beyond repeal of the retention provisions.  In 1986 Congress amended the statute to ease
the requirements the parent must meet prior to the child’s birth, from ten years (five of
which are after the age of fourteen) to five years (two of which are after the age of four-
teen). Supra at note 140.  Then, in 2000 Congress again amended the statute to reform the
parallel derivative citizenship provisions of INA §§ 320, 322.  8 U.S.C. § 1431 (2006); 8
U.S.C. § 1433 (2006).  The Child Citizenship Act permits a legal resident child to derive
citizenship when one parent is or becomes a U.S. citizen and further provides for derivative
citizenship for adopted children.  Levy, supra note 119, at 293.
174. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 863 (1987).  “The power of
Congress to control immigration and to regulate alienage and naturalization is plenary.”
Id. But even plenary power is subject to constitutional restraints. Id. Accord Stephen H.
Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP.
CT. REV. 255 (1985); Ludwin, supra note 155, at 1382–85; Stanley N. Ingber, Note, Consti-
tutional Limitations on the Naturalization Power, 80 YALE L.J. 769, 796–98 (1971).
175. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining the Plenary Power: the Meaning and Im-
pact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 365, 367–75 (2002) (discussing Mr.
Zadvydas and how the court ruled against his indefinite detention, but continued to em-
brace the plenary power doctrine); Hiroshi Motomuro, The Curious Evolution of Immigra-
tion Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
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INS,176 a case concerning citizenship for children born abroad and out of
wedlock, the Court employed a reasonableness standard and found the
statute satisfied legislative interests even though it imposed more onerous
conditions for acquisition of citizenship on the U.S.-citizen father than it
required of U.S.-citizen mothers.177  The Court did not rely on a distinct
plenary power analysis.178
The Supreme Court is more active in affording protection from threats
to removal and from congressional restrictions on the judicial review of
administrative decisions.179  In an early case involving an applicant who
sought entry to the United States as a citizen, United States v. Ju Toy,180
the Supreme Court ruled that due process did not require judicial review
of the executive decision of an immigration inspector who denied en-
try.181  Then in Ng Fung Ho v. White,182 the Court considered whether an
individual who claims to be a U.S. citizen can be deported solely based on
an executive order.183  The Court guaranteed the right of a U.S. citizen
who was facing deportation to a judicial determination of citizenship,184
and reasoned that the deportation of a U.S. citizen could cost that indi-
vidual a constitutionally protected right, the possible “loss of both prop-
erty and life, or of all that makes life worth living.”185 Ng Fung Ho
survives as a hallmark for judicial review of deportation/removal when
1625, 1626–27 (1992) (identifying that courts use procedural due process as a substitute for
use of substantive constitutional claims); Hiroshi Motomuro, Immigration Law After a
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100
YALE L.J. 545, 549 (1990) (arguing that the Court relies on “phantom constitutional
norms” to avoid application of constitutional principles).
176. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
177. United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 564 U.S.
__, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam).
178. Upon finding that there was no violation of equal protection, the Court reasoned
“we need not assess the implications of statements in our earlier cases regarding the wide
deference afforded Congress in the exercise of its immigration and naturalization power.”
Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 72–73 (2001).  However, in his concurring opinion,
Justice Scalia employed the long-standing plenary power language, the “Court lacks power
to provide relief of the sort requested in this suit—namely, conferral of citizenship on a
basis other than that prescribed by Congress.” Id. at 73 (Scalia, J., concurring).
179. See Won Kidane, The Alienage Spectrum Disorder: The Bill of Rights from Chi-
nese Exclusion to Guantanamo, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L. J. 89, 142 (2010) (arguing that
the Supreme Court unequivocally repudiated the plenary power doctrine in Boumediene v.
Bush).
180. 198 U.S, 253 (1905).
181. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905).
182. 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
183. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 282 (1922).
184. Id. at 284–85.
185. Id. at 284; see Alexander v. INS, 74 F.3d 367, 370 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that U.S.
citizenship is “one of the most precious [rights] imaginable”).
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the loss of citizenship is at stake.186  Furthermore, in an apparent under-
mining of Ju Toy, the Court in Rusk v. Cort187 extended the right of judi-
cial review to an individual who asserted a claim to citizenship at the
border.188  However, Part VI will address the right to due process for
some citizen claimants and the extent to which Congress can insulate
from judicial review the decisions of low-level immigration officials who
reinstate prior orders of deportation and removal against U.S.-citizen
claimants.
B. Standards and Procedures for Asserting Claims to Acquired
Citizenship
Acquired citizenship operates as a matter of law at the time of the U.S.
–citizen child’s birth and is not a benefit for which the child must ap-
ply.189  However, unlike a person born in the United States who normally
has a birth certificate, a U.S. citizen who is born abroad has no documen-
tary proof, and he or she must affirmatively apply for a certificate of citi-
zenship before the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),190 or
alternatively a U.S. passport from the Department of State.191  The U.S.
citizen may also claim citizenship as a defense to deportation or removal
proceedings in immigration court, an agency of the Department of Jus-
tice.192  The different channels set up within these agencies provide pro-
cedures for asserting a claim to citizenship and rules for obtaining
administrative appeals.
186. Iasu v. Smith, 511 F.3d 881, 886 (9th Cir. 2007); Rivera v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d
1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 2004); Alexander, 74 F.3d at 370.
187. 369 U.S. 367 (1962).
188. Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 375 (1962); see Hernandez v. Cremer, 913 F.2d 230,
236 (5th Cir. 1990) (ruling that the Fifth Amendment protects U.S. citizens seeking return
to the United States from abroad).  In another example of the weakening of the plenary
power doctrine, the Court extended due process protections to legal permanent residents
seeking to reenter the United States.  Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982).
189. See United States v. Smith-Baltiher, 424 F.3d 913, 920–21 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Smith
was entitled to U.S. citizenship, along with its rights and privileges, from the moment of
birth, not upon the issuance of a certificate of citizenship or any other formal determina-
tion by the INS or any other governmental official.”).
190. INA § 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2006).  Until 1929 the government had
no authority to issue a certificate of citizenship.  7 GORDON, supra note 8, at § 99.04.  The
Act of March 2, 1929 provided for issuance of a certificate to children who derived citizen-
ship from a naturalized parent, and in the Nationality Act of 1940, Congress provided for
certificates of citizenship to children who acquired citizenship.  Id.
191. INA §§ 104(a), (c); 22 U.S.C. § 211a (2006).
192. Ortega v. Holder, 592 F.3d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 2010); Rios-Valenzuela v. DHS, 506
F.3d 393, 396 (5th Cir. 2007).
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1. Applications for Certificate of Citizenship
The Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS) of the DHS is charged
with the adjudication of the citizenship provisions of the INA and is au-
thorized to issue certificates of citizenship to individuals residing in the
United States.193  Applications are made using form N-600 and filed with
the CIS district office where the applicant lives.194  Appeal of the denial
of an application for certificate of citizenship is made to the Administra-
tive Appeals Unit (AAU), also part of the CIS.195
DHS regulations specify that the citizenship application must be ac-
companied by “supporting documentary and other evidence essential to
establish the claimed citizenship, such as birth, marriage, death, and di-
vorce certificates.”196  Instructions for filing the N-600 provide more spe-
cific guidance on the evidence supporting the application.  For proof of
U.S. citizenship, the form suggests the applicant file a birth certificate,
U.S. passport, or other certificate of naturalization or citizenship issued
by the federal government.197  Listed as suggested evidence of the re-
quired period of residence or physical presence is school and employment
records, documents relating to ownership or lease of property, social se-
curity earnings reports, and “[a]ffidavits of third parties having knowl-
edge of the residence and physical presence.”198  The instructions further
provide that if the suggested documents are not available, other forms
may be submitted including affidavits from persons with personal knowl-
edge who “may be relatives and need not be citizens of the United
States.”199
Additional guidance on supporting evidence of U.S. citizenship for
other immigration related applications is in the regulations, and there,
DHS distinguishes between what the agency terms “primary and secon-
dary evidence.”200  For instance, the regulations give preference to pri-
mary evidence of the parent’s U.S. citizenship which includes U.S.
passports, certificates of naturalization and citizenship, and a state-issued
record of birth which provides the individual’s full name, date, place of
birth, and was filed within one year of the birth with the official custodian
193. 8 C.F.R. § 301.1(a) (2010).
194. Id. § 301.1(a)(1).
195. Id. § 341.6, 103.3(a).
196. Id. § 301.1(a)(1).
197. U.S CITIZEN AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., OMB No. 1615-0057, INSTRUCTIONS
FOR N-600, APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATE OF CITIZENSHIP, INSTRUCTIONS, at 3–4 (Jan.
2011), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/n-600instr.pdf.
198. Id. at 4.
199. Id.
200. 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.1(g)(1)–(2).
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of birth records,201 and permits submission of secondary evidence when
primary evidence is not available.202  Secondary evidence of citizenship
includes hospital and baptismal records, school records, census records,
other documents created close to the date of birth, and affidavits of indi-
viduals with personal knowledge of the applicant’s birth or presence in
the United States.203
A CIS officer assigned to adjudicate the N-600 has broad authority to
investigate an application, conduct examination of witnesses, and report
and recommend findings to the district director.204  A claimant has the
right to legal representation, but if not represented, the CIS officer as-
signed to the application “shall assist him in the introduction of all evi-
dence available in his behalf.”205
2. Citizenship Asserted Before the Department of State
The claimant seeking to acquire citizenship can also file an application
for a U.S. passport with the Department of State in lieu of or simultane-
ous to filing an application for a certificate of citizenship.206  The statute
authorizes the Department of State to administer and enforce citizenship
provisions and mandates establishment of a Passport Office.207  The same
evidence would support both applications although the Department of
State uses different forms and procedures for issuance of a passport.208
Because the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Se-
curity have concurrent jurisdiction over claims to citizenship, conflicting
201. Id. § 204.1(g)(1).
202. Id. § 204.1(g)(2).
203. Id.
204. Id. § 341.2(d).  The statute provides that:
[t]he assigned officer shall have authority to administer oaths or affirmations; to pre-
sent and receive evidence; to rule upon offers of proof; to take or cause to be taken
depositions or interrogatories; to regulate the course of the examination; to examine
and cross-examine all witnesses appearing in the proceedings; to grant or order contin-
uances; to consider or rule upon objections to the introduction of evidence; to make a
report and recommendation to the district director as to whether the application shall
be granted or denied, and make such other action as may be appropriate to the con-
duct of the examination and the disposition of the application.
Id.
205. 8 C.F.R. § 341.2(f).
206. Id. § 301.1(a)(1).  The regulations provide that individuals residing abroad must
apply for evidence of U.S. citizenship at a U.S. embassy or consulate. Id. § 301.1(a)(2).
207. INA §§ 104(a),(c), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), (c) (2006); 22 U.S.C. §  211a (2006); see
BRODYAGA, supra note 96, at 7–10.
208. 22 C.F.R. § 51.43 (2010); see also 7 GORDON, supra note 8, at § 99.06(3)(b)(iv).
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determinations are possible.209  However, a U.S. passport, unless void on
its face, is conclusive proof of U.S. citizenship.210
U.S. citizens who are abroad may register at a U.S. consulate to estab-
lish a claim of citizenship.211  The regulations prescribe procedures for
registration of U.S. citizenship,212 for registration of a child’s birth
abroad,213 and for filing an application for a U.S. passport.214  The State
Department makes no provision for representation by an attorney, “ex-
cept in administrative proceedings challenging the denial of passports.”215
Furthermore, the regulations fail to provide for an administrative hearing
to review the denial of a U.S. passport based on a decision that the appli-
cant is not a U.S. citizen.216
3. Removal Proceedings
If an application for a certificate of citizenship is denied, DHS may
institute removal proceedings where the citizen claimant can again assert
the claim and request the immigration judge to review the evidence.  An
individual that was not previously aware of a claim to citizenship and has
not filed an application for certificate of citizenship or U.S. passport, can
also assert the claim while in removal proceedings.217  Removal proceed-
ings are initiated by the DHS and heard before immigration courts, part
209. See Gary Endelman, How to Prevent Loss of Citizenship, IMMIGRATION BRIEF-
INGS, Nov. 1989, at 6 (stating that “ordinarily neither Department will interfere with the
other’s decision”).
210. In re Villanueva, 19 I&N Dec. 101, 102 (B.I.A. 1984).  Further, a decision in favor
of citizenship establishes the claim unless there is clear, convincing and unequivocal evi-
dence to the contrary.  Lee Hon Lung v. Dulles, 261 F.2d 719, 724 (9th Cir. 1958) (holding
that a favorable government determination of citizenship may not be disregarded absent
error or fraud “established by evidence which is clear, unequivocal, and convincing”).
211. 22 C.F.R. § 50.2; 7 GORDON, supra note 8 at § 91.03(2)(b).
212. 22 C.F.R. § 50.3.
213. Id.; see also DOS Announces Redesigned Consular Report of Birth Abroad, 88
INTERPRETER RELEASES 117 (2011).
214. 22 C.F.R. § 50.4.
215. 7 GORDON, supra note 8, at § 91.04(2).
216. The regulations provide for review before the Bureau of Consular Affairs when
denial or revocation of a U.S. passport is based on factors listed in 22 C.F.R. § 51.60, such
as fugitive warrants, extradition, or national security.  22 C.F.R. §§ 51.60, 51.70(a).  Review
of loss of citizenship is available at the Board of Appellate Review (BAR).  22 C.F.R.
§ 7.3(a).  However, the DOS provides no hearing for review based on “non-nationality.”
22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(1); see also 7 GORDON, supra note 8, at § 99.06(4)(c); ENDELMAN,
supra note 209, at 3–5.
217. See Ortega v. Holder, 592 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 2010) (in a claim to citizenship as a
defense to removal proceedings, the INS office denied an application for certificate of
citizenship, but shortly thereafter, the immigration judge “terminated the removal pro-
ceedings[,] . . . . determin[ing] that she had ‘established that she acquired U.S. Citizen-
ship . . . .’”) Rios-Valenzuela v. DHS, 506 F.3d 393, 396 (5th Cir. 2007) (providing
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of the U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Re-
view (EOIR).218  However, removal is a civil, not criminal, proceeding,
and while the INA guarantees the right to counsel, there is no right to an
attorney at government expense.219
Because removal proceedings determine whether a non-citizen may be
admitted or may remain in the United States, the immigration court has
no jurisdiction over citizens of the United States.220  The first allegation
in the Notice to Appear (NTA), the document which initiates removal
proceedings, is that the respondent is “not a citizen or national of the
United States.”  Consequently, citizenship claims may be raised in immi-
gration court as a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court, and the immi-
gration judge can thus decide a claim to acquired citizenship.221  At this
point, the respondent may deny the first allegation, and the court can
then consider whether there is sufficient evidence to terminate the
proceedings.222
However, removal proceedings are not a direct appeal from denial of a
certificate of citizenship or U.S. passport.  The immigration judge can ter-
minate the proceedings based on the evidence of citizenship and the
judge’s order may support the claimant’s efforts to obtain a certificate of
citizenship from DHS or a U.S. passport from the Department of State
(DOS),223 but the immigration judge does not have the power to confer
U.S. citizenship.224  An individual who is in removal proceedings and did
procedural history in which appellant, believing himself to be a U.S. citizen, reentered by
claiming citizenship and was subsequently charged with “criminal illegal reentry”).
218. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.0, 1003.12; Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Re-
view of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1297,
1306 (1986).
219. INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006). See Hiroshi Motomura, Fortieth Annual Ad-
ministrative Law Issue: Immigration Law and Adjudication: The Rights of Others: Legal
Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1773 (May 2010) (stating
that in long-standing precedent, the U.S. Supreme Court does not view deportation or
removal as a criminal punishment, hence it does not warrant Sixth Amendment
protections).
220. Rivera v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that “[t]he execu-
tive may deport certain aliens but has no authority to deport citizens”).
221. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (“The claim of citizenship is thus
a denial of an essential jurisdictional fact.”).
222. The statute at INA § 240 provides that “[a]n immigration judge shall conduct
proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
223. See infra Part V.A.
224. See, e.g., INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U. S. 875, 883–84 (1988) (discussing Congress’s
intent to not give power to the federal courts to deny or grant citizenship).  Thus, while the
immigration judge may terminate a removal proceeding, the DHS is not required to honor
the decision and issue a certificate of citizenship.  Ortega v. Holder, 592 F.3d 738, 742 (7th
Cir. 2010); Rios-Valenzuela v. DHS, 506 F3d. 393, 396 (5th Cir. 2007).
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not apply for a certificate of citizenship or a U.S. passport has two op-
tions.  One is to request that the proceedings be postponed to apply for a
certificate of citizenship or U.S. passport.  The other is to present the
claim to the judge, request the proceedings be terminated, and then sub-
mit applications to DHS for the certificate of citizenship or to the DOS
for a U.S. passport.225
The citizenship claim may be made by individuals in the United States
or those who apply for admission to the United States from abroad.
While generally the burden of proof rests with the DHS to prove that the
respondent “is not a citizen or national of the United States,” that burden
is met by evidence that an acquired citizen claimant was born abroad.226
The burden shifts to the claimant to demonstrate that at the time of his or
her birth the transmitting parent was a citizen and established all other
conditions precedent to the acquisition of citizenship.227  If the claim is
established and the DHS is unable to counter the evidence, the immigra-
tion judge will terminate the proceedings.  Appeal of a final order of re-
moval in which citizenship is an issue must be made to the Board of
Immigration Appeals228 within thirty days of the order of the immigra-
tion judge as in any other appeal of a removal order.229
C. Federal Court Review
The statute currently provides separate means for federal court review
of a claim to citizenship depending on the manner the claimant asserted
his or her claim.  An action for declaratory judgment can be brought in
federal district court to challenge the denial of an application for certifi-
cate of citizenship or U.S. passport.  When a claim to citizenship is raised
in removal proceedings, federal court review of the removal order is
channeled to the courts of appeal with the opportunity for remand to the
district court for a hearing on citizenship.230  However, there has been
considerable congressional action in the area of judicial review of depor-
tation and removal orders and efforts by Congress to limit access to fed-
225. See generally MARIA BALDINI-POTERMIN, IMMIGRATION TRIAL HANDBOOK
§ 5.13 p. 179 (West 2011).
226. See In re Tijerina-Villareal, 13 I&N Dec. 327, 330 (B.I.A 1969) (stating that the
burden is on the government “to establish alienage in a deportation proceeding”).
227. Id.
228. “The Board of Immigration Appeals was created in 1940” and now operates
within the Executive Office for Immigration Review of the Department of Justice.  Legom-
sky, supra note 218, at 1307.
229. 8 C.F.R. §1003.3(a)(2) (2010).
230. Ortega, 592 F.3d at 743–44 (ruling that an applicant cannot file a declaratory
action in district court as a means to “frustrate Congress’s effort to channel all appeals
from removal proceedings”).
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eral courts now impacts the review of removal orders with appended
citizenship claims.
1. Early Judicial Review
In early cases, claims to U.S. citizenship were addressed under the
court’s habeas corpus jurisdiction.231  In Ng Fung Ho, the petitioners
challenged the executive orders of deportation by an application for writ
of habeas corpus in federal district court.232  Actions brought under the
Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA) and the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA) later served as additional routes for federal court determinations
of citizenship.233  In Perkins v. Elg,234 the petitioner filed suit for declara-
tory and injunctive relief to challenge the denial of her passport on the
ground that she had lost her citizenship,235 and in Frank v. Rogers,236 a
U.S. citizen claimant successfully brought an action under the APA.237
The 1952 Act provided for a special declaratory judgment remedy to
review the claims to U.S. citizenship of individuals present in the United
States.238  Then, in 1961, during an overhaul of the provisions for judicial
review of deportation and exclusion orders, Congress enacted INA Sec-
tion 106 to limit protracted litigation in immigration cases and channel
review of deportation orders to the courts of appeal.239  The statute es-
tablished a procedure under INA Section 106(a)(5) for review of citizen-
ship claims raised in deportation proceedings that also authorized a
transfer of proceedings to the district court for a hearing de novo if “a
231. Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 658–59 (1927); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259
U.S. 276, 282 (1922); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 258 (1905); United States v.
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 649 (1898).
232. Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 277–78.
233. See Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 52 (1955) (“[T]here is a right of judicial
review of deportation orders other than by habeas corpus and that the remedy sought here
[under the Administrative Procedure Act] is an appropriate one.”); Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 459, 461–62 (2006) (asserting that with the INA of 1952 coupled with the
decision in Shaughnessy, individuals could challenge deportation and exclusion orders
without the physical custody requirement of a habeas proceeding).
234. 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
235. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 349–50 (1939).
236. 253 F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
237. Frank v. Rogers, 253 F.2d 889, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1958).  The court, citing Ng Fung
Ho v. White, stated that historically the habeas corpus proceeding was an appropriate
venue for the review of a citizenship claim raised in deportation proceedings, and that the
APA also served the same function. Id.; see Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 46
(1950) (applying the APA to deportation proceedings).
238. INA § 360(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (1995).  The statute provided for an action in
district court to review a decision denying a right or privilege based on U.S. citizenship. Id.
239. Motomura, supra note 233, at 462-63.
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genuine issue of material fact as to the petitioner’s nationality is
presented.”240  These two avenues, actions for declaratory judgment and
petitions for review became the dominant means for review of citizenship
claims until 1996.241
2. Declaratory Judgment
INA Section 360 permits an action for declaratory judgment on behalf
of an individual who is in the United States and claims to be a citizen, but
is “denied such right or privilege by any department or independent
agency or official . . . .”242  The claimant may sue in federal district court
on the question of citizenship.243  It is used when an application for proof
of citizenship has been denied, such as when the State Department Pass-
port office declines to issue a U.S. passport or when the CIS rejects an
application for a certificate of citizenship.  The burden rests with the peti-
tioner to prove his or her claim to U.S. citizenship and the district court
will ordinarily require that the claimant exhaust all administrative reme-
dies before the individual files an action for declaratory judgment.244
The statute provides that the right to bring a declaratory judgment suit
is limited to individuals who are present in the United States.245  A U.S.-
citizen claimant outside the United States who is denied “a right or privi-
lege as a national” is directed to apply for a certificate of identity from a
U.S. consulate and seek admission to the United States. However, despite
the statutory requirement that the petitioner must be present in the
United States, the Supreme Court has ruled that district courts have juris-
diction to hear cases of individuals outside the United States who assert a
right to citizenship.246
240. INA § 106(a)(5)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(5)(B) (1995) (no longer in force).
241. Habeas corpus proceedings remained an avenue for review of a denial of citizen-
ship.  Despite Congressional efforts to direct appeals to the court of appeals, the statute
permitted habeas corpus review of orders of exclusion and further provided that “an alien
held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation” could obtain review in habeas pro-
ceedings.  INA § 106(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) (no longer in force); see Motomura, supra
note 233, at 463 (discussing habeas proceedings in reference to the Hobbs Act).  However,
during the period between enactment of former INA § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a  and the 1996
legislation in AEDPA and IIRIRA, habeas review of deportation cases, while available,
was used in “‘narrow circumstances as a supplement to petitions for review in the courts of
appeals.’”  Kolkevich v. Att’y Gen., 501 F.3d 323, 327 (3rd Cir. 2007) (quoting Motomura,
supra note 233, at 463).
242. INA § 360(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2000).
243. Id.
244. United States v. Breyer, 41 F.3d 884, 891–92 (3rd Cir. 1994).
245. INA § 360(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2000).
246. See Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 372 (1962) (holding that the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act is available for review of an administrative decision regarding citizenship); see
also Frank v. Rogers, 253 F.2d 889, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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Under the terms of the statute as enacted in 1952, a citizen claimant
could not bring an action for declaratory judgment if the claim arose in
exclusion proceedings.247  With the IIRIRA Congress amended INA Sec-
tion 360 to extend the limitation for an action in district court when the
claim to citizenship “arose by reason of, or in connection with any re-
moval proceeding . . . or is in issue in any such removal proceeding.”248
District court review of an agency denial of a claim to citizenship benefits
the citizen claimant but is considered by the government as an interfer-
ence with the removal process and frustration of Congress’s attempts to
channel all review of removal orders in the courts of appeal.  In Rios-
Valenzuela v. DHS,249 the petitioner raised his claim to citizenship in re-
moval proceedings and also applied for a certificate of citizenship before
DHS.250  Following the denial of his application for certificate of citizen-
ship he sought a declaratory judgment in district court.251  The Fifth Cir-
cuit ruled that INA Section 360(a) precluded review of the decision since
the petitioner’s citizenship claim arose in his removal proceedings.252
3. Review of Removal Orders
Since 1961 when INA Section 106 was enacted, Congress has consist-
ently provided a means for review of citizenship claims made by individu-
als in deportation (and later, removal) proceedings.  INA Section
106(a)(5) authorized the court of appeals to review a citizenship issue
raised in deportation proceedings and to remand to the district court the
cases that presented unresolved issues of fact.253
In April 1996 with the enactment of AEDPA, Congress again at-
tempted to streamline judicial review in deportation cases and targeted
noncitizens charged under crime-based grounds of deportation.254  A few
months later in September 1996, Congress enacted IIRIRA and replaced
247. See Benson, supra note 26, at 1450 n.185 (discussing the holding in Rusk as it
pertains to exclusion proceedings and the claimant’s case).
248. INA § 360(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2000).
249. 506 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2007).
250. Rios-Valenzuela v. DHS, 506 F.3d 393, 396 (5th Cir. 2007).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 397.
253. INA § 106(a)(5)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(5)(B) (1995) (no longer in force).  De-
spite Congress’s efforts to direct appeals to the court of appeals, the statute permitted
habeas corpus review of orders of exclusion, and further provided that “an alien held in
custody pursuant to an order of deportation” could obtain review in habeas proceedings.
INA § 106(b), 8 U.S.C. 1105a(b) (no longer in force).
254. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. 104-
132, §§ 440–42, 110 Stat. 1214.
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Section 106 with new Section 242.255  IIRIRA mirrored AEDPA’s provi-
sions eliminating judicial review of orders based on criminal convic-
tions.256  Furthermore, IIRIRA consolidated deportation and exclusion
proceedings into what has become removal proceedings,257 designated
the courts of appeals as the sole avenue of judicial review of removal
orders,258 and reduced the deadline for filing a petition for review in the
court of appeals to thirty days.259
When IIRIRA replaced Section 106 with Section 242, it did not disturb
the provisions previously guaranteeing review of claims to citizenship
made in removal proceedings.260  INA Section 242(b)(5)(A) specifies that
if the respondent in removal proceedings has asserted U.S. citizenship
and the court finds “no genuine issue of material fact about the peti-
tioner’s nationality,” the court of appeals shall determine the claim to
citizenship.261  The court must consider the claim to citizenship de
novo.262  When an issue of fact relating to the respondent’s citizenship is
raised in the court of appeals “the court shall transfer the proceedings to
the district court . . . for a new hearing on the nationality claim.”263  The
determination as to whether a material fact issue exists is based on stan-
dards governing summary judgment motions.264
Challenges to the restrictions on judicial review prompted by AEDPA
and IIRIRA were swift, most notably on behalf of non-citizen legal re-
sidents who had been convicted of the criminal offenses for which the
255. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. 104-208, § 306, 110 Stat. 3009; Motomura, supra note 233, at 464.
256. Compare AEDPA § 440(a) (amending INA § 106 to prohibit “review by any
court” for criminal aliens who are ordered removed) with IIRIRA § 306(a)(2) (creating a
new section specifying when judicial review would be eliminated).
257. IIRIRA § 304.
258. Id. § 306(b)(2) (outlining the venue and form of appeals).  INA § 242(b)(2), 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2006).  The appellate court is expected to review the appeal using
only the administrative record.  IIRIRA § 306(b)(4) (codified at INA § 242(b)(2), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1212(b)(2) (2006)).  The standard of review is a reasonable basis standard and discretion-
ary judgments are conclusive “unless manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discre-
tion.” Id (codified at INA § 242(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (2006)).
259. Id. § 306(b)(1) (“[t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days
after the date of the final order or removal.”) (codified at INA § 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(1) (2006)).
260. INA § 242(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(5).
261. INA § 242(b)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A); Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 107,
110 (5th Cir. 2009).
262. INA § 242(b)(5)(A); Lopez, 563 F.3d at 110; Scales v. INS 232 F.3d 1159, 1162
(9th Cir. 2000).
263. INA § 242(b)(5)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B) (emphasis added); Lopez, 563
F.3d at 110; Alexander v. INS, 74 F.3d 367, 368 (1st Cir. 1996).
264. Batista v. Ashcroft, 270 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2001); Alexander, 74 F.3d at 368.
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new legislation eliminated review.265  To support their efforts to access
federal courts, respondents utilized petitions for writs of habeas corpus
and argued that AEDPA and IRRIRA could not, without violation of the
Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution,266 be interpreted as having
eliminated habeas corpus jurisdiction for judicial review of deportation
and removal orders.  In two cases, INS v. St. Cyr267 and Calcano-Martinez
v. INS,268 the Supreme Court held that AEDPA and INA Section 242 did
not completely divest federal courts of habeas jurisdiction in removal
cases.269  In St. Cyr the Court ruled that petitioner was entitled to an
opportunity to challenge “the erroneous application or interpretation” of
law.270  To avoid the serious constitutional questions implicated by the
Suspension Clause if Congress failed to provide an adequate substitute
for habeas review of deportation and removal orders and absent “a clear
statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction,” the
Court found that habeas corpus relief survived AEDPA and IIRIRA.271
Thus, subsequent to St. Cyr there were two means of reviewing re-
moval orders, by appeal to the courts of appeal under INA Section 242
and by a habeas corpus petition.272  Courts generally acknowledged con-
gressional preference for the court of appeals route, but notwithstanding,
habeas proceedings provided an avenue when an issue of citizenship was
raised.  The Ninth Circuit addressed the exercise of habeas jurisdiction in
Rivera v. Ashcroft,273 a case concerning an individual with two conflicting
birth certificates from Mexico and the United States.  The respondent
waived counsel and the right to appeal his deportation order, but subse-
quently filed a habeas petition in the district court.274  The court rejected
265. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 293 (2001).
266. The Suspension Clause of the Constitution provides that the “Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Inva-
sion the public Safety may require it.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.2.
267. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
268. 533 U.S. 348, 351 (2001).
269. Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348 (2001) (holding that judicial review and
habeas corpus are separate, distinct proceedings); St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305 (holding that
IRRIRA’s limitations on judicial review did not repeal habeas corpus jurisdiction in dis-
trict courts).
270. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 302; see Lenni Benson, Making Paper Dolls: How Restrictions
on Judicial Review and the Administrative Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Fed-
eral Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 38 (2006) (afirming that “courts are loathe to find a
complete bar to judicial review”).
271. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298.
272. AEDPA, IIRIRA, and the decision in INS v. St. Cyr led to a renewed use of
habeas corpus proceedings as a means for federal court review of removal orders.
Motomura, supra note 233, at 460.
273. 394 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 2005).
274. Rivera v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 2005).
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the petition and on appeal to the court of appeals, the Ninth Circuit
found that the availability of habeas relief was “[t]he only result consis-
tent with the” Constitution.275  The court also held that citizenship is “an
essential jurisdictional fact” in deportation proceedings,276 and that any
person who asserts a non-frivolous claim to U.S. citizenship is entitled to
“a judicial evaluation of that claim.”277
Three months after Rivera, in May 2005, Congress renewed its efforts,
begun with AEDPA and IIRIRA, to streamline judicial review of re-
moval orders in a single forum, the court of appeals.278  The passage of
the REAL ID Act eliminated habeas corpus review of removal orders.279
But, to forestall the serious constitutional questions identified in St. Cyr,
Congress amended INA Section 242 and restored review of removal or-
ders in the courts of appeal for “constitutional claims or questions of
law”280 although the statute maintained restrictions to review of removal
orders involving criminal aliens281 and applicants for discretionary
relief.282
The question remaining after the REAL-ID Act’s limitation on habeas
corpus relief is whether amended INA Section 242, even with protections
for review of citizenship claims, provides adequate and effective review.
This issue will be discussed in Part V below.
IV. ASSERTING CLAIMS BEFORE DHS AND DOS
Historically, many Mexican children born abroad to U.S. citizen par-
ents have faced significant obstacles to the recognition of their acquired
U.S. citizenship.  They bear a burden of establishing eligibility and doubts
are “resolved in favor of the United States and against the claimant.”283
The cases are often difficult to prove before any agency or court because,
as illustrated from the fact patterns in the cases presented here, there may
be scant and sometimes no documentary evidence to support the parent’s
birth in the United States and presence in the United States prior to the
275. Id. at 1138.
276. Id. at 1136 (quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922)).
277. Id.
278. Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 107, 109 (5th Cir. 2009).
279. See Benson, supra note 270, at 43.
INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C § 1252(a)(D) (2000).
280. Id.
281. Id. § 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(C) (aliens removable under INA
§ 212(a)(2) or § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D)).
282. Id. § 242(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (relating to decisions involving dis-
cretionary relief, including under INA §§ 212(h), 212(i), 240A, 240B, and 245).
283. United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 626 (1931) (quoting United States v.
Manzi, 276 U.S. 463, 467 (1928)).
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birth of the child.  In addition to the factual and legal complexities of the
cases, other barriers within the agencies charged with adjudicating citi-
zenship claims contribute to the denial of claims and even the deporta-
tion/removal of U.S. citizens.
First, the agencies struggle under enormous and complex caseloads.
Both DHS and DOS adjudicate an extraordinary number of applications
under multiple parts of an exceedingly intricate statute that encompasses
immigration and citizenship issues.  They are not equipped to expedi-
tiously and consistently handle the kinds of applications for certificate of
citizenship, which are described here and involve difficult issues of fact.
Furthermore, there is the lack of attention and indifference within the
government to claims of acquired citizenship.  Concern over crime and
national security issues dominate both agencies, particularly the enforce-
ment arms of DHS, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and overshadow the cases of ac-
quired citizens.  Individuals with a U.S. parent and a claim to acquired
citizenship are frequently ignored by DHS and DOS and consequently,
many potential beneficiaries do not learn of the right to make a claim.
A. Citizenship Claims in CIS
CIS has the task of adjudicating a large volume of applications for an
extended variety of benefits.  There were a total of 4,831,371 applications
filed with CIS in fiscal year 2010, including petitions and adjustment of
status applications for family- and employment-based visas, employment
authorizations, non-immigrant visas, asylum, and self-petitions for bat-
tered spouses and children of U.S. citizens and legal residents.284
Further complicating the sheer number of cases is the complexity of the
law.285  Besides the INA and regulations, decisions in administrative ap-
peals from the Administrative Appeals Unit and the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals provide guidance on the law.  The complex legal and
processing questions confronting CIS adjudicators are further covered in
284. U.S CITIZEN AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., APPLICATIONS FOR IMMIGRATION BEN-
EFITS MONTHLY CHART 1 (Aug. 2011), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Resources/
Reports/Application-for-Benefits/applications-for-benefits-2011-aug.pdf. The processing
and adjudication of the vast array of CIS benefits applications is delegated between re-
gional service centers and district offices located throughout the United States. CIS has
further centralized the adjudication of certain specialized benefits such as asylum applica-
tion, self-petitions for battered spouses and children, and U-visa applications for victims of
crime.
285. See Legomsky, supra note 218, at 1300 (stating that “[t]he governing statute and
accompanying regulations authorize a bewildering array of administrative decisions in indi-
vidual cases).  Initial decision making is by various officials in various agencies after vari-
ous procedures.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
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a labyrinth of policy and practice memoranda issued from central and
regional DHS offices.
CIS has delegated the processing and adjudication of applications for
certificate of citizenship, including those filed under INA Sections 301
and 309, to the district offices.  Some of the applications can be processed
and adjudicated with little controversy, but given the volume of cases it
handles, the limitations on resources, and complexity of the law, CIS is
not equipped to properly adjudicate citizenship claims with difficult fac-
tual and legal issues.  The problems raised in these cases are similar to
what has been found in studies regarding DHS benefits adjudications.
Critical of the agency’s handling of applications for immigration benefits,
Professor Lenni Benson found regarding the adjudication of employment
based visas that the “integrity, efficiency and transparency” of the system
was threatened by an adjudicatory structure of multi-agency participation
with each application, layers of confusing guidance, and an obsession with
fraud.286  Professor Jill Family argues that in CIS adjudications there are
an extraordinary number of applications handled by non-lawyers and
guided by uncertain legal standards, all leading to a system she termed
“unpredictable and obscure.”287
An application for certificate of citizenship presented to DHS can be
resolved with little controversy if applicant has documentary evidence
that is favored by the agency.  The child born abroad to a U.S. citizen
parent who was born in a physician-assisted facility and who has a consis-
tent record of education and employment in the United States can pre-
sent a successful application for certificate of citizenship.288  However,
cases that present difficult and complicated factual and legal analysis may
be stalled for months or even years.289
The regulations permit applicants to submit a wide range of evidence to
support an application for benefits under the INA, but CIS adjudicators
often dismiss evidence it does not consider objective.  In their concern
with possible fraud, CIS  adjudicators are particularly suspicious and criti-
cal of the testimony affidavits of witnesses which they consider subjective
and self-serving, and many children of U.S. citizen parents who are indi-
286. Lenni Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders: A Necessary Step Toward Immi-
gration Law Reform, 54 ADMIN. L.REV. 203, 262–268, 289–290 (2002); see Legomsky,
supra note 218, at 1313 (goals for an administrative process should be accuracy, efficiency,
acceptability and consistency).
287. Jill E. Family, Murky Immigration Law and the Challenges Facing Immigration
Removal and Benefits Adjudication, 31 J. NAT’L ASSOC. ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 45, 64–67
(2011).
288. See BRODYAGA, supra note 96, at 5.
289. See Email from Lisa S. Brodyaga, supra note 96; Email from Barbara Hines,
supra note 108.
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gent migrants and who depend on testimonial evidence are left with few
options.
1. Birth in the United States
To establish the parent was born in the United States, CIS favors state-
issued birth certificates indicating a physician-assisted birth.290  The
agency will accept church baptismal certificates, delayed birth records,
and midwife recorded registrations if supplemented by other evidence of
birth in the United States, but many officers question the validity of these
birth records.  Once fraud is suspected, applicants must await a lengthy
investigation and face a heavy burden to convince a skeptical adjudicator.
The applications for certificates of citizenship for four of J.Z.’s children
included J.Z.’s delayed certificate of birth in Big Spring, Texas and the
Mexican birth record stating J.Z. was born in “Viges Prin, Texas.”  The
INS launched an investigation into J.Z.’s birth and, prompted by a re-
quest from the U.S. Consulate in Monterrey, Mexico, the Mexican gov-
ernment issued a birth certificate, which the U.S. Consulate
authenticated, which reported that J.Z. was born in the “Estados Unidos
de Mexico,” the United States of Mexico.  The certificate, however, re-
corded no city and state of birth.  Armed with a verified but facially inva-
lid Mexican birth certificate, the INS officer adjudicating the applications
informed J.Z. that he was a non-citizen who was not entitled to be in the
United States, and that his children’s applications were to be denied.  Ul-
timately the four applications were approved but only after a law stu-
dent’s extraordinary efforts.  The student located the only living witness
to J.Z.’s birth, a woman who was six-years-old at the time and
remembered her own mother attending to J.Z.’s mother one night in a
barn in Big Spring, Texas and the next morning waking to see the baby.291
The student then traveled to the small village in Mexico where J.Z.’s fa-
ther recorded the birth in 1939, located the original handwritten birth
record in a dusty archive, and convinced the Mexican authorities to re-
scind the incorrect birth record and established for INS that “Viges Prin,
Texas” meant “Big Spring, Texas.”292
290. See Jordan, supra note 97 (reporting that midwives’ forging of birth certificates
has resulted in requirements for further proof).
291. See Affidavit of A.M. (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Mi-
nority Issues).
292. It was never determined why the Mexican government issued an erroneous birth
certificate and one that failed to provide a key piece of data, the city and state where J.Z.
was alleged to be born.  Once directed to the original handwritten record, the Mexican
registrar readily issued a corrected and certified copy reflecting that J.Z. was born in
“Viges Prin, Texas.”  I can only surmise that officials of the DHS and the DOS presumed
that the Mexican registration recorded a Mexican birth and the Mexican authorities were
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The circumstances of J.Z.’s birth illustrate common problems faced by
U.S. citizens when they attempt to return to the United States and to
establish citizenship for their own children.  Frequently, because they lack
official and contemporaneous records of birth in the United States, they
depend on documents such as a baptismal certificate issued by the local
Catholic Church or a school record.293  From these documents they apply
for a delayed state certificate of birth.  For example, J.Z. obtained his
delayed Texas birth certificate by presenting a 1940 baptismal record
from a Mexican church and affidavits from his mother.294  While the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in In re Serna,295 acknowledged
that many individuals were not born in a hospital, it found “there can be
little dispute that the opportunity for fraud is much greater with the
delayed birth certificate.”296  Taking this cue from the BIA holding, many
adjudicators consider a delayed certificate of birth suspect, warranting an
often lengthy investigation.
The DHS also routinely investigates birth certificates executed by mid-
wives, another record common for children of Mexican migrants.  INS
mounted aggressive investigations of a number of midwives who serve
the low income population of Texas and criminally prosecuted some for
having issued fraudulent birth records for Mexican born children.297  Al-
influenced by the U.S. officials who requested the Mexican birth registration.  A complaint
to the U.S. Consulate at Monterrey, N.L. Mexico that had “certified” the Mexican birth
certificate was never answered.
293. Baptismal and school records were commonly used as evidence of birth in the
United States. In re Pagan, 22 I&N 547, 548 (B.I.A 1999).  The federal government often
requests the “oldest available evidence.” Id.; BRODYAGA, supra note 96, at 2.  However,
when that evidence is contradicted by other evidence of birth abroad, the individual may
not be able to definitively prove U.S. citizenship. See In re A.M., 7 I&N Dec. 332, 335
(B.I.A. 1956) (considering competing evidence from family members’ against school
records and census records).  There, the respondent’s evidence of birth consisted of a
school record and a census report. Id.  All other records and affidavits state she was born
in Mexico. Id.  “The Government did not sustain the burden of proving that she was an
alien, and she was unable to prove that she is a citizen.” Id. at 336.
294. Texas law permits the use of such documents to support an application for
delayed birth certificate. See generally Delayed Certificate of Birth Registration, supra note
100 (outlining the procedures for filing a delayed birth certificate and the suggested types
of supporting documents—specifically baptismal records and birth affidavits are suggested
as documents that might show parent’s names).
295. 16 I&N Dec. 643, 645 (B.I.A. 1978).
296. In re Serna, 16 I&N Dec. 643, 646 (B.I.A. 1978); accord In re Herrera, 13 I&N
Dec. 755 (B.I.A. 1971) (holding that a delayed birth certificate, even with supporting evi-
dence does not establish citizenship in every case).
297. DHS frequently challenges births recorded by midwives on the Texas border with
Mexico.  When midwife birth certificates are used to support birth in the United States,
DHS demands additional evidence or will conduct an investigation.  The suspicion is based
largely on the prosecution of a Texas midwives for selling Texas birth certificates.  See
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though the government in the criminal cases never alleged that every cer-
tificate issued by these midwives was fraudulent, their convictions cast
doubt not only on all of the birth records they have attested to, but to the
records of Texas midwives in general.
DHS maintains a more expansive list of midwives that the agency be-
lieves have issued fraudulent birth certificates.298  The list does not spec-
ify the charges against the named midwives and some on the list have
never been convicted of an offense.299  Applicants and their advocates
have difficulty responding when DHS has adopted a presumption that a
birth certificate executed by a listed midwife does not establish
citizenship.
It is not uncommon for Mexican parents, such as J.Z.’s father, to record
their children’s births with a Mexican registry although the children were
born in the United States.300  Investigations of delayed certificates,
church baptismal records, and midwife records include searches of Mexi-
can registries to determine whether the birth was recorded abroad.  INS/
DHS will presume the birth occurred in Mexico if a registration of birth
in Mexico is located.301  The registration may have resulted from the par-
ents’ attempts to obtain identification or schooling for a U.S.-born child
when there was no registration in the United States, but such explana-
tions rarely overcome the presumption by CIS that the birth occurred in
Mexico.302  Individuals seeking to establish U.S. citizenship for admission
United States v. Lopez, 704 F.2d 1382, 1383 (5th Cir. 1983) (deciding the case of Emma
Lopez, who was accused of selling birth certificates for around two hundred dollars); see
also Jordan, supra note 97; Midwives Deliver New Problems in Citizenship, HOUS. CHRON.,
(July 20, 2008), at B7 (reporting that seventy-five midwives were convicted for selling birth
certificates in the last forty years).
298. One list maintained by the DHS in San Antonio includes 248 Texas midwives.
Some are listed with dates when convicted, had a license revoked, or “confessed.” (list on
file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues). See also BRODYAGA,
supra note 96, at 2.
299. After some effort one attorney who was representing an individual whose birth
record was challenged by DHS, was able to locate the conviction record of a listed midwife
and found she had been convicted of “falsifying birth records for Mexican babies that were
being illegally adopted by U.S. citizen families.”  Email from Rebecca Bernhardt, Att’y,
Criminal Justice Coalition, to Lee Tera´n, Clinical Professor of Law, St. Mary’s Univ. Sch.
of Law (Sept. 24, 2011) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority
Issues).  The attorney successfully argued on behalf of her client, who was not an adopted
child, that the birth record was valid. Id.
300. In re Lugo-Guadiana, 12 I&N Dec. 726, 727 (B.I.A. 1968).
301. Even when the Mexican birth registration records a child’s birth as having oc-
curred in the United States, the federal government will question the veracity of the re-
cord. See supra note 292.
302. See In re Lugo-Guadiana, 12 I&N Dec. at 729–30 (providing that the Board gave
little weight to a delayed certificate of birth when a Mexican certificate was registered
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to the United States or as proof of a child’s acquisition of citizenship
carry a heavy burden to explain the conflicting and unexpected evidence
and will risk removal when dual competing records are found in both the
United States and Mexico.
2. Evidence of Presence
The citizenship statutes require that the transmitting U.S. citizen parent
accumulate a certain number of years of presence in the United States
prior to a child’s birth.  Each time it has amended the relevant statutes
Congress has reduced the mandated length of presence in the U.S.  The
Nationality Act of 1940 required that the parent demonstrate ten years
residence in the United States, at least five of which were after the parent
attained the age of sixteen.303  Residence, which is defined as a fixed
abode in the United States is understandably a difficult standard to meet.
A U.S. citizen parent who maintained a family in Mexico and traveled to
the United States may face obstacles to prove a residence in the coun-
try.304  The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 liberalized the stan-
dard to ten years of physical presence in the United States, five of which
were after the age of fourteen.305  The presence standard often better fits
the circumstances of the U.S. citizens who have families in Mexico and
live there at least part of the year.  In these situations, a parent may be
able to more easily establish presence in the United States than resi-
dence, for example, through employment in the United States prior to the
birth of the child.
However, in practice, both the Board of Immigration Appeals and CIS
discount affidavit and testimonial evidence from relatives and families to
the detriment of Mexican migratory workers who may be forced to rely
on this type of proof.  As the Board stated in In re Tijerina-Villareal,306
“[e]xperience has demonstrated in cases of this character that the testi-
mony of parties in interest cannot always be accepted or relied upon.”307
Consequently, CIS demands documentary evidence of the parent’s pres-
twelve days after the birth and the witnesses, respondent’s parents and aunt “are not disin-
terested parties”).
303. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, Pub. L. No. 76-853, § 201(g), 54 Stat. 1137, 1169
(emphasis added).
304. Alcarez-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002).
305. INA § 322(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1433(a)(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
306. 13 I&N Dec. 327 (B.I.A. 1969).  While In re Tijerina is a precedent decision and
DHS officers rely on the case, there are unpublished decisions from the AAU that ac-
knowledge the lifestyle of many of the U.S. citizens who possess few records and accept
affidavits as evidence to prove presence. See, e.g., AAU decision of July 6, 2005 (on file
with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues).
307. In re Tijerina-Villareal, 13 I&N Dec. 327, 331 (B.I.A. 1969).
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ence in the United States from sources other than affidavits and testi-
mony of the applicant’s family and acquaintances.
For example, B.V. was already in removal proceedings and charged
with deportability for a drug possession conviction when he sought to
apply for a certificate of citizenship as the son of a parent who was a U.S.
citizen under INA Section 301(g).308  While B.V.’s father had worked in
the United States from the time he was a teenager until his death, CIS
denied B.V.’s application for certificate of citizenship.  B.V’s application
included social security earnings records, pay stubs for work performed in
the United States, and money order receipts that he sent from the United
States to his family in Mexico.  B.V.’s brother had also been in removal
proceedings several years earlier.  In that case, another immigration
judge had found that B.V.’s father had accumulated ten years of presence
before his brother’s birth.  B.V. included the transcript of his brother’s
hearing as evidence in his case.  Finally, B.V.’s application also contained
a number of detailed affidavits of family members attesting to the father’s
presence in the United States.309
Nevertheless, DHS denied B.V.’s application based on insufficient evi-
dence of the father’s presence.310  The adjudicator counted only the work
history recorded on B.V.’s father’s social security earnings report and ig-
nored evidence that the father had performed other work for which he
was paid in cash.311  DHS also determined that immigration petitions the
father had filed for his family in which he recorded his residence in Mex-
ico were conclusive that he was physically present in Mexico and not the
United States.  Furthermore, DHS determined that the affidavits and the
immigration judge’s findings in B.V.’s brother’s case failed to prove Mr.
V.’s father’s required presence in the country.312
308. File of B.V. (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues).
DHS initiated proceedings and charged B.V. with deportability as an aggravated felony
under INA § 237(a)(2)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(iiii), for a felony conviction for illegal
possession of a controlled substance.  B.V. asserted a claim to citizenship and the immigra-
tion judge continued the removal proceedings to permit B.V. to apply for a certificate of
citizenship.  At that time DHS argued that a felony conviction involving possession of a
controlled substance met the definition for an aggravated felony in INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), drug trafficking offense.  However, in Lopez v. Gonzalez, the
Supreme Court ruled that a conviction that did not involve the sale or distribution of drugs
was not an aggravated felony.  Lopez v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 47, 54–55 (2006).
309. Case file on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues.
310. Denial on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues.  Fol-
lowing the rejection of his application for certificate of citizenship, B.V. presented his evi-
dence, including the testimony of witnesses to his father’s presence in the United States
before the immigration judge. See infra Part V.C.
311. Case file on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues.
312. Id.
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U.S.-citizen women have a greater burden of proving presence in the
United States because their work history is not well documented.  In an-
other case, P.H. claimed citizenship under INA Section 301(g).  His father
and mother were born in Mexico, but his mother acquired U.S. citizen-
ship from her mother who was born in the United States.313  To establish
his acquired citizenship, P.H. offered witnesses who attested to his
mother’s ten years of physical presence in the United States.  She lived in
Mexico near the U.S. border and maintained she traveled daily to the
United States where she worked in housekeeping and child care.  P.H.’s
mother had no evidence of her work history in the United States other
than the testimony of witnesses.  DHS conducted an investigation and
determined that P.H.’s family birth records and prior immigration peti-
tions filed by his mother stated that she resided in Mexico.  DHS con-
cluded that records of P.H.’s mother’s residence in Mexico outweighed
any evidence contained in the testimony of witnesses.314
Thus, the applicant whose parent must rely on affidavits and testimo-
nial evidence faces a heavy burden of proof.  Some adjudicators are
predisposed to distrust such evidence and others do not have the time to
fully and carefully interview significant witnesses.315  DHS relies solely on
313. File of P.H. (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues).
314. The case is still pending a motion to reopen the denial by DHS, in part arguing
that DHS ignored key evidence and used the wrong standard for determining that the
mother failed to meet conditions by which her son could acquire U.S. citizenship.  DHS
used the same evaluation of evidence in P.H.’s case that it did with regard to B.V.’s appli-
cation.  While the statute requires that the parent prove physical presence in the United
States which permits consideration of time spent working in the United States, DHS deter-
mined that the mother’s listing of Mexico as her residence in her family and immigration
records was conclusive of the mother’s presence in the United States.
Other cases also demonstrate difficulties women face in proving their presence in the
United States.  In the case of C.J., he was born out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen mother and
claimed citizenship under INA § 309, which required evidence of one continuous year of
presence.  INA § 309(c); 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2006).  C.J.’s mother was born in the United
States and raised in Mexico.  She also traveled frequently to the United States with rela-
tives to work although she never attended school and had no records of the farm labor she
performed in the U.S.  Her history of presence was based almost entirely on the testimony
of her elderly aunt and her cousins.  She also submitted employment records relating to her
aunt and her cousin and one report of an arrest of the aunt by INS in which her presence
was recorded as accompanying the aunt.  DHS refused to issue a certificate of citizenship,
but after an immigration judge who heard the testimony of the witnesses terminated the
proceedings, DHS finally issued the certificate of citizenship.  See case on file with author.
315. Many of the U.S. parents and their witnesses are elderly and infirm and present-
ing their testimonies is difficult and discouraging for both the applicant and the busy DHS
adjudicator.  The application for N.Q. was denied for insufficient evidence of her father’s
presence in the United States even though the father, born in 1926, had worked and lived
in the United States for over thirty years before his daughter’s birth in 1971.  He was
interviewed by the DHS adjudicator when he was 80 and almost deaf.  The adjudicator
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records which establish the family’s residence in Mexico and refuses to
acknowledge the U.S.-parent’s lifestyle as a migratory worker in the
United States.  In the absence of substantial documentary evidence of
employment in the United States, CIS is likely to find that the U.S. par-
ent failed to meet the presence requirement of the statute.
B. Citizenship Claims Before the Department of State
In the United States, a citizenship claimant can apply for a U.S. pass-
port under rules established by the DOS in conjunction with or as an
alternative to the application for certificate of citizenship offered by
DHS.316  However, in practice acquired citizenship claimants find the
same barriers when submitting a passport application as they find with
DHS.  The Passport Office is challenged by an enormous number of pass-
port applications which it must adjudicate.317  An application on behalf of
an acquired citizen requires more attention and will not be adjudicated
expeditiously.
Furthermore, the DOS favors state-issued and physician-assisted birth
certificates to establish the parent’s birth in the United States and docu-
mentary evidence to support the parent’s U.S. presence.318  Adjudica-
tions are delayed and often result in denials when applicants present as
evidence delayed and mid-wife executed birth certificates and affidavits
and testimonies.  Moreover, evidence successfully submitted to DHS on
behalf of acquired citizens has been rejected by DOS on behalf of siblings
living abroad.  An example is a daughter of J.Z. who lived in Mexico and
sought to apply for recognition of her acquired citizenship status at a U.S.
consulate.  She used the same evidence which supported her siblings’ ap-
stated, “[i]t becomes difficult to get a straight answer from Mr. Q.”  N.Q. was placed in
removal proceedings and then retained the St.Mary’s Clinic.  Law students discovered that
N.Q.’s father read Spanish.  They painstakingly prepared an affidavit based on the father’s
detailed responses to written questions.  Notwithstanding, the DHS adjudicators have re-
fused to interview the father by written questions.  Case on file with The Scholar: St.
Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues.
316. See supra Part IV.B. The standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence, the
same as with applications for certificates of citizenship.  22 C.F.R. § 51.40 (2010); Patel v.
Rice, 403 F. Supp. 2d 560, 561 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
317. See All Things Considered: Passport Backlog Blamed on New Requirements
(NPR radio broadcast Apr. 4, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story
Id=9359805.  Since January 2007, new rules have taken effect requiring U.S. citizens to
have passports for all plane travel between the United States, Mexico, Canada, and the
Caribbean. Id.  In the months following these changes, DOS handled more than one mil-
lion passport applications per month, and the resulting backlog increased the wait time for
a passport from eight weeks up to three months or more. Id.
318. See Email from Lisa Brodyaga, supra note 96; Interview with Nelly Vielma,
Att’y, (Sept. 29, 2011) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority
Issues).
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proved applications for certificates of citizenship, but her requests were
denied.  Ultimately, J.Z.’s daughter obtained an immigrant visa, was ad-
mitted to the United States and eventually obtained her certificate of citi-
zenship from DHS.319
On June 1, 2009 the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) was
implemented.320  The statute requires that U.S. citizens carry a U.S. pass-
port when departing from or entering the United States.  A crisis in as-
serting claims to citizenship before the DOS occurred when the
government began requiring that all U.S. citizens carry a passport.321  Not
only did the WHTI cause delays in obtaining passports, but many individ-
uals who were born in the United States and acquired U.S. citizenship
were unable to convince the DOS to grant their passport applications.
Applications containing delayed and mid-wife executed birth certificates
and scant documentary evidence of parent presence have often been
denied.322
The regulations provide that a citizenship claimant who is outside the
United States cannot apply for a certificate of citizenship and must resort
to presenting a claim at a United States embassy or consulate.323  Again,
success in asserting a citizenship claim abroad depends on the amount
and type of evidence submitted.  Practitioners state that the DOS abroad
is not likely to accept delayed and mid-wife birth certificates and affida-
vits and testimonies, causing many attorneys to prefer presenting their
clients claims to acquired citizenship in the United States.324
319. Case file of J.Z. (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority
Issues).  Advocates also report that consular officials often challenge the U.S. citizenship of
individuals who appear at the consulates with mid-wife executed and delayed certificates of
birth. Advocates complain that individuals who appear at consulates without counsel are
pressured to sign statements admitting they procured their birth certificates by fraud. See
BRODYAGA, supra note 96, at 4.
320. Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L.
No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (2007).
321. Melissa Del Bosque, Locked Out, TEXAS OBSERVER, May 12, 2010, http://
www.texasobserver.org/archives/item/16529-locked-out?tmpl=component&print=1.
322. See Second Amended Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus, Constitutional Tort
Claims, Bivens Action For Damages, And Class Action Complaint For Declaratory And
Injunctive Relief at 22–23, Castro v. Freeman, Case 1:07-cv-00218 (S.D. Tex. May 3, 2010),
available at http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=32410; see also Valencia-Weber
& Lopez, supra note 65, at 308–09 (discussing the impact of the WHTI on native peoples
who live at or near the U.S.–Mexico border).
323. 8 C.F.R. § 301.1(a)(2) (2011).
324. See Email from Lisa S. Brodyaga, supra note 96; Interview with Nelly Vielma,
supra note 318. See also Second Amended Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus, Constitu-
tional Tort Claims, Bivens Action For Damages, And Class Action Complaint For Declara-
tory And Injunctive Relief at 18, Castro v. Freeman, Case 1:07-cv-00218 (S.D. Tex. May 3,
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C. Citizenship Claims Ignored
Certainly there are instances in which children of U.S. citizens learned
of their claim to acquired citizenship from U.S. government officers.
Those who applied on their own for certificates of citizenship or U.S.
passports report they learned of the process when they or family mem-
bers were petitioning for an immigration benefit at a U.S. consulate or an
INS/DHS office.  However, many individuals born abroad to a U.S. par-
ent do not know they have a claim to acquired citizenship, and it is com-
mon that individuals who have had multiple contacts with officers of the
INS/DHS or State Department, including those who have immigrated to
the United States through a U.S.-citizen parent, are not notified of a pos-
sible claim to citizenship and did not learn of the right until they received
advice from an attorney or legal representative.
DHS has made some improvements to provide notice of citizenship
benefits.  CIS has updated its website to provide more comprehensive
information about immigration and citizenship.  The website includes the
N-600 form, instructions for preparing the form, and commonly asked
questions about citizenship.325  Furthermore, some CIS offices expedite
the adjudication of applications for certificates of citizenship involving in-
dividuals who are detained by DHS or in removal proceedings.326  But,
the legacy INS and DHS have never established a program within the
agency with the task of notifying and locating acquired citizens.327  In
2010), available at http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=32410 (alleging that the
DOS refuses to accept affidavit evidence to support passport applications).
325. Citizenship Through Parents, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://
www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (select “Citizenship Through Parents”) (last updated June
3, 2011).  However, the information provided is only in English. See generally id.
326. Email from Albert W. Blakeway, supra note 44. See also case of P.H. (on file
with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues) (indicating that the CIS of-
ficer traveled to interview witnesses who were unable to appear at the CIS office). See also
Interview with Irma Whiteley, Investigator for the Fed. Pub. Defender’s Office in El Paso,
Tex. (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues) (N-600s on
behalf of detained individuals are expedited); Interview with Maria Rangel, Investigator
for Fed. Pub. Defender’s Office in McAllen, Tex. (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law
Review on Minority Issues) (indicating that N-600 adjudications take a least a year and
defendants charged under immigration-related criminal offenses remained detained).
327. While DHS has the capability to locate some citizens, it has failed to do so, a
problem that often affects derivative citizens.  A child automatically becomes a U.S. citizen
if, while under the age of 18, he or she is admitted as a legal resident, and resides in the
custody of a U.S. citizen parent.  While key information is located in the DHS files relating
to the legal resident child and the naturalized parent, DHS databases have not been up-
dated to reflect the change in the child’s status.  Margaret Stock, Citizenship and Com-
puters, 15 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1143 (2010); see KOHLI ET AL., supra note 3, at 4
(reporting the failure of DHS to update its databases with naturalization data and the
detention of U.S. citizen children of naturalized parents).
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contrast, the agency has made significant efforts to assist other individuals
seeking citizenship benefits, in particular with naturalization applicants.
CIS offices have established programs in communities targeted to inform
and guide legal residents who aspire to become naturalized citizens.328
The lack of prioritization is starkly evident in DHS enforcement where
the agency concern is for unauthorized immigration, crime, and national
security,329 and DHS enforcement officers frequently ignore potential cit-
izen claimants.  There are no requirements that DHS officers provide no-
tice of the provisions for citizenship under U.S. nationality law to
individuals who have a U.S. parent and who are encountered by officers
during enforcement operations.330  DHS officers ignore even obvious citi-
zenship issues that arise during enforcement.331
328. See Memorandum on Naturalization, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1495 (Aug.
22, 1996) as cited in Note, Administrative Denaturalization: Is There “Nothing You Can Do
that Can’t Be [Un]done,” 34 LOYOLA OF L.A. L. REV. 895, n.5 (2001)  President Clinton
announced Citizenship USA in 1996, a program to naturalize one million new citizens and
the program led to 1,049,867 naturalized citizens. Id. at 907.  CIS has also made significant
and admirable efforts to reach out to legal residents who are serving in the armed forces.
See Amy Kirk, Eisenhower Kicks Off Naturalization Campaign (Apr. 19, 2010), NAVY.MIL,
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=52714 (reporting about a program that al-
lows servicemen to more easily apply for citizenship).  In fact, the “National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004” extended all aspects of the naturalization process,
including naturalization applications, interviews, oaths, and ceremonies to members of the
U.S. armed forces serving overseas.  Before October 1, 2004, military service members
could only naturalize while physically within the United States. Since September 2001, US-
CIS has naturalized over 65,000 service men and women.  Anthony Marshall, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. Senior Immigration Services Officer of San Antonio, TX, Address at St.
Mary’s University School of Law & The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues
Symposium: Immigration Law: Practice and Policy in the Twenty-first Century (Mar. 2012)
(source on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues) (quoting text
from slide five of Marshall’s presentation).
329. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 38, at 12–15 (discussing the change in immigration
policies since 9/11); Chacon, supra note 56, at 1856–57 (reporting on the number of foreign
nationals detained by DHS in the name of national security); Miller, supra note 82, at 615
(discussing immigration in terms of national security).
330. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Asst. Sec. U.S. Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement to Field Office Directors, Superseding Guidance on Reporting and In-
vestigating Claims to United States Citizenship (Nov. 19, 2009), available at www.ice.gov/
doclib/detention-reform/pdf/usc_guidance_nov_2009.pdf (directing officials to prioritize in-
vestigations into U.S. citizenship).
331. For instance, cases in which the individual arrested reported to DHS that both
parents are U.S. citizens. See case of J.L. (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review
on Minority Issues).  Mr. L was born in Mexico to two U.S. citizens and acquired citizen-
ship under INA § 301(c), but notwithstanding that he informed several INS and DHS of-
ficers that both his parents were U.S. citizens, he was removed multiple times. See also
infra note 405.
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For example, law students interviewed C.J. when he had just completed
a sentence of 120 days for falsely claiming to be a U.S. citizen.  C.J. was a
legal resident who immigrated through a U.S.-citizen mother, lived with
her and his naturalized U.S.-citizen father, but did not know that he
might have a claim to acquisition to U.S. citizenship.  At the time of his
arrest he was returning to the U.S. from a trip to Mexico but had lost his
permanent resident card.  At the border, he was detained after he told
the inspector that he was a U.S. citizen.  The INS inspector asked him a
series of questions, including the citizenship of his parents.  C.J. re-
sponded that both his parents were U.S. citizens.  At that point it should
have been clear to any trained immigration inspector that C.J. could actu-
ally be a U.S. citizen through one or both parents.  Not only did the of-
ficer fail to notify C.J. of the possibility he could be a citizen, but he
recommended to the U.S. Attorney that C.J. be prosecuted for making a
“false claim to citizenship.”  C.J. was convicted of the offense and after
completion of his criminal sentence, C.J., through his attorneys, asserted
his citizenship claim before an immigration judge and eventually was
granted a certificate of citizenship.332
DHS enforcement officers have the resources and ability to determine
at least prima facie eligibility for acquired citizenship status.  All DHS
officers receive training in immigration and nationality law and presuma-
bly understand that individuals born abroad to a U.S. parent may have a
claim to citizenship.  Forms used by DHS enforcement officers during an
arrest of a suspected non-citizen, particularly the form I-213, request in-
formation concerning the citizenship of parents.333  Many individuals who
are arrested by DHS officers have an administrative file which contains
information about the parents and is accessible to all DHS officers.334
Each year DHS removes hundreds of thousands of individuals follow-
ing a removal order335 or pursuant to a voluntary departure which per-
332. Case file of C.J. (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority
Issues).  Ultimately, C.J. acquired citizenship through his mother because C.J. was born out
of wedlock and the mother established she had been physically present in the United
States at least one year before C.J.’s birth.  This situation is governed by INA § 309, 8
U.S.C. § 1409 (2006).
333. DHS officers prepare a form I-213, Record of Deportable Alien, for every indi-
vidual arrested.  The form contains data concerning the individual, including date of birth,
place of birth and the names and birth places of the individual’s parents. See In re Mejia,
16 I&N Dec. 6 (B.I.A. 1976) (discussing Form I-213, and its role in processing individuals
in immigration arrest, detention, and proceedings).
334. See United States v. Smith-Baltiher, 424 F.3d 913, 916 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting
that the “A-File” provides biographic data and contains all records and documents related
to the individual).
335. See 2010 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 5, at 94 (detailing
the total number of individuals removed by fiscal year).  The total number of individuals
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mits non-citizens to depart the United States and avoid a removal
order.336  Despite the discovery that U.S. citizens are among individuals
detained and even removed by DHS, the agency has established no
screening process and no policy directive which would guarantee that in-
dividuals with a potential claim to citizenship are discovered and their
removal from the United States stayed.337  In 2009, John Morton, Assis-
tant Secretary for ICE, issued a memorandum instructing DHS officers to
investigate and report claims to citizenship which arise during enforce-
ment duties.338  However, the memorandum provides no requirement
removed pursuant to orders by immigration judges (INA § 240(a)) or expedited and rein-
stated orders of removal executed by DHS officers (INA §§ 235(b), 238, 241(a)(5)) for the
ten year period, 2000-2010, is 2,983,413. Id. (identifying the following statistics regarding
removals [FY Year: # individuals removed that year]: 2000:188,467; 2001: 189,026; 2002:
165,168; 2003: 211,098; 2004: 240,665; 2005: 246,431; 2006: 280,974; 2007: 319,382; 2008:
359,795; 2009: 395,165; 2010: 387,242).
336. “The Attorney General may permit an alien voluntarily to depart the United
States at the alien’s own expense . . . in lieu of being subject to proceedings under section
1229a of this title or prior to the completion of such proceedings.”  INA § 240B(a)(1), 8
U.S.C. § 1229c (2000).  During the ten year period, 2000-2010, DHS voluntarily returned a
total of 11,054,756 individuals, and the majority was from Mexico. See 2010 YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 5, at 94–95 (identifying the following statistics re-
garding removals [FY Year: # individuals voluntarily returned that year]: 2000:1,675,876;
2001:1,349,371; 2002:1,012,116; 2003:945,294; 2004:1,166,576; 2005:1,096,920; 2006:1,043,381;
2007:891,390; 2008: 811,263; 2009:586,164; 2010:476,405).
337. The government has launched several programs for screening criminals for po-
tential immigration violations: the Criminal Alien Program (CAP), the 287(g) Program,
and the Secure Communities Program. ROSENBLUM & BRICK, supra note 39 at 1.  Each of
these three programs could initiate policies to screen for possible acquired citizenship and
therefore prevent individuals with a valid claim to U.S. citizenship from being detained
and/or removed. See id. (explaining each program and government efforts to increase en-
forcement against criminal aliens).
338. Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 330.  The memo was meant to “en-
sure claims to U.S. citizenship received immediate and careful investigation and analysis.”
Id. at 1. The memo states that field officers must investigate when they encounter an indi-
vidual who asserts a citizenship claim, but does not establish a screening process for locat-
ing citizens and concrete, department-wide procedures when officers encounter individuals
who have a U.S. parent. Id. The Morton Memorandum follows a similar directive that was
issued on Nov. 6, 2008 by ICE Director James T. Hayes, Jr. and instructed ICE officers to
investigate and report individuals encountered who “either assert claim to U.S. citizenship
or are unsure of their citizenship.”  Jacqueline Stevens, Newly Released ICE Memorandum
Admits US Citizens in ICE Custody, STATES WITHOUT NATIONS BLOG (Oct. 26, 2009),
http://stateswithoutnations.blogspot.com/2009/10/on-november-6-2008-james-hayes-jr.html
(detailing the contents of Hayes memorandum) (proving “superseding guidance on report-
ing and investigating crimes to United States Citizenship”).  Unlike the Morton memo, the
Hayes memo did not mandate a 24-hour reporting deadline. Id. Notwithstanding, compli-
ance with the 24-hour rule is questioned. See Stevens, supra note 8, at 633–34 (finding
evidence through emails that the 24-hour rule was not followed).  While the Morton Memo
increased protections to prevent detention and removal of known U.S. citizens, it also em-
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that DHS officers affirmatively advise individuals in custody of the terms
and procedures for asserting citizenship.339  Furthermore, any benefit of
the Morton Memorandum to a potential acquired citizen comes only af-
ter the individual satisfies DHS that a valid claim exists.340
V. ASSERTING CLAIMS BEFORE THE IMMIGRATION COURT
For an individual who is fortunate to learn of a possible claim to ac-
quired U.S. citizenship prior to removal, immigration court provides an
additional avenue for asserting a claim and for resolution of disputed
facts and legal issues.  Notwithstanding, immigration court regulations
phasizes to enforcement officers the need to document false claims to citizenship.  Memo-
randum from John Morton, supra note 330.  The memo includes requirements that officers
work with local U.S. Attorneys “to ensure that any statement includes information suffi-
cient to use in prosecuting appropriate cases under 18 USC § 911” for false claims to citi-
zenship. Id. at 3.
339. See Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 330 (providing only direction
on how to properly investigate claims).
340. See id. (directing officials not to arrest anyone who has provided evidence that
they are a U.S. citizen).  The Morton Memo has served to prevent the removal of some
citizenship claimants, and in an effort to prevent the detention of U.S. citizens, DHS
launched a toll free hotline for detained individuals who believe they are U.S. citizens. See
News Release, ICE Establishes Hotline for Detained Individuals, Issues New Detainer
Form (Dec. 29, 2011) (available at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1112/111229wash-
ingtondc.htm).  However, a toll free hotline can only benefit individuals who know they
are citizens, and DHS continues to detain individuals even after receiving substantial evi-
dence of citizenship.  The memo states that individuals should not be detained if there is
“probative evidence” of U.S. citizenship and “if the evidence of U.S. citizenship outweighs
evidence to the contrary.” Id. at 1.   DHS demands conclusive evidence of citizenship in
cases of individuals claiming acquired citizenship.  For instance, J.L. was born in Mexico to
two U.S. parents and had been removed from the U.S. multiple times prior to his arrest by
DHS in March 2009. See infra note 405.  A DHS officer finally investigated his claim, but
even with the birth certificates of both parents and evidence that they married, J.L. re-
mained in custody for three months until an immigration judge terminated proceedings.
Case on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues.  In the case of
M.J. who was arrested by DHS in 2010, DHS refused to agree to his release from detention
even though his older brother’s removal case had been terminated upon evidence that the
father was born in the U.S. and had been physically present ten years prior to the brother’s
birth.  Case on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues.  The law
students representing M.J. requested a bond hearing and the immigration judge ordered
the release of M.J.  Furthermore, the Morton Memo does not instruct DHS officers to
cancel reinstatement of removal orders relating to individuals who have been removed and
subsequently discovered to have citizenship claims. See Memorandum from John Morton,
supra note 330, at 1.  Consequently, although citizenship claims have been asserted, the
claimants remain in detention and subject to reinstatement of prior orders. See id. Rein-
statement of removal orders deprive individuals of a hearing before an immigration judge,
prevent motions to reopen the prior order of removal, and provide very limited access to
judicial review. See infra Part VI.A.  Acquired-citizen claimants who are unable to conclu-
sively prove their citizenship continue to be removed under reinstatement orders. Id.
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compound the general lack of notice and fail to require that immigration
judges inform all individuals of the terms and procedures by which a child
born abroad to a U.S. citizen can acquire citizenship.341  With no guaran-
teed access to legal representation, individuals who are unaware of possi-
ble claims can be ordered removed from the United States.  In the midst
of an already flawed system for hearing claims to citizenship, Congress
ushered in major changes in immigration law in 1996, first in AEDPA342
and a few months later, in IIRIRA,343 and dramatic increases in enforce-
ment against noncitizens exposed more individuals who have a U.S. par-
ent and potential claim to U.S. citizenship to detention and removal.
A. Citizenship Claims in Removal Proceedings
Immigration court provides a trial-like setting appropriate to hear citi-
zenship claims and there have been successful outcomes for children of
U.S. citizens, including many whose applications for certificates of citi-
zenship and U.S. passports have failed before the DHS and DOS.  The
immigration judge will consider and evaluate all the evidence, including
testimony of witnesses, and resolve questions of fact and law concerning
the birth and presence of the parent.344
Hearings before an immigration judge provided B.V. with the opportu-
nity to fully present his claim to citizenship and to establish his father’s
required physical presence.  The judge heard the witness testimony which
corroborated the evidence that B.V.’s father had lived and worked in the
United States most of his life and ultimately, discounted the incomplete
and unfair DHS position that B.V.’s father resided in Mexico and only
occasionally came to the United States to work.345
341. See infra Section V. A.
342. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214.
343. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009.
344. Immigration judges are all lawyers and “their only responsibility is adjudication.
They conduct relatively formal, evidentiary, adversarial hearings.”  Legomsky, supra note
218, at 1305.
345. Initially, the immigration judge in B.V.’s case terminated the proceeding based
on res judicata and collateral estoppel.  The judge relied on the findings of the immigration
judge who determined in B.V.’s brother’s case that the U.S.-citizen father met the ten years
of physical presence requirements of INA § 301(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g).  The DHS appealed
to the BIA, which ruled that res judicata and collateral estoppel principles apply only to
B.V.’s brother and not to B.V.  On remand, the judge re-determined the physical presence
issue, found that B.V. was likely a U.S. citizen, and terminated the proceeding.  The BIA
decision in B.V.’s case conflicted with an earlier AAU decision, In re J.D.-G. (AAU 1985)
in which evidence that established the older brother’s acquired citizenship was held deter-
minative in the younger brother’s case. Case on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law
Review on Minority Issues.  See also ENDELMAN, supra note 209, at 5.
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In a similar case, S.R. asserted his claim to U.S. citizenship before an
immigration judge.  The N-600 application that S.R.’s father had submit-
ted when his son was a child had been denied in 1977 by legacy INS for
insufficient evidence of the father’s physical presence.  Thereafter, S.R.
was removed multiple times by INS officers before he asserted his claim
before an immigration judge in 1993.346  S.R.’s father was born in 1928
and testified that he had worked continuously in the United States in
farm and ranch labor.  Several of the father’s siblings gave vivid and de-
tailed testimony of the father’s presence in the United States.  The judge
found that S.R. was likely a U.S. citizen and terminated the proceedings.
In both cases the claimant presented substantially the same evidence in
the earlier N-600 applications for certificate of citizenship and in immi-
gration court.347  In both cases, after the immigration judges’ orders ter-
minating removal proceedings, DHS granted motions to reopen and
issued certificates of citizenship to both B.V. and S.R.348
Notwithstanding the ability to successfully assert a claim to citizenship
in a removal proceeding as a defense to removal and the advantage to
doing so in some cases involving complex factual and legal issues, there is
no guarantee that a respondent in removal proceedings will be fully ad-
vised of the rules for obtaining U.S. citizenship.  The first allegation of
facts in the Notice to Appear, which is served on the respondent by DHS
and filed with the immigration court, charges that the respondent is not a
citizen of the United States and signifies that removal proceedings may
not proceed against a U.S. citizen.  The immigration judge is not required
346. In one arrest by the Border Patrol on December 14, 1986, S.R. attempted to
assert his claim for citizenship.  The Border Patrol agent noted on the form I-213 that he
spoke to the father and agreed that S.R. was likely a U.S. citizen.  But, the next day on
December 15, 1986 the agent amended his notes to state that “subject was determined to
be an illegal alien.”  S.R. was deported following the arrest.  I-213 relating to S.R. on file
with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues.
347. The N-600 application for S.R. was prepared by a well-known immigration attor-
ney, Sarah Reinhardt, when she was a law student working in a summer program for a non-
profit legal project for migrant farm workers in the Midwest.  The application meticulously
documented S.R.’s father’s presence in the United States and included a very detailed affi-
davit from the father.  S.R. and his family moved from the area to South Texas and lost
contact with their attorneys.  Legacy INS denied the N-600, but in 1993 when S.R.
presented his claim to the immigration judge, he submitted the same evidence previously
filed with the N-600, and S.R.’s father testified consistent with his earlier statement.
348. While these cases demonstrate that acquired citizenship disputes can be settled in
immigration court, there is no guarantee that DHS will issue a certificate of citizenship
after an immigration judge orders a termination of proceedings.  The agency may remain at
odds with the judge’s findings.  In some cases the citizenship claim is left unresolved. See
Rios-Valenzuela v. DHS, 506 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2007) (dismissing the case for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction); Ortega v. Holder, 592 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 2010) (remanding the
case to the lower court for further proceedings).
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to provide any additional specific information about citizenship to ensure
that the respondent fully understands the law and a respondent who is
unaware of the terms by which an individual born abroad can acquire
citizenship will likely answer the question in the negative.
Individuals in removal proceedings generally appear before an immi-
gration judge who is present in the courtroom or by televideo linked to a
courtroom located at a detention site.  The regulations mandate that im-
migration judges notify individuals in removal proceedings of certain
rights such as to obtain counsel, to present evidence and to appeal,349 and
furthermore, requires notice of any “apparent eligibility to apply for any
of the benefits.”350  Arguably if an immigration judge learns that an indi-
vidual in removal proceedings has a U.S. parent, his or her status as an
acquired citizenship would be apparent and trigger notice of the require-
ments for acquired citizenship under U.S. law.  EOIR publishes an Immi-
gration Court Bench Book which provides a checklist of questions for use
by immigration judges when addressing unrepresented individuals, and
the list includes the question, “[w]ere your parents or grandparents ever
United States citizens.”351  However, not all immigration judges use the
suggested checklist,352 and the statute and the regulations do not man-
date that an immigration judge inquire as to the respondent’s parents nor
explain acquisition of citizenship under U.S. law.353  Furthermore, there
349. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10 (2010); Picca v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 2008);
United States v. Jimenez-Marmolejo, 104 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1996).
350. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2). See United States v. Gonzalez-Valerio, 342 F.3d 1051,
1054 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that petitioner argued that his due process rights were violated
when he wasn’t informed of his right to petition for relief under the appropriate section of
the INA).
351. EOIR Immigration Court Bench Book, supra note 25.
352. Interview with Judge Howard Van Winkle, Former Immigration Judge (Sept. 30,
2011).  A survey of six immigration judges in the San Antonio immigration court in 2011
revealed that the judges have not consistently asked detained and unrepresented individu-
als if they had a U.S. citizen parent or grandparent. Id. Retired Judge Howard Van Win-
kle states that the EOIR guidelines are recent and that in his experience most judges have
not on a regular basis asked detainees if they have a parent or grandparent who is a U.S.
citizen. Id.  Furthermore, EOIR does not monitor immigration judges to determine
whether they do inquire about parental citizenship when addressing unrepresented individ-
uals.  Interview with Marion Hicks, EOIR Court Adm’r (Oct. 5, 2011).
353. I argue that at a minimum the immigration judge should follow the EOIR guide-
lines and ask all unrepresented individuals whether they have a parent or grandparent who
is a U.S. citizen.  However, as any practitioner of immigration and nationality law knows,
there are several questions that must be asked at an initial interview, and it would seem
more appropriate for EOIR to provide for every respondent in removal proceedings more
in-depth information about U.S. citizenship law.  Robert Mautino advises, “[y]our first
questions to all prospective immigration clients should be along these lines: (1) Where
were you born? (2) Where were your parents, grandparents and great-grandparents born?
(3) To your knowledge, do you have any direct-line ancestors who were born in the
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are many instances when the respondent in removal proceedings does not
appear before an immigration judge, either in person or by televideo.354
The regulations permit an immigration judge to enter a stipulated re-
moval order in which the respondent waives his right to a hearing.355
While the immigration judge is required to determine that the waiver of a
hearing by an unrepresented individual is “voluntary, knowing and intel-
ligent,”356 the stipulated order fails to provide any information about ac-
quired citizenship.
B. Increased Enforcement
Congress ushered in changes to immigration law enforcement which
led to dramatic increases in the detention and removal of purported de-
portable non-citizens.357  While immigration law has consistently imposed
consequences to non-citizens who commit or are convicted of crimes,358
[United States], naturalized in the [United States] or lived for several years or more in the
[United States]? (4) Please answer the same questions regarding your spouse. (5) Did you
or your spouse ever perform U.S. military service?” 90 IMMIGRATION BRIEFING 2 (Apr.
1990). See BALDINI-POTERMIN, supra note 225, at § 5:12 (listing two pages of questions
that a practitioner should ask a client to assess nationality and citizenship).
354. For example, individuals detained at the DHS contract-detention facilities in
Laredo and Pearsall, hearings are held via televideo, with the judge presiding at the court-
house in San Antonio, Texas. About the Court, IMMIGR. COURT–SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/sibpages/sna/about.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
355. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (2010).  Professor Jill E. Family soundly criticizes this and
other means of removal as a diversion from the immigration adjudication system and a
violation of sound administrative law practices.  Family, supra note 23, at 598.
356. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b).
357. Nora Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement
Tools in the “War” on Terrorism?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1061–63 (2002).
358. Early immigration laws provided sanctions for criminals; for example, the Act of
1875 established exclusion grounds based on prostitution and convictions. DAN KESSEL-
BRENNER & LORY ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES (West 2011).  Long-es-
tablished crime-based grounds of inadmissibility and deportability include crimes of
moral turpitude, INA § 212(a)(2)(A)((i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and INA
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i); controlled substances offenses, INA
§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i); and weapons crimes, INA § 237(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C).  In
1988, Congress, in a push to expand enforcement against drug trafficking, enacted the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988), and established a new
ground of deportability for aggravated felonies, INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  As defined originally, the term aggravated felony meant convictions
for and any attempts and conspiracies to commit “murder, any drug trafficking crime as
defined in section 924(c)(2) of title 18 . . . or any illicit trafficking in any firearms or de-
structive devices as defined in section 921 of such title . . . .”   INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43) (1988). See Demleitner, supra note 357, at 1065–66 (explaining the develop-
ment of the term “aggravated felonies”).  Congress then made incremental changes which
expanded the definition of aggravated felonies in IMMACT 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104
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AEDPA and IIRIRA significantly changed the law by expanding the na-
ture and scope of crime-based grounds of inadmissibility and de-
portability and mandating detention for a large number of non-citizens
convicted of crimes.359  The 1996 legislation further diminished or elimi-
nated forms of relief which had traditionally been available to non-citi-
zens deportable for crimes.360  To increase apprehension of non-citizens
illegally in the United States but deportable for crimes, the legislation
Stat. 4978 (adding crimes of violence to the definition) and in Immigration & Technical
Correction Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4305 (adding conviction for theft
and burglary). See generally KESSELBRENNER & ROSENBERG, supra; IRA KURZBAN, PRAC-
TISING LAW INST., CRIMINALIZING IMMIGRATION LAW 325 (Oct. 13–14, 2009) (reflecting on
the current paradigm of criminalizing civil conduct in immigration law).
359. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. 104-
132, § 435, 440, 110 Stat. 1214; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 104-208, §§  305, 321–322, 344, 347, 350, 110 Stat. 3009;
KESSELBRENNER & ROSENBERG, supra note 358; Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Im-
pact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 1936, 1936 (2000); KURZBAN, supra note 358, at 325 (identifying that under the
1996 legislation, “Congress radically altered how lawful permanent residents and non-re-
sidents would be treated upon the commission or conviction of an aggravated felony”).
360. The most notable waiver for crime-based grounds of inadmissibility was found
under former INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), a provision which allowed the immigration
judge to consider and balance the equities involving long term immigrants and their fami-
lies, and determine as a matter of discretion whether the individual should be deported.
Former INA § 212(c) was part of the 1917 Proviso and authorized discretionary relief to
individuals charged with offenses covered in the grounds of inadmissibility. See In re Her-
nandez-Casillas, 20 I&N Dec. 262, 262 (B.I.A. 1990), aff’d, 983 F.2d. 231 (5th Cir. 1993)
(concluding that § 212(c) does not provide a ground of exclusion and therefore, once a
lawful permanent resident is found to be deportable for entry without inspection they are
ineligible for a waiver under that section); In re Marin, 16 I&N 581, 581 (B.I.A. 1978)
(explaining that it is necessary to balance “the adverse factors of record evidencing an
alien’s undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane considerations
presented in his behalf” when determining whether to grant relief).  INA § 212(c) re-
mained virtually intact until 1990 when Congress barred relief for those aggravated felons
who actually served a five-year prison term. See In re Ramirez-Somera, 20 I&N Dec. 564,
564–65 (B.I.A. 1992) (denying the opportunity for a § 212(c) waiver because respondent
had been convicted of two aggravated felonies and served a term of imprisonment for at
least five years).  AEDPA barred access to § 212(c) relief to most non-citizens charged
under crime-based grounds. AEDPA §§ 435, 440.  IIRIRA repealed the statute altogether
and replaced it with a new form of relief, cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(a).
IIRIRA § 304(a)(3) (inserting a new section entitled “Cancellation of Removal for Certain
Permanent Residents”).  However, cancellation of removal is unavailable to non-citizens
who have been convicted of an aggravated felony and also includes strict residence re-
quirements that further narrow relief. See Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence:
Uncovering Contributors to the Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541,
556–57 (2011) (“Once a deportability ground attaches . . . there is a narrow avenue of
potential relief from deportation.  The narrowness of this relief also exhibits the harshness
and complexity of immigration law.”).
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authorized substantial funding for enforcement.361  Furthermore, the gov-
ernment launched cooperative programs with local law enforcement
authorities.362
The level of enforcement officers rose to an unprecedented 17,057
agents as of 2010.363  Since 1996, detention of deportable individuals has
mushroomed, and in 2010 DHS detained 363,000 individuals.364  Not sur-
prisingly, immigration courts have experienced extraordinary increases in
their caseloads.365  Between 2006 and 2010, the cases filed in immigration
court increased from 351,051 to 392,888.366  Individual immigration
judges may carry caseloads in excess of 1,000 cases, and most cases in-
volved detained individuals.367  Furthermore, a crisis developed in legal
representation as the number of unrepresented individuals in removal
361. IIRIRA § 385 (authorizing appropriations of $150 million in order to fund the
new provisions relating to the removal of aliens).
362. See KOHLI ET AL., supra note 3, at 1 (introducing the Secure Communities pro-
gram that helps to mobilize law enforcement resources on the local level to enforce federal
immigration laws).  The 287(g) and Secure Community programs gave DHS access to
“every individual booked into a local county jail, usually while still in pre-trial custody.”
Id.  Congress allocated $200 million each year in 2009 and 2010 to fund the Secure Com-
munity program. Id. at 3.
363. Angie Drobnic Holan, U.S. has more border patrol agents on the border with
Mexico than ever, but debate goes on, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), July 2, 2010, 2010
WLNR 13457481 (identifying the massive increase in the number of agents; there were
only 6,315 agents in 1997).
364. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010, supra note 7, at 1; see Family,
supra note 360, at 560 (explaining that DHS continued to set detention records year after
year).
365. The increase in cases has led to widespread concern among federal judges as to
the quality of decisions made by immigration judges. See Figueroa v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d
487, 490 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the Immigration Judge applied incorrect standards
when making his decision).  Commensurate with the increases in cases filed in immigration
courts was a streamlining of the appellate body, the Board of Immigration Appeals.  Fed-
eral courts have also been critical of the streamlining procedures sanctioned by the Board.
See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829–30 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the adju-
dication of these cases by the Board “has fallen below the minimum standards of legal
justice”).
366. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2010 STATISTI-
CAL YEARBOOK A1, available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy10syb.pdf [hereinaf-
ter DEP’T OF JUSTICE YEARBOOK].  The number of cases for 2011 is expected to rise to
400,000. Immigration Court Backlog Tool: Pending Cases and Length of Wait in Immigra-
tion Court, TRAC IMMIGRATION, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/
(last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
367. Noel Brennan, A View from the Immigration Bench, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 623,
624 (2009); Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing
Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, a Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 545
(2009).
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proceedings grew.368  With no guaranteed legal assistance, detained indi-
viduals in removal proceedings faced an exceedingly complicated law, im-
migration courts taxed with a high volume of cases, and a formidable
DHS.369
The number of immigration lawyers in the United States has steadily
increased, but there are not enough lawyers who are dedicated to provid-
ing assistance to individuals who are detained and facing removal.370  The
detention facilities used by DHS are frequently located in areas where
there are few if any immigration attorneys or public interest organiza-
tions able to provide immigration assistance.371  Public interest organiza-
tions which provide legal services to indigents are understaffed and
experience the never ending challenge of obtaining adequate funding.372
368. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE YEARBOOK, supra note 366, at G1 (illustrating that in 2010
fifty-seven percent of cases completed in immigration court involved unrepresented indi-
viduals); see also Brennan, supra note 367, at 626 (“This means that the detainee must
manage the acquisition of documents and identification of witnesses from behind bars . . . .
All this puts substantial pressure on the judge to ensure that available relief is thoroughly
explored and the record is fully developed.”); Markowitz, supra note 367, at 542 (reporting
that from 2002 until 2007, over 800,000 individuals facing removal were unrepresented by
counsel).
369. See Jennifer L. Colyer et al., The Representational and Counseling Needs of the
Immigrant Poor, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 461, 464 (2009) (stating that “[t]he government will
be on the other side with its awesome power, extensive institutional experience, and so-
phisticated understanding of the law”).
370. Securing legal representation for detained individuals is by no means a new prob-
lem.  Professor Margaret Taylor discussed the issue in her 1997 article when the detainee
population was significantly less than it is today.  Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal
Representation for Detained Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 CONN L.
REV. 1647, 1663–64 (1997) (identifying that INS has the capacity to detain 12,000 detainees
and ninety percent are not represented). See also Michael Churgin, An Essay on Legal
Representation of Non-Citizens in Detention, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 167,
173 (2009) (explaining that obtaining counsel is often “like the proverbial search for a
needle in a haystack”).  The number of members of the American Immigration Lawyers
Association (AILA) has increased from 6,858 in 2000 to 11,343 in 2010.  AILA member-
ship statistics on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues.  How-
ever, many private immigration lawyers do not accept removal cases, particularly for
detained individuals, because of the complexity and the cost. See Markowitz, supra note
367, at 549 (“[p]rivate attorneys are hesitant to take on the hardest, most time-consuming
cases[—]deportation defense cases[—]since . . . those clients are most likely to default on
their financial obligations.”).
371. Benson, supra note 270, at 54–55.
372. See Markowitz, supra note 367, at 549 (explaining that a major problem with
non- profit organizations is lack of funding).  An important source of legal services to the
poor, the Legal Services Corporation (LSC), is restricted from providing comprehensive
legal services to many immigrant groups and also faces funding shortages.  Alan W. House-
man, Restrictions by Funders and the Ethical Practice of Law, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2187,
2188–89 (1999).  And, even while U.S. citizens are eligible for LSC funded services, many
legal services programs no longer provide immigration and citizenship services because of
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Pro bono representation is very limited, particularly for individuals
targeted under the new laws.  Immigration and nationality law is viewed
by lawyers to be so complex and harsh that few want to volunteer to help
even the most deserving individuals.373  Lawyers who agree to provide
pro bono representation generally do not favor accepting those cases in-
volving individuals who are detained and have criminal convictions,374
and prefer instead to represent asylees and victims of crime.375
C. Removal of Citizens
The unprecedented level of enforcement contributed to a greater num-
ber of U.S. citizens subject to detention and removal proceedings.  The
immigration courts do not track the cases in which ultimately the removal
proceedings were terminated based on claims to acquired U.S. citizen-
ship.376  Similarly, the DHS does not record the number of applications
for certificates of citizenship adjudicated for individuals in DHS custody
the restrictions, lack of funds, and insufficient staff. See Geoffrey Heeren, Illegal Aid: Le-
gal Assistance to Immigrants in the United States, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 619, 657–58 (2011)
(indicating the difficulty that individuals who need immigration assistance face if they can-
not afford representation).  Law school clinics, such as the immigration clinics at St. Mary’s
University School of Law, the University of Texas Law School, and the University of Hous-
ton School of Law, provide legal services to individuals in removal proceedings in a setting
that is appropriate for law students’ training in practical skills. See generally Karen Barton
et al., Valuing What Clients Think: Standardized Clients and the Assessment of Communica-
tive Competence, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (2006) (assessing the need for developing inter-
viewing skills in law school); Carol Suzuki, Unpacking Pandora’s Box: Innovative
Techniques for Effectively Counseling Asylum Applicants Suffering from Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder, 4 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 235 (2007) (discussing significance of
interviewing techniques which can be acquired in clinic immigration cases).  However, law
school clinics and other public interest organizations that provide much needed legal ser-
vices, are not able to meet the demands of a growing population of detained individuals.
Churgin, supra note 370, at 175–76.
373. See Family, supra note 360, at 542 (describing immigration law is “an insulated
realm practiced by too few”).
374. See Chacon, supra note 56, at 1856 (explaining the difference in classification of
“criminal aliens” and those who are simply classified as “non-citizens”); Family, supra note
360, at 569 (“The government’s efforts to brand the removal process as a tool to protect
Americans from crime and national security threats may cause some attorneys to think
twice before engaging in representation.”); Markowitz, supra note 367, at 561 (explaining
that it is often difficult to even determine what cases are appropriate for representation).
DHS also contributes to a culture where only the “deserving alien” should receive free
legal services.  On a few occasions DHS trial attorneys have voiced their opposition to
some of the cases the St. Mary’s University Immigration & Human Rights clinic has ac-
cepted.  In one, the trial attorney asked the supervising attorney why the clinic was wasting
its resources on representing a criminal alien.  That individual, who had immigrated
through his U.S.-citizen father, was a U.S. citizen.
375. Colyer et al., supra note 369, at 470.
376. Interview with Marion Hicks, supra note 352.
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or subject to removal and reinstatement proceedings.377  However, immi-
gration attorneys who regularly appear in removal proceedings and the
public interest organizations that assist indigent populations have en-
countered individuals who have valid claims to acquired citizenship.378
Many have successfully asserted their claims.
Attorneys providing representation to individuals charged under immi-
gration related criminal statutes, such as illegal entry under INA Section
275 and illegal reentry after removal under INA Section 276, have also
discovered U.S. citizens amongst these individuals.379  Immigration au-
thorities have frequently combined civil proceeding for removal with
prosecution and sentencing under immigration-related criminal stat-
utes.380  Although individuals in removal proceedings may be unrepre-
377. Email from Albert W. Blakeway, supra note 44.
378. Email from Lisa S. Brodyaga, supra note 96; Email from Anne Monahan, Att’y,
to Lee Tera´n, Clinical Professor of Law, St. Mary’s Univ. Sch. of Law (Sept. 21, 2011) (on
file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues); Interview with Nelly
Vielma, supra note 318; Interview with Javier Maldonado, Att’y (Sept. 9, 2011) (on file
with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues). See case of B.V. (charged
with a drug possession conviction); case of C.J. (charged with false claim to citizenship and
a drug possession conviction) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority
Issues); case of N.Q. (charged with unlawful presence) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s
Law Review on Minority Issues); case of M.J. (charged with drug possession) (on file with
The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues); case of J.L (charged with tres-
pass) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues).  In a 2009
survey of thirty-one members of AILA working in Minnesota, thirty-eight percent of the
attorneys reported they had represented “at least one U.S. citizen who was in immigration
detention,” although the majority were derivative citizens instead of acquired citizens. See
Jacob Chin et al., Attorneys’ Perspectives on the Rights of Detained Immigrants in Minne-
sota, 40 CURA REPORTER 16 (2010), available at http://www.cura.umn.edu/sites/
cura.advantagelabs.com/files/publications/40-1&2-Fennelly-et-al.pdf (reporting that some
attorneys had clients who were detained even when credible claims to U.S. citizenship had
been exerted, and one described a case in which a U.S. citizen agreed to be deported in
order to get out of detention).
379. INA § 275(a), 8 USC § 1325(a), penalizes “[a]ny alien who (1) enters or attempts
to enter the United States at any time or place other than as designated by immigration
officers, or (2) eludes examination or inspection by immigration officers, or (3) attempts to
enter or obtains entry to the United States by a willfully false or misleading representation
or the willful concealment of a material fact.” Id.  An alien who “enters, attempts to enter,
or is at any time found, in the United States” after having been deported, excluded or
removed is subject to prosecution under INA § 276.  INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)
(2006).
380. See KURZBAN, supra note 358, at 326–27 (explaining that the government has
increasingly used criminal prosecution in conjunction with civil removal); Chacon, supra
note 56, at 1856–57 (explaining that there has been a “remarkable expansion in security-
related expansions of the INA”).  Consequently, prosecution rates in federal district court
have soared to the point that more than one-half of all criminal cases are immigration
related. KURZBAN, supra note 358, at 327.  District courts located along the U.S. and Mex-
ico border have seen their caseloads rise more than five-fold. See Surge in Immigration
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sented, they are entitled to appointment of legal counsel if subject to
criminal prosecution.  Furthermore, in prosecutions under INA Section
275 and INA Section 276 citizenship of the defendant is a factor the gov-
ernment must prove.381  During their investigation in these cases, federal
public defenders have found that many of their clients were unaware that
they had valid citizenship claims and are in fact U.S. citizens.382
The number of cases in some areas on the U.S. and Mexico border is
significant and has resulted in changes in training and protocol for offices
of federal public defenders.  For instance, public defenders in the South-
ern and the Western Districts of Texas interview all defendants regarding
their parentage and assign paralegals to investigate each case in which the
client has a U.S. parent.383  Attorneys who are federal public defenders
cannot represent the defendants in their civil proceedings before the CIS
and the immigration judges, but they assist the clients in obtaining evi-
dence of the acquired citizenship as part of the defense to the immigra-
tion-related criminal charges.384  In 2011, the Laredo, Texas office of the
Federal Public Defender reported that twelve criminal prosecutions were
dismissed by the federal court due to likely U.S. citizenship of the defend-
ants, and two individuals obtained certificates of citizenship.385  The other
Prosecutions Continues, TRAC IMMIGRATION (June 17, 2008), http://www.trac.syr.edu/im-
migration/reports/188 (illustrating that in March of 2008, such prosecutions increased by
fifty percent from February 2008, and by almost seventy-three percent since 2007).  Con-
tributing to the increased prosecutions is the rise in individuals returning to the United
States after removal.  In 2005, forty-four percent of individuals arrested by DHS had prior
removals; in 2010 the rate rose to fifty-six percent. See Damien Cave, Crossing Over, and
Over, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2011, at A1 (explaining that prosecution for illegal reentry has
increased by two-thirds and is the most prosecuted federal felony).
381. See United States v. Sandoval-Gonzalez, 642 F.3d 717, 722 (9th Cir. 2011) (stat-
ing that “alienage is a core element of the 8 U.S.C. § 1326 offense”); United States v.
Cervantez-Nava, 281 F.3d 501, 504 (5th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the United States has
the burden of proving alien status as an important element of any illegal re-entry charge).
In United States v. Smith-Baltiher, a district judge stated, “there seems [to] be a lot of
citizenship cases as a defense to 1326.”  United States v. Smith-Baltiher, 424 F.3d 913, 918
n.5 (9th Cir. 2005).
382. Etter, supra note 9 (telling the story of an individual who was deported, despite
the fact that it was likely that he was a U.S. citizen); Interview with Irma Whiteley, supra
note 326; Interview with Maria Rangel, supra note 326.
383. Email from Horatio Aldredge, Asst. Pub. Fed. Defender, to Lee Tera´n, Clinical
Professor of Law, St. Mary’s Univ. Sch. of Law (Feb. 3, 2010); Interview with David Cas-
tillo, Fed. Pub. Defender for the S. Dist. of Tex. (Sept. 21, 2011); Interview with Irma
Whiteley, supra note 326; Interview with Shelly Strayer, Asst. Chief Investigator for the
Fed. Pub. Defender’s Office for S. Dist. of Tex. (Sept. 21, 2011); Interview with Maria
Rangel, supra note 326.
384. Interview with Irma Whiteley, supra note 326; Interview with Shelly Strayer,
supra note 383; Interview with Maria Rangel, supra note 326.
385. Interview with Shelly Strayer, supra note 383.
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ten individuals were referred to private attorneys for assistance in com-
pleting their applications for certificate of citizenship.386  In the El Paso,
Texas office of the Federal Public Defender, one investigator reports that
she receives approximately one to two cases each week involving a possi-
ble U.S. citizen facing federal immigration-related prosecution.387  In the
past four years she reported that in sixteen of the cases she handled, crim-
inal charges were dismissed and the defendants were issued certificates of
citizenship by CIS.388  An investigator with the McAllen, Texas office of
the Federal Public Defender also stated there are significant numbers of
individuals with a U.S. parent and viable claims to U.S. citizenship that
her office represents in criminal prosecutions, and that she spends ap-
proximately twenty percent of her time investigating such cases.389  Fur-
thermore, the investigators working at the federal public defenders
offices reported that many of the individuals who ultimately obtain a cer-
tificate of citizenship were charged with reentry after removal under INA
Section 276, and consequently, were deported or removed before the
claim to citizenship was discovered.390
VI. EXTRAORDINARY MIGRATION AND UNRELENTING REMOVAL
Prior to April 1, 1997, the effective date of IIRIRA, an individual who
was deported and later returned to the United States retained the right to
present a claim to acquired citizenship in any subsequent deportation
proceeding.  Then, Congress enacted IIRIRA and expanded in INA Sec-
tion 241(a)(5) the authority of INS/DHS to reinstate prior orders of de-
386. Id.  Four of the ten individuals whose criminal cases were dismissed are being
represented by Attorney Nelly Vielma and she reported that each has a pending N-600
with CIS.  Interview with Nelly Vielma, supra note 318.
387. Interview with Irma Whiteley, supra note 326.
388. Id.
389. Interview with Maria Rangel, supra note 326.  Ms. Rangel stated that until five
years ago she assisted defendants in preparing N-600s and she estimated her office handled
about fifteen per year. Id. She no longer is able to assist in preparing applications for
certificates of citizenship because the time for CIS adjudication of the N-600 exceeds one
year. Id. Presently, she prepares the evidence of citizenship that will assist in obtaining
dismissal of the criminal charges, and then refers the defendant to an immigration attorney
or to the U.S. consulate abroad. Id. She stated that some individuals whose criminal cases
are dismissed are removed by DHS, but after removal have been able to obtain a U.S.
passport at the U.S. consulate. Id. She further stated that there are other individuals who
are removed and did not prevail in their efforts to obtain a U.S. passport. Id. She was
aware that some have re-entered the United States and  been removed again by DHS. Id.
390. Interview with Irma Whiteley, supra note 326; Interview with Shelly Strayer,
supra note 383; Interview with Maria Rangel, supra note 326.  Irma Whiteley stated that
most of her clients are men in their twenties or thirties, but she recalled two men in their
sixties who had “struggled their whole lives” as undocumented immigrants when actually
they were U.S. citizens.  Interview with Irma Whiteley, supra note 326.
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portation and removal.391  Reinstatement of prior orders of deportation
and removal departs significantly from past procedures and is fundamen-
tally at odds with due process.  The statute contains no procedure for
adjudicating a claim to U.S. citizenship.392  Prior orders of deportation
and removal are reinstated and executed by low level immigration of-
ficers and under guidelines established by INS/DHS, the U.S. claimant
has no opportunity for a hearing before an immigration judge.393  Be-
cause the statute prohibits the filing of a motion to reopen, a U.S.-citizen
claimant has no means to effectively challenge the prior deportation or
removal order.394
Furthermore, the statutory scheme for judicial review of a reinstate-
ment order is insupportable constitutionally.  Congress has channeled the
judicial review of all removal orders to the court of appeals, narrowed the
filing deadline to thirty days and eliminated the automatic stay of re-
moval.395  The enactment of the REAL-ID Act in 2005 with an apparent
elimination of writs of habeas corpus as an alternative means of review
places some individuals who have unresolved claims to citizenship with-
391. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2000).
392. INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2000).
393. See Reinstatement of Removal Orders, 8 C.F.R. § 241.8 (2010) (providing that an
“alien has no right to a hearing before an immigration judge”; 62 Fed. Reg. 444, 451 (Jan. 3,
1997) (stating that the district director could reinstate a final order after verification of the
individual’s identity and unlawful reentry, and that “[r]emoval would be accomplished
under the proposed rule without referral to the Immigration Court.”).
394. INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (stating that the prior order “is not sub-
ject to be reopened or reviewed”).  Given the specific bar to reopening the prior order, it is
unlikely that an individual who discovers a claim to acquired citizenship after having reen-
tered the United States can utilize the statutory provisions for motions to reopen and to
reconsider under INA § 240(c)(6) and (c)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6) and (c)(7) to present
the claim to citizenship and request vacation of the order. Motions to reopen and to recon-
sider were once regulatory procedures and then codified by IIRIRA.  Dada v. Mukasey,
554 U.S. 1, 14 (2008).  The statute permits a respondent who is subject to a final order of
removal to file one motion to reconsider within thirty days, INA § 240(c)(6), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(6), and one motion to reopen within ninety days, INA § 240(c)(7), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7).  Motions to reopen and to reconsider clearly benefit an individual who seeks
to assert a claim to citizenship prior to removal. See Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 87 (2d
Cir. 2011).  Furthermore, post departure motions may also assist a citizenship claimant if
filed within the statutory time constraints.  Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591 (7th
Cir. 2010); William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2007) (DHS regulation barring post
departure motion to reopen conflicts with statutory right, but see Ovalles v. Holder, 577
F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2009) (concluding that departure after removal effectively overrides any
sua sponte authority to reopen); Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303, 1310 (10th Cir. 2009)
(even when underlying order is determined erroneous, it is not subject to reopening post
departure).
395. INA §§ 242(a)(5), (b)(1), (b)(3)(B); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(5), (b)(1), (b)(3)(B)
(2000).
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out an effective and adequate avenue for judicial review of reinstatement
orders.396
The case of Wilfredo Garza, the son of a U.S.-citizen father, provides
an example—Mr. Garza was ordered deported by an immigration judge
and deported to Mexico by INS in 2001.397  He reentered the United
States and in 2005 was arrested and charged with violation of INA Sec-
tion 276, reentry after deportation.398  His lawyer discovered Mr. Garza
had a claim to U.S. citizenship, obtained a dismissal of the criminal
charge, and filed an N-600 application for certificate of citizenship.399
But, as soon as Mr. Garza’s criminal charges were dismissed by the fed-
eral district court, an INS officer, armed with an executed prior order of
deportation, reinstated the order and despite Mr. Garza’s protestations
that he was a U.S. citizen, the officer deported Mr. Garza again to Mex-
ico.400  A few months later and after Mr. Garza had again reentered the
United States without inspection, INS approved the N-600 and issued to
Mr. Garza his certificate of citizenship.401
Some of those persons who had U.S.-acquired citizenship were discov-
ered by federal public defenders during the course of federal criminal
prosecutions have been released from custody and successfully obtained
certificates of citizenship.402  Most of the U.S. citizens found were born in
Mexico.403  However, federal public defenders and attorneys retained to
represent citizenship claimants face considerable obstacles to prevent
their clients from being removed to Mexico under reinstatement or-
396. INA § 242(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2005) (providing that notwithstanding
any habeas corpus provisions, the petition for review to the court of appeals is “the sole
and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal”).
397. Etter, supra note 9.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Interview with Irma Whiteley, supra note 326; Interview with Shelly Strayer,
supra note 383; see supra Part V.C.
403. There are individuals who are from countries other than Mexico who have as-
serted claims to citizenship and yet been removed. See, e.g., Minasyan v. Gonzales, 401
F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (following his assertion of a claim to citizenship, a citizen of
Armenia, who arrived in the United States when he was eight years old, was removed).
But, the individuals who are found to be citizens while in custody of DHS and the U.S.
Marshal are predominantly from Mexico. Id. In 2010, aliens from Mexico accounted for
nearly 83 percent of all reinstatements. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010,
supra note 7, at 3.  Other leading countries included Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salva-
dor. Id. These four countries accounted for ninety-eight percent of all reinstatements in
2010. Id.
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ders.404  Furthermore, the case of Wilfredo Garza is not isolated, and
other individuals have been removed by DHS as they attempted to assert
their claims to citizenship.405
404. Email from Lisa S. Brodyaga, supra note 96 (explaining that the cases are a chal-
lenge and require the cooperation of the Assistant U.S. Attorney who is prosecuting the
criminal reentry case to keep DHS from removing the client) (on file with The Scholar: St.
Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues); Interview with Javier Maldonado, supra note 378
(describing the work as difficult and time consuming, and often involving federal litigation,
to challenge DHS’ efforts to detain and remove individuals who are asserting claims to
citizenship); Interview with Irma Whiteley, supra note 326 (detailing two occasions in
which she had to run to the international bridge to prevent DHS from removing individu-
als who had been granted certificates of citizenship); Interview with Shelly Strayer, supra
note 383 (explaining that clients of the Federal Public Defenders office have remained
detained even after the certificate of citizenship was granted because DHS officers did not
believe that the individuals were U.S. citizens) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law
Review on Minority Issues).
405. Lisa S. Brodyaga reported on a 2005 case involving a client, A.C., who was re-
moved under a reinstatement order while attempting to assert a claim to citizenship.  Email
from Lisa S. Brodyaga, supra note 96; Anne Monahan represented J.H.V. who was born in
Mexico to two U.S. parents.  Email from Anne Monahan, supra note 378.  He was de-
ported in 2003, returned to the United States, and was charged with reentry after deporta-
tion. Id. Federal Public Defender Clare Koontz discovered his claim to citizenship and
obtained a dismissal of the charges. Id. Although an N-600 application for certificate of
citizenship was pending, DHS ordered reinstatement of the deportation order and re-
moved J.H.V. again. Id. DHS dismissed the N-600 application because J.H.V. was no
longer in the United States. See 8 C.F.R. § 301.1 (2010) (permitting the filing of an N-600
application to obtain citizenship; however, the individual must be able to appear in front of
a USCIS officer to review their application).  J.H.V. then reentered the United States
again and traveled to Oklahoma, where a CIS officer finally approved his N-600 and
awarded him a certificate of citizenship.  Email from Anne Monahan, supra note 378.  Re-
becca Bernhardt’s client, J.M. was subject to an expedited removal and then reentered the
United States.  Email from Rebecca Bernhardt, supra note 299.  His father was a U.S.
citizen who had been physically present more than the ten years required for J.M to ac-
quire citizenship. Id. J.M was arrested in 2004 and charged with reentry after deportation.
Id. His criminal case was dismissed when Federal Public Defender Kristen Etter discov-
ered his claim to U.S. citizenship. Id. An N-600 was filed with the CIS and an adjudicator
interviewed the father and made a preliminary determination that J.M. was eligible for a
certificate of citizenship. Id.  However, J.M.’s expedited removal order was reinstated and
he was removed. Id. His N-600 was then dismissed because J.M. was no longer present in
the United States. Id. J.M. brought an action in federal district court challenging the dis-
missal of the application for certificate of citizenship, and DHS finally granted the applica-
tion and issued the certificate to J.M. Id. In 2011, the St. Mary’s University School of Law
Immigration Clinic was retained by J.L. to obtain a certificate of citizenship.  Case on file
with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues.  J.L. was born in Mexico to
two U.S. citizen parents and yet, between 1975 and 2009 he was removed by INS and DHS
multiple times, including under reinstatement of removal orders. Id. He states that each
time he was arrested he informed INS and DHS officers that he was the child of two U.S.
citizen parents. Id.
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A. Reinstatement of Removal
In 2001 38,943 individuals were removed from the United States under
reinstatement orders.406  By 2010 the number of reinstatement orders in-
creased to 130,840.407  With no provisions for a hearing before an immi-
gration judge and limited means to challenge the underlying order, INA
Section 241(a)(5) has become a swift and powerful tool of enforcement.
In Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales,408 the only case the Supreme Court has
considered concerning reinstatement, the Court found that INA Section
241(a)(5) could be applied to individuals who were deported and reen-
tered the United States before the effective date of IIRIRA.409  Efforts to
challenge the statute as a violation of the INA and the Fifth Amendment
have to date failed.
1. Procedures and Lack of Protections
Reinstatement of deportation or removal is not a new concept.  It is a
longstanding, although rarely used, authority enacted by Congress in 1950
to target a small group of anarchists and subversives who had previously
been deported.410  In the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 Con-
gress enlarged the scope of the statute at former INA Section 242(f) to
include individuals who had previously been deported under grounds of
deportation tied to crimes, falsification of documents, and security.411
Significantly, INA Section 242(f) was interpreted to authorize only immi-
gration judges to reinstate deportation orders.412  INS regulations pro-
vided for the issuance of an order to show cause, hearing before an
immigration judge, and an order issued by the judge.413  Consequently,
individuals who were subject to reinstatement prior to IIRIRA were af-
forded a deportation hearing under the terms of former INA Section
406. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010, supra note 7, at 4.
407. Id.
408. 548 U.S. 30 (2006).
409. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 34 (2006).
410. Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, § 23, 64 Stat. 1012 (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 156); Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 33.
411. INA § 242(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f) (Repealed 1996); Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonza-
les, 486 F.3d 484, 494 n.11 (9th Cir. 2007).
412. 8 C.F.R. § 242.22 (1991) (removed 1997); see Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1, 5
(1st Cir. 2003) (comparing INA § 242(f), which was repealed in 1996, with INA
§ 241(a)(5)).
413. 8 C.F.R. § 242.23 (1991); see Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 499 (explaining that
an alien was entitled to a hearing under former 8 C.F.R. § 242.23).
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242(b), the statute which authorized the immigration judge to conduct
proceedings “to determine the deportability of any alien.”414
IIRIRA accomplished several changes to the statute.  INA Section
241(a)(5) substantially expanded the class of affected individuals from
those charged under the few crime and security related section of the
grounds of deportability to all non-citizens who had been previously sub-
ject to a deportation or removal order.415  Furthermore, the statute pro-
hibits the filing of a motion to reopen the prior order and constrains the
relief available to individuals subject to reinstatement.  INA Section
241(a)(5) provides:
If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United
States illegally after having been removed or having departed volun-
tarily, under an order of removal, the prior order of removal is rein-
stated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or
reviewed, the alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief
under this Act, and the alien shall be removed under the prior order
at any time after the reentry.416
After IIRIRA, INS opted to change the procedures for reinstatement.
Regulations promulgated pursuant to INA Section 241(a)(5), vest full au-
thority and discretion to low level officers to reinstate deportation and
removal orders.  The regulations at 8 CFR Section 241.8 affirmatively
provide that “[t]he alien has no right to a hearing before an immigration
judge in such circumstances.”417  Additionally, the scope of inquiry by an
immigration officer in a reinstatement case is very narrow: whether the
individual is subject to a prior order; the identity of the individual; and
whether the individual has unlawfully reentered the United States.418
The reinstatement regulation appears to exceed the statutory authority
of the immigration judge. In IIRIRA, Congress replaced the former INA
414. INA § 242 (b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (repealed in 1996).  The statute referred to a
special inquiry officer  (later changed to immigration judge) and provided for broad pow-
ers in the conduct of the proceedings:
A special inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings under this section to determine the
deportability of any alien, and shall administer oaths, present and receive evidence,
interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien or witnesses, and as authorized by
the Attorney General, shall make determinations, including orders of deportation.
Id.
415. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, div. C, § 305(a)(3), 110 Stat. 3009 (proposing a new statute that allows for the
reinstatement of removal orders for people who have reenter the United States); Arevalo
v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2003).
416. INA § 241(a)(5),  8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2000).
417. Reinstatement of Removal Orders, 8 C.F.R. § 241.8 (2010).
418. 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.8(a)(1), (2), (3).
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Section 242(b), with new INA Section 240 which is consistent with the
earlier section and unambiguously assigns to immigration judges the au-
thority to determine an individual’s removability.419  The statute provides
that the immigration judge “shall conduct proceedings for deciding the
inadmissibility and deportability of an alien,” and “unless otherwise spec-
ified,” removal proceedings before the immigration judge “shall be the
sole and exclusive procedure” for making such determinations.420  The
powers assigned to the immigration judge under the former INA Section
242(b) were incorporated in the new INA Section 240(b)(1).  The immi-
gration judge may administer oaths, receive evidence, and examine and
cross-examine the respondent and any witnesses.421
Notably, INA Section 240 specifies that there are alternative removal
procedures to those specified in the statute.422  The statute provides for
expedited removal proceedings in a number of circumstances, for in-
stance when the government determines that an applicant for admission
is inadmissible on grounds of misrepresentations or lack of proper docu-
ments,423 when an applicant is inadmissible on security grounds,424 and
when a non-permanent resident has been convicted of an aggravated fel-
ony.425  But, INA Section 240 does not exempt the procedures for rein-
statement of prior orders from the requirement that an immigration
judge determine issues of inadmissibility and deportability.  Furthermore,
Congress did not in INA Section 241(a)(5) create any alternative proce-
dures which would exempt reinstatement from the general provisions of
INA Section 240.426
Comparison between the expedited removal and reinstatement of re-
moval schemes is also instructive.  Neither statute provides for a hearing
to determine a claim to U.S. citizenship.427  However, while low level im-
migration officers may order the “expedited removal” of non-citizens in a
419. INA § 240(a)(1), (3) & (b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1),(3) & (b)(1); See Morales-
Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 503 (9th Cir. 2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
420. INA § 240(a)(1), (3),  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1), (3) (2000).
421. Id. § 240(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2000).
422. The statute provides, “[u]nless otherwise specified in this chapter” and “[n]othing
in this section shall affect proceedings conducted pursuant to section 1228 of this title.”
INA § 240(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3).
423. INA § 235(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).
424. INA § 235(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c).
425. INA § 238, 8 U.S.C. § 1228.
426. INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).
427. INA § 235(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c); INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).   Be-
cause Congress made no specific provisions for claims to citizenship in the expedited re-
moval and reinstatement of removal statutes, it would therefore appear that Congress
anticipated that all citizenship claims would be heard before an immigration judge in INA
§ 240 proceedings. Benson, supra note 26, at 1449 n.185.
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procedure conducted without a hearing before an immigration judge,428
regulations provide that when the applicant makes a claim to U.S. citizen-
ship, the claim must be evaluated by an immigration judge in what is re-
ferred to as “a claimed status review hearing.”429  No comparable
procedure was provided for in the regulations promulgated for INA Sec-
tion 241(a)(5) reinstatement of prior deportation and removal orders.430
Under the regulations, reinstatement of a prior order of deportation or
removal begins with completion of form I-871, Notice of Intent to Rein-
state.431  The notice includes a statement that the individual is an alien
who is subject to a prior order of deportation or removal and who reen-
tered the United States.432  The regulations provide that the individual
who is subject to reinstatement can make a statement and that “the of-
ficer shall allow the alien to do so and shall consider whether the alien’s
statement warrants reconsideration of the determination.”433  However,
in most cases, particularly involving Mexicans arrested near the U.S./
Mexico border, the process of reinstatement of removal can be completed
in a matter of hours.434
428. INA § 235(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A); Memorandum from John P.
Torres, Acting Dir. Office of Detention and Removal Operation, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, to Field Office Dirs., Detention and Deportation Officer’s Field
Manual § 14.8 (March 27, 2006), (available at http://www.immigration.com/sites/default/
files/icedetention.pdf) [hereinafter Memorandum from Torres].
429. INA§ 235(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) (2000); In re Efrain Lujan-
Quintana, 25 I&N Dec. 53, 54 (B.I.A. 2009) (citing 8 C.F.R § 1235.3(b)(5)(iv) (2010)).
430. Reinstatement of Removal Orders, 8 C.F.R. § 241.8 (2010).
431. Memorandum from Torres, supra note 428, § 14.8(b)(3).
432. Id.
433. 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a)(3).  This officer is the same officer who made the initial deter-
mination, and is only required to “consider” the statement. TRINA REALMUTO, AM. IMMI-
GRATION LAW FOUND., REINSTATEMENT OF REMOVAL, A PRACTICE ADVISORY 4 (July
2006), available at http://www.ailf.org/lac/pa/reinstatment.pdf.
434. Email from Lisa S. Brodyaga, supra note 96.  “Due to the lack of a hearing and
speed at which the orders are executed and issued, removal under INA § 241(a)(5) is
sometimes called summary removal.” See also Maria Baldini-Potermin, It’s Time to Con-
sider Automatic Stays of Removal: Petitions for Review, Motions to Reopen, BIA Regula-
tions and the Race to the Courthouse, 86 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1477, 1478 (2009)
(“[D]aily buses leave from DHS and contract detention facilities along the U.S.-Mexico
border.”).  In cases challenging the implementation of INA § 241(a)(5) and 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.8, the petitioners raise a number of serious challenges to the procedures for reinstate-
ment.  In Arreola-Arreola v. Ashcroft, 383 F.2d 956, 960 n.5 (9th Cir. 2004) the petitioner
stated that the reinstatement form was “written in English only, did not inform Arreola
that he had a right to hire an attorney; and the INS did not serve an alien’s existing counsel
with the form.”  In Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1049–50 (9th Cir. 2001), the peti-
tioners alleged they were denied the right to access to their attorneys and that they were
provided no opportunity to submit evidence before the INS. See also Morales-Izquierdo v.
Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 506–07 (9th Cir. 2007) (opining that the failure to follow proper
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Reinstatement of deportation and removal orders under INA Section
241(a)(5) is unquestionably intended to expedite the removal of non-citi-
zens.  To an officer examining an individual identified with a prior order
of deportation or removal that has been executed, reinstatement of the
order will appear unassailable.435  But, while the statute streamlines the
procedures to reinstate old orders of deportation and removal, there is no
indication that Congress intended to depart from the well-established
structure for determining an individual’s citizenship.  As implemented,
INA Section 241(a)(5) and its regulations include no protection against
the unintended removal of a U.S. citizen.436
In the case of Wilfredo Garza, the criminal prosecution for reentry af-
ter deportation was dismissed by a federal district judge due to the likeli-
hood Mr. Garza acquired citizenship, Mr. Garza filed an application for
certificate of citizenship with DHS, and he repeatedly told the officer that
he had a claim to citizenship.437  DHS failed to consider Mr. Garza’s
claim and simply removed him.438  The risk of removal of individuals with
citizenship claims is high when examination by DHS is limited to the
identity of the individual subject to reinstatement and whether he has
previously been deported or removed.439  The procedures implemented
by DHS fail to require at a minimum a full and objective investigation of
the claim, cancellation of the reinstatement order, and referral to the im-
migration judge.440  The unbridled use of INA Section 241(a)(5) under
procedures where there is no hearing before an immigration judge and no
reinstatement procedures breaks apart families across the United States, who would other-
wise be allowed to stay together).
435. Rivera v. Ashcroft, 394 F3d. 1129, 1140 (9th Cir. 2005).  The DHS may rely on
estoppel and argue that the prior order of deportation or removal is a final determination
of citizenship; however, an unrepresented individual who did not understand he had a
claim and was not notified by DHS and the immigration judge of the conditions for acqui-
sition of citizenship should be provided an opportunity to fully present a claim to acquire
citizenship in a later hearing.  United States v. Smith-Baltiher, 424 F.3d 913, 925–26 (9th
Cir. 2005).
436. See Reinstatement of Removal Orders, 8 C.F.R. § 241.8 (2010) (essentially mak-
ing reinstatement of deportation automatic); 64 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10236 (Mar. 6, 1997) (dis-
cussing the public concerns after the proposed regulation amendments following IIRIRA).
During the public comment period, the Federal Register notes that several members of the
public expressed concern about the lack of protective procedures in the reinstatement pro-
cess. Id.  The Service rebutted that the provision in the regulation requiring fingerprints to
verify identity of the individual was sufficient to “adequately address the concerns ex-
pressed by the commentators.” Id.  Of note, however, is that the regulation does contain
special safeguards for aliens with a viable claim under Convention Against Torture provi-
sions.  Reinstatement of Removal Orders, 8 C.F.R. § 241.8.
437. Etter, supra note 9.
438. Id.
439. Reinstatement of Removal Orders, 8 C.F.R. § 241.8.
440. See Trina Realmuto, supra note  433.
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meaningful opportunity to present a claim to citizenship all but guaran-
tees that individuals like Mr. Garza who have unresolved claims to U.S.
citizenship are removed.
a. Court Challenges
The Supreme Court has yet to address whether the government’s dele-
gation to low level immigration official the authority to reinstate deporta-
tion and removal orders raises a constitutional problem.  In Fernandez-
Vargas v. Gonzales, the petitioner relied on a presumption against retro-
activity and challenged the application of amendments to INA Section
241(a)(5) to individuals who unlawfully reentered the United States after
deportation orders entered prior to the effective date of IIRIRA.441  The
Court found the statute had no impermissible retroactive effect and ruled
“the statute applies to stop an indefinitely continuing violation that the
alien could end at any time by leaving the country.”442  Thus, the govern-
ment is empowered to reinstate deportation and removal orders entered
at any time.443
In a number of federal courts, challenges to the authority of low-level
officers to reinstate removal orders have failed.444  The courts that have
considered these cases have found that Congress intended reinstatement
to be a process uncomplicated by the questions normally heard in re-
moval proceedings and have declined to require that DHS institute pro-
ceedings under INA Section 240 for purposes of reinstatement of prior
orders.  Furthermore, the courts have rejected claims that the implemen-
tation of INA Section 241(a)(5) is a violation of due process.445
In Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales446 the Ninth Circuit in an en banc
decision rejected the notion that removal proceedings before an immigra-
tion judge are required for reinstatement of removal orders.447  The court
found that Congress intended to expand the class of non-citizens subject
to reinstatement and at the same time to narrow defenses normally avail-
441. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 36 (2006).
442. Id. at 45.
443. See Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 46 (explaining that IIRIRA enlarged the class
of individuals whose prior deportation and removal orders are likely to be reinstated, and
limited relief options for those subject to reinstatement).
444. Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 487–88, 498 (9th Cir. 2007); Ochoa-
Carrillo v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2006); De Sandoval v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440
F.3d 1276, 1282–83 (11th Cir. 2006); Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 20 (1st Cir. 2004).
445. Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 498; Ochoa-Carrillo, 437 F.3d at 847; Lattab, 384
F.3d at 20–21; De Sandoval, 440 F.3d at 1285–86.
446. 486 F.3d 484 (9th Cir. 2007).
447. Id. at 498.  Morales-Izquierdo argued that a reinstatement order was the func-
tional equivalent of a removal order under INA § 240 which requires an individual hearing.
Id. at 490.
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able to non-citizens in removal proceedings.448 To accomplish this goal,
the court reasoned that reinstatement proceedings were intended to be
summary in nature.449  Removal proceedings generally entail two inquir-
ies: (1) removability of the individual and (2) eligibility “for relief from
removal,”450 but the court found that reinstatement proceedings need not
address settled and “relatively straightforward” questions of inadmissibil-
ity and deportability questions and the statute prevents the assertion of
any type of relief from removal and forecloses the opportunity to reopen
the prior decision.451  The statute’s narrowed scope of the inquiry could,
according to the court, be safely carried out by low-level immigration of-
ficials who perform routine ministerial enforcement actions.452
Judge Thomas wrote for the dissent. He argued that INA Section
241(a)(5) must be considered in the context of the statute as a whole and
that Congress is presumed to “create a ‘symmetrical and coherent regula-
tory scheme.’”453  He opined that reinstatement orders are a sub-set of
removal orders, and INA Section 240 unambiguously provides the struc-
ture by which immigration judges determine questions of inadmissibility
and deportability in a setting that provides all procedural protections to
individuals in removal proceedings.454  Judge Thomas further warned that
reinstatement of removal approaches a “constitutional danger zone”455 in
which the procedures became so streamlined that individuals subject to
reinstatement orders are stripped of “any meaningful opportunity to raise
potentially viable legal, constitutional, or factual challenges to their
removability.”456
In other cases the authority of low level immigration officers to rein-
state removal orders has been similarly challenged as a violation of due
process.457  Notwithstanding, the courts have declined to require that
DHS institute proceedings consistent with INA Section 240 prior to rein-
statement of removal, finding instead, as did the court in Morales- Iz-
quierdo v. Gonzales, that Congress intended reinstatement to be a
448. Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 494.
449. Id. at 491.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 500 (9th Cir. 2007) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995)).
454. Id.
455. Id. at 505.
456. Id. at 507.
457. Ponta-Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 158, 162 (3rd Cir. 2009); Ochoa-Carrillo v.
Gonzales, 437 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2006); De Sandoval v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1276,
1282–83 (11th Cir. 2006); Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 20 (1st Cir. 2004).
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process uncomplicated by questions normally heard in removal
proceedings.458
B. Changes in Judicial Review
At the conclusion of his dissent in Morales-Izquierdo, Judge Thomas
spoke to the challenges faced by individuals in reinstatement proceedings
after the REAL ID Act withdrew the power of federal courts to review
removal orders in habeas corpus proceedings.459  He stated that limits
placed on the power of the district court to hear challenges to reinstate-
ment orders “approaches a second and independent ‘constitutional dan-
ger zone.”’460  The current scheme for judicial review of reinstatement
orders places individuals who raise a previously unresolved claim to citi-
zenship with limited and restricted avenues for review.
The dangers are illustrated in the case of P.H., who like Wilfredo
Garza, was subject to a reinstatement order, and struggled to have his
claim to citizenship recognized by the government.  P.H was charged with
reentry after removal under INA Section 276 and then learned that he
had a claim to citizenship from the federal public defender who repre-
458. Ponta-Garcia, 557 F.3d at 163; Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 498; Ochoa-Car-
rillo, 437 F.3d at 847; De Sandoval, 440 F.3d at 1285–86; Lattab, 384 F.3d at 20–21.  In most
cases, the courts found no serious challenge to the underlying question of removability.  In
Morales-Izquierdo, supra at 496–97, the court found that the petitioner failed to raise a
substantial claim and that “the risk of erroneous deprivation is extremely low.” Id. The
court further determined that even if Mr. Morales-Izquierdo had a legitimate challenge,
“he will be able to pursue it after he leaves the country . . . .” Id. at 498 (emphasis added).
In Lattab v. Ashcroft, the court also determined that the petitioner did not raise issues
which disputed his removability, but opined, “Although this case does not provide a vehi-
cle for testing the merits of the constitutional claim, we do not mean to imply that the claim
is insubstantial. The summary reinstatement process offers virtually no procedural protec-
tions.” Id. at 21 n.6. In a case in which the petitioner presented a substantial challenge to
removability, a claim to citizenship, the court declined to rule on the validity of the rein-
statement statute and regulations. In Batista v. Ashcroft, 270 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2001), the
court reviewed the appeal of a reinstatement order involving a U.S. citizen claimant and
remanded the case to the district court for a determination on the claim; however, the
court did not evaluate the reinstatement process under INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(5) and 8 C.F.R. § 241.8. Id. at 17.  Then, in Ponta-Garcia, the court addressed the
reinstatement of removal against an individual who claimed to have last entered the U.S.
as a legal resident, and found that the regulation authorizing DHS to issue reinstatement
orders without a hearing before an immigration judge was a reasonable construction of the
statute. Id. at 162-63.  Under the express terms of INA § 241(a)(5) the court was pre-
vented from reopening the original deportation order,  but the court found it had “author-
ity to determine the appropriateness of its resurrection”  and remanded the question of
Mr. Ponta-Garcia’s status to the DHS. Id. at 163 (quoting Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1,
9 (1st Cir. 2003).
459. Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 508–09 (9th Cir. 2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
460. Id. at 508.
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sented him during the criminal proceeding.  P.H. immigrated to the
United States through a petition filed by his U.S.-citizen mother, but he
was deported following a conviction and then reentered the United
States.  His potential claim to citizenship was never raised during his prior
deportation hearing.461  The evidence collected by the public defender
concerning P.H.’s parent’s U.S. birth and residence in the United States
prior to P.H.’s birth, convinced the U.S. Attorney and the federal district
judge of P.H.’s claim to citizenship and the reentry after removal charges
were dismissed.  P.H. also filed his application for a certificate of citizen-
ship, based largely on testimonial evidence. When the application was de-
nied on the ground that the mother lacked documentary evidence of her
presence in the United States before P.H. was born, DHS moved to re-
move P.H. under an order of reinstatement of P.H.’s prior deportation
order.  P.H. filed a petition for review after the thirty day deadline for
appealing removal orders.  He faced removal to Mexico and he had no
means, by way of a removal hearing before an immigration judge or a
habeas corpus proceeding in district court, to review administrative deci-
sions regarding his claim to citizenship and the reinstatement of the prior
removal order.462
1. Review of Reinstatement Orders
When Congress enacted IIRIRA it expanded the power of the govern-
ment in INA Section 241(a)(5) to subject “vastly more aliens within the
sweep of the reinstatement provision.”463  Under the plain language of
the statute, “the prior order of removal . . . is not subject to being re-
opened or reviewed . . . .”464  Additionally, when Congress crafted the
rules for appeals of removal orders in INA Section 242 under IIRIRA, no
provision appeared for federal court review of reinstatement orders.465
Uncertain what court, if any, had jurisdiction to challenge reinstatement
461. Case on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues.
462. Case on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues. See
Email from Lisa S. Brodyaga, supra note 96 (describing a time when her client was re-
moved after he filed an out of time petition for review); Interview with Maria Rangel,
supra note 326; Interview with Shelly Strayer, supra note 383; Interview with Irma White-
ley, supra note 326 (who explained that they cannot assist all defendants with acquired
citizenship claims and defendants must pursue their claims before the DHS pro se).
463. Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 494; see Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 305(a)(3), 110 Stat. 3009
(amending and adjusting the status requirements to include a broader range of aliens in the
reinstatement provision).
464. INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2000). See supra note 394 for discussion
on motions to reopen and to reconsider.
465. INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006); The apparent restriction to any review in INA
§ 241(a)(5) and the lack of any provision for review in INA § 242 led to cases filed in
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orders, litigants used the traditional means of review of removal orders in
habeas corpus proceedings and petitions for review directed to the courts
of appeals.466
The Supreme Court found in INS v. St. Cyr that “[t]he writ of habeas
corpus has always been available to review the legality of Executive de-
tention[,]”467 and ruled that congressional efforts to deprive the federal
courts of the power to review removal orders without providing an ade-
quate substitute raised a serious constitutional question under the Sus-
pension Clause.468  Congress responded to St. Cyr with the enactment of
the REAL ID.469  To avoid any further constitutional challenges to the
scheme for judicial review of removal orders, Congress amended INA
Section 242 to enlarge the jurisdiction of the courts of appeal to review
“constitutional claims or questions of law.”470  To “ensure that criminal
aliens received the same type and amount of judicial review as other
aliens,”471 Congress eliminated habeas corpus proceedings as a vehicle
for review of removal orders.472
Thus, in its present form INA Section 242(a)(2)(D) provides review in
the courts of appeals of a reinstatement of a deportation/removal or-
der.473  Furthermore, any removal order, including a reinstatement of re-
district courts under habeas jurisdiction and in the courts of appeal through a petition for
review.  Sifuentes-Barraza v. Garcia, 252 F. Supp. 2d 354, 361 (W.D. Tex. 2003).
466. Ramirez-Molina v. Ziglar, 436 F.3d 508, 510 (5th Cir. 2006).
467. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305 (2001).
468. Id.  The Suspension Clause at U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl.2 provides that “the Privi-
lege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebel-
lion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” Id. at 336–37.
469. See Ruiz-Martinez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 102, 116 (2nd Cir. 2008) (explaining that
the purpose of the REAL ID Act is to “provide an ‘adequate and effective’ alternative to
habeas corpus”).
470. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106(a)(1)(D), 119 Stat. 231.  The
statute provides, “Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other provision of his Act
(other than this section) which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as
precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for
review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.”  INA
§ 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2011). See also Ruiz-Martinez, 516 F.3d at 113
(explaining that the REAL ID Act also provided that “sole and exclusive means for judi-
cial review of final orders” are petitions of review filed in the correct Courts of Appeals);
Kolkevich v. Att’y Gen., 501 F.3d 323, 328 (3rd Cir. 2007) (emphasizing that nothing in the
Act precludes questions of law brought in the correct court of appeals or review of consti-
tutional claims).
471. Ruiz-Martinez, 516 F.3d at 117.
472. REAL ID Act of 2005, § 106(a)(1).
473. Without regard to INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1235(a)(5) (stating that reinstate-
ment orders not subject appeal) and without regard to INA § 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(C) (mandating that review is not available to orders based on crime based
grounds), review of reinstatement orders can proceed.  See Ramirez-Molina v. Ziglar, 436
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moval order, that contains a claim to citizenship, is reviewable under INA
Section 242(b)(5)474 and limits district court participation only when
“genuine issues of material fact” warrant remand by the court of ap-
peals.475  The admonishment at INA Section 242(b)(5)(C), “[t]he peti-
tioner may have such nationality claim decided only as provided in this
paragraph” appears to preempt district court review of reinstatement or-
ders under INA Section 360 or any action in habeas corpus.476
Following enactment of the REAL ID Act, habeas corpus petitions
pending at the district court level were transferred to the courts of appeal
and converted to petitions for review.477  REAL ID was effective imme-
diately and applied to cases “in which the final administrative order of
removal, deportation, or exclusion was issued before, on, or after” May
11, 2005, the Act’s effective date.478  Included in the habeas corpus cases
were pending claims to citizenship, and post-REAL ID review of those
questions was to be determined under INA Section 242(b)(5).479
F.3d 508 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that the court of appeals does have jurisdiction to deter-
mine a due process challenge to reinstatement of removal).
474. Batista v. Ashcroft, 270 F.3d. 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2001).
475. Id.  The court stated that normally the court would review only the “administra-
tive record on which the order of removal is based” under INA § 242(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(A). Id. But INA § 242(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5) directed the court to
consider “pleadings and affidavits” in its determination whether a genuine issue of fact
existed. Id. Notwithstanding, the court also admonished respondents who assert a claim to
citizenship that they do not have “an automatic right to have new evidence considered on
appeal . . . the statute merely indicates that such evidence may be considered.” Id. at 15.
476. But see Flores-Torres v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 708, 711 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that
petitioner successfully challenged his unlawful detention by filing a habeas corpus petition
after being detained pending removal proceedings where he asserted a claim to citizen-
ship).  Furthermore, it may be argued that the district court retains jurisdiction under the
APA over citizenship claims raised in reinstatement proceedings.  In Wong Yang Sung, the
Supreme Court struck down a procedure by which immigration inspectors were authorized
to investigate cases and enter deportation orders.  Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33, 45 (1950).  The Court found the comingling of investigative and adjudicative functions
particularly objectionable and held that protections under the APA are triggered by depor-
tation proceedings that lack procedural safeguards guaranteed by due process. Id. at
49–50.  While the Wong case has received little attention, it has not been directly over-
turned. See William Funk, The Rise and Purported Demise of Wong Yang Sung, 58 ADMIN.
L. R. 881, 881 (2006) (observing that neither Wong nor the Wong doctrine has been ex-
pressly overturned by the Supreme Court).
477. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106(c), 119 Stat. 231; see Ruiz-
Martinez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 102, 113 (2nd Cir. 2008) (comparing the requirements
before and after passage of the Act).
478. REAL ID Act of 2005, § 106(b).
479. Id. § 106(c); see Jordan v. Att’y Gen., 424 F.3d 320, 326 (3rd Cir. 2005) (“The
REAL-ID Act . . . allows us to avoid the dense thicket of habeas jurisdiction over national-
ity claims.”); Baeta v. Sonchik, 273 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 2001) (transferring the case,
yet determining that there is no issue of material fact on which to “justify an evidentiary
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2. Habeas Post-REAL ID
While the present scheme for review of removal orders in the courts of
appeals provides citizenship claimants in reinstatement proceedings with
a means to challenge removal, the question remains: do obstacles to ac-
cessing the courts of appeals give these claimants adequate and effective
judicial review absent the availability of the writ of habeas corpus?480  In-
dividuals that are in reinstatement proceedings and intent on asserting
claims to citizenship, are detained and facing criminal prosecution for vio-
lation of INA Section 276 reentry after removal.  The Federal Public De-
fender appointed to represent the defendant in the criminal prosecution
may assist in acquiring evidence to support the claim to citizenship, but
they are unable to appear in proceedings before DHS and federal courts
related to the citizenship claim.481  Filing a petition for review in the court
of appeals presents a daunting and for many an impossible task.482  The
location of the court of appeals, filing requirements, limited availability of
counsel, and the lack of a developed record are significant challenges fac-
ing U.S.-citizen claimants.
The courts of appeal may be located far from where the individual who
is claiming citizenship is detained483 and the organizing and filing the pe-
tition is a process not easily accomplished.  For instance, a petition for
hearing on nationality); Batista, 270 F.3d at 12 (finding that transfer of a removal order was
proper under the act).
480. Habeas corpus petitions can be prepared with greater ease than petitions for
review because the district court is more accessible and there is no time deadline. Ruiz-
Martinez, 516 F.3d at 113 (explaining that there is no time limit for filing a habeas corpus
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241). See also GERALD SEIPP, IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS, FED-
ERAL COURT JURISDICTION TO REVIEW IMMIGRATION DECISIONS: A TUG OF WAR BE-
TWEEN THE THREE BRANCHES 4 (Apr. 2007) (discussing the ease of summary removal at
the border and explaining that if the applicant for admission does not express a “credible
fear of persecution” the removal order will be issued without review by an immigration
judge). But see Nancy Morowetz, Detention Decisions and Access to Habeas Corpus for
Immigrants Facing Deportation, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 13, 15–16 (2005) (discussing
the challenges to obtaining habeas corpus relief when DHS selects detention sites.)
481. See supra Part V.C. The office of the federal public defender assists the client in
obtaining evidence of acquired citizenship as part of the preparation of the criminal de-
fense.  Unless the client can retain an immigration attorney, he must file and pursue the N-
600 pro se. Interview with David Castillo, supra note 383.  See also the case of P.H. in
which he filed his N-600, appeal to the AAO and petition for review to the Fifth Circuit pro
se.  Case on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues.
482. See Baldini-Potermin, supra note 434, at 1481 (explaining that there is an ex-
tremely high standard for motions for stays of removal).
483. Individuals pending removal in South Texas are most likely detained in detention
in Pearsall, Karnes City, Laredo, or Los Fresnos, Texas, far from the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in New Orleans, Louisiana.
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review no longer entitles a petitioner to an automatic stay of removal,484
and a motion to stay the order must be prepared and filed with the peti-
tion.  At the stage that a petition for review is filed, the record for review
may be sparse and consist of the documents and affidavits prepared for
filing with an N-600 or U.S. passport.  Because DHS has not instituted a
removal proceeding under INA Section 240, there is no record of a pro-
ceeding in which evidence and testimony was taken and evaluated by an
immigration judge.485  Finding pro bono counsel or an attorney among
the few public interest organizations to assist with federal court review is
difficult at best.
However, the most serious hurdle to review under INA Section 242 is
the time constraint and the requirement that the petition for review be
filed in thirty days.486  The thirty-day deadline is “a strict jurisdictional
prerequisite” for review of a removal order.487  Individuals in reinstate-
ment proceedings who are facing criminal charges for reentry after re-
moval under INA Section 276 must be prepared to file the petition for
review shortly after the time of arrest which is when the reinstatement
order is normally executed by the DHS officer.488  If the citizen claimant
waits until after the criminal case is completed, s/he has more than likely
missed the thirty-day deadline.489  That is the scenario that faced P.H.  He
filed a petition for review of the reinstatement order at the time his crimi-
484. INA § 242(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B) (2000) (“Service of the petition on
the officer or employee does not stay the removal of an alien pending the court’s decision
on the petition, unless the court orders otherwise.”); Benson, supra note 270, 68–69.
485. See Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 21 n.6 (1st Cir. 2004) (“While judicial review
of reinstatement orders is available in courts of appeals . . . that review may not be ade-
quate when the alien has not been given a meaningful opportunity to develop an adminis-
trative record.”).  The statutory scheme in INA § 242 presupposes that the review of
nationality claims in the court of appeals was litigated in removal proceedings and the
claimant has exhausted administrative remedies. See INA § 242(d)(1),  8 U.S.C.
§ 1232(d)(1) (2000); Moussa v. INS, 302 F.3d 823, 825 (8th Cir. 2002) (explaining that a
court may not review a final order of removal until all administrative remedies that are
available to an alien have been completely exhausted).
486. INA § 242(b)(1),  8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(1) (2000); see Batista v. Ashcroft, 270 F.3d.
8, 12 (1st Cir. 2001) (explaining that “an alien seeking judicial review of a reinstated re-
moval order must file a petition for review in this court within [thirty] days of the date of
the reinstatement of removal order”); see also Malvoisin v. INS, 268 F.3d 74, 75 (2nd Cir.
2001) (explaining that the thirty day filing deadline is “a strict jurisdictional prerequisite”).
487. Ruiz-Martinez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 102, 113–14 (2nd Cir. 2008); Malvoisin, 268
F.3d at 75.
488. See Malvoisin, 268 F.3d at 76 (explaining that even after a show of good cause,
courts are “expressly prohibited from extending the prescribed time,” which makes it im-
perative for the alien to file as soon as possible).
489. See id. at 75 (finding that it was inappropriate to extend the thirty-day deadline
even though the plaintiff’s reasons “might be cause for extending”).
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nal case was dismissed but the reinstatement order was dated more than
thirty days before the criminal case was dismissed.
Since the enactment of REAL ID in 2005, a number of courts have
considered whether review under INA Section 242 in the federal court of
appeals is an adequate and effective substitute for the writ of habeas
corpus, the question raised in St. Cyr.490  A variety of circumstances pre-
vented the petitioners from perfecting their appeals to the courts of ap-
peals, but the courts determined that the present statutory scheme post-
REAL ID provides sufficient relief and is not unconstitutional.491
The Second Circuit addressed whether a petition for review provides
an adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus in Ruiz-Martinez
v. Mukasey,492 a case in which the petitioners sought habeas corpus re-
view of their removal orders in district court immediately following pas-
sage of the REAL ID Act.  They had failed to file petitions for review in
the court of appeals within the thirty day deadline set by INA Section
242(b)(1) due to circumstances common to immigrants, “language barri-
ers, immigration detention, and the attendant difficulties that might affect
a detained alien’s opportunity to compose and file a petition for re-
view.”493  The court afforded the parties a grace period for the filing of
petitions for review.494  However, the court concluded that the thirty-day
filing deadline was jurisdictional and that a petition for review to the
court of appeals, even with the statute of limitations, remains an adequate
and effective substitute for habeas corpus.495
The Ninth Circuit in Iasu v. Smith496 reconsidered Rivera v. Ash-
croft,497 the earlier case in which the court decided that extreme circum-
stances permit a habeas proceeding in district court for purposes of
determining a citizenship claim.498  Mr. Iasu filed a habeas corpus peti-
tion in district court following the enactment of the REAL ID Act, and
the Ninth Circuit ruled that “the district court plainly lacked habeas juris-
490. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 (2001).
491. Ruiz-Martinez, 516 F.3d at 105; Mohammed v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 522, 526 (8th
Cir. 2007); Iasu v. Smith, 511 F.3d 881, 892 (9th Cir. 2007); De Ping Wang v. DHS, 484 F.3d
615, 618–19 (2d Cir. 2006).  Alexandre v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 1204, 1206 (11th Cir.
2006);
492. 516 F.3d 102 (2nd Cir. 2008).
493. Ruiz-Martinez, 516 F.3d at 115.
494. Id. at 117.
495. Id.
496. 511 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2007).
497. 394 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 2005). See also Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 87 (2d Cir.
2011) (deciding whether “the statutory motion to reopen process is an adequate and effec-
tive substitute for habeas”).
498. Rivera v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1129, 1137 (9th Cir. 2005).
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diction.”499  The court reasoned that Mr. Isau had an avenue that would
“suffice to alleviate Suspension Clause concerns,” a motion to reopen his
removal.500  Mr. Isau had not been removed from the United States, and
the court determined that filing a motion to reopen to the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals could potentially provide him with the relief he sought
and trigger anew his right to appeal to the court of appeals.501
The courts in Iasu and Ramirez-Martinez did not address the central
question here—whether REAL-ID violates the Suspension Clause of the
U.S. Constitution as applied to individuals in reinstatement proceedings
who assert a claim to U.S. citizenship.  The petitioners in Ramirez-Marti-
nez were not claiming U.S. citizenship and while the court was sympa-
thetic to the obstacles they faced in pursuing their appeals, ultimately the
court determined that Congress, mindful of the decision in St. Cyr, en-
sured “all aliens received an equal opportunity to have their challenges
heard.”502  In the Iasu case the court was faced with a U.S. citizen claim-
ant, but reasoned that existing administrative and judicial avenues were
still available to him and provided adequate opportunity for review.503
P. H. and other individuals in reinstatement proceedings are potentially
United States citizens and under the present statutory scheme, their sole
avenue for review of the reinstatement order and their claim to citizen-
ship is the thirty day petition for review to the courts of appeals.504  They
have no other administrative or judicial option.  INA Section 241(a)(5)
forecloses any opportunity for a motion to reopen or review of the prior
order of deportation or removal, and the regulation implemented by
DHS, 8 CFR Section 241.8, deprives them of a hearing before an immi-
gration judge and appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals.505
3. Forward to Boumediene v. Bush506 and Back to Ng Fung Ho507
The Supreme Court has yet to rule whether, post-REAL-ID, habeas
corpus proceedings remain as an alternative form of review of removal
499. Iasu v. Smith, 511 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 2007).
500. Id. at 892.
501. Id.
502. Ruiz-Martinez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 102, 116 (2nd Cir. 2008); see also Kolkevich
v. Att’y Gen., 501 F.3d 323, 335 (3rd Cir. 2007) (citing to H.R.Rep. No. 109–72, at 174–75,
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2005, pp. 240, 299–300).
503. Iasu, 511 F.3d at 893.
504. See Ruiz-Martinez, 516 F.3d at 105 (explaining that “the petitioner must file a
petition for review” by the thirty-day deadline to challenge a final order) (emphasis
added).
505. 8 C.F.R. § 241.8 (2010) (stating that an alien who reenters the United States after
removal or returns voluntarily “has no right to a hearing before an immigration judge”).
506. 553 U.S. 723 (2007).
507. 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
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orders.  However, the Court has considered the availability of habeas
proceedings for non-citizens who are detained at Guantanamo.508  The
restrictions on judicial review challenged by the Boumediene petitioners
mirror the limitations on habeas corpus review found in the REAL ID
Act.509 Boumediene v. Bush, therefore, renews the debate on access to
habeas corpus proceedings for individuals seeking review of removal
orders.510
The Court addressed the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) and the Mili-
tary Commissions Act (MCA) which denied federal court jurisdiction to
hear habeas corpus proceedings to enemy combatants in Guantanamo
and considered whether Congress provided an adequate substitute for the
writ.  In the majority opinion Justice Kennedy detailed the history of the
writ of habeas corpus511 and determined whether relief extended to de-
tainees at Guantanamo.512  The Court noted that few cases have consid-
ered the “standards defining suspension of the writ . . . [which] confirms
the care Congress has taken throughout our Nation’s history to preserve
the writ and its function.”513  Citing to St. Cyr, the Court ruled that at a
minimum a prisoner must have an opportunity to defend against the “er-
roneous application or interpretation” of law and to obtain an order of
release if unlawfully detained.514
The standards for review affirmed in Boumediene apply with equal
force to reinstatement orders when a citizenship claim is asserted.  Justice
Kennedy described the writ of habeas corpus is an “adaptable rem-
edy[,] . . . [i]ts precise application and scope changed depending upon the
circumstances.”515  The Court further found that habeas provides a vehi-
508. Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (“If the privilege of habeas corpus
is to be denied to the detainees now before us, Congress must act in accordance with the
requirements of the Suspension Clause.”).
509. Id. at 803–04 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Kidane, supra note 179, at
143–44 (arguing that Boumediene implies that “enemy aliens” have rights that even some
U.S. citizens do not).
510. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 804 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that “[i]t is
grossly premature to pronounce on the detainees’ right to habeas without first assessing
whether the remedies the DTA system provides vindicate whatever rights petitioners may
claim”); Jennifer Norako, Accuracy or Fairness?: The Meaning of Habeas Corpus After
Boumediene v. Bush and Its Implications on Alien Removal Orders, 58 AM. U. L. REV.
1611 (2009) (arguing that the REAL ID Act fails to comply with the “adequate and effec-
tive” standard set forth by the court in Boumediene).
511. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739–53.
512. Id. at 732.  “We hold that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the Constitution has full effect at
Guantanamo Bay.” Id. at 771.
513. Id. at 773.
514. Id. at 779.
515. Id.
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cle to introduce previously unavailable evidence,516 and determined that
“Where a person is detained by executive order, . . . the need for collat-
eral review is most pressing.”517  Serious constitutional concerns result
when Congress has structured review of removal orders so that the peti-
tion for review is the only avenue for review of reinstatement orders in-
volving purported U.S. citizens with a claim that has not been presented
and fully litigated.  There are no administrative and judicial alternatives
left that benefit citizen claimants in reinstatement proceedings.518 St. Cyr
and Boumediene remain models for ensuring adequate review of orders
of reinstatement under these circumstances.519
Furthermore, the early citizenship cases, Rogers v. Bellei and Ng Fung
Ho v. White, deserve consideration as to the power of Congress to limit
judicial review in cases where a citizenship claim has been lodged. Rogers
v. Bellei affirmed congressional authority to set the terms and conditions
for acquisition of citizenship. Consequently, Congress decides whether a
U.S. parent must have five years or ten years of presence in the United
States before transmitting citizenship to a child who is born abroad.  But,
the Court in Ng Fung Ho unquestionably found that an individual with a
claim to citizenship is guaranteed under the Constitution a judicial review
of that claim.520
“[U]ntil the claim of citizenship is resolved, the propriety of the entire
proceeding is in doubt.”521  P.H. and the other acquired citizenship claim-
ants in reinstatement proceedings have only one option if they fail to file
a timely petition for review to the courts of appeals and that is a wholly
discretionary request for a stay of removal from the DHS.  Without the
ability to rely on the writ of habeas corpus proceedings, they have no
safeguard to ensure de novo review of a denial of citizenship.522  No less
is required or individuals who acquired U.S. citizenship truly become
“second-class” citizens.
516. Id. at 780.
517. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783.
518. In a case involving a U.S.-citizen claimant following Boumediene, Luna v.
Holder, 637 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2011), the Second Circuit considered the claimant’s rights to
habeas review to cure a late-filed petition for review, but ruled that the petitioner had an
option to file a motion to reopen his earlier proceeding before the Board of Immigration
Appeals, lodge his claim, and then pursue an appeal to the court of appeals.  Id. at 104–05.
The court found, consistent with Boumediene, that it “must have adequate authority . . . to
formulate and issue appropriate order for relief” and took the unusual step of ordering the
Board to reissue a final order of removal so Mr. Luna could appeal. Id. at 103.
519. The Boumediene decision “may have immense consequences in the immigration
context” states one commentator.  Kidane, supra note 179, at 100.
520. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284–85 (1922).
521. Frank v. Rogers, 253 F.2d 889, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
522. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 791 (2007); Luna, 637 F.3d at 104–05.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Citizens are caught in the middle of conflicting goals between govern-
ment efforts to adjudicate claims to acquired U.S. citizenship and the fo-
cus on crime and national security interests.  The consequence is that
more individuals who have yet to fully resolve their claims to U.S. citizen-
ship are removed again and again.  DHS must prioritize a mission
throughout the agency to locate individuals who have claims to citizen-
ship and provide concrete assurances that no U.S. citizen is detained or
removed from the United States.  The cost to each U.S. citizen who is
subjected to removal is incalculable.523
Centralizing acquired citizenship claims in one CIS office benefits the
claimants and the government.  In one location, applications can be expe-
ditiously processed. If adjudications were centrally located with exper-
ienced staff, CIS can quickly identify fraud issues and establish uniform
standards for the evaluation of evidence which may acknowledge the
lifestyle of many U.S. citizens and reaffirm a policy to consider all credi-
ble evidence, including the testimonies of witnesses.  CIS has successfully
centralized offices to adjudicate other benefit forms, such as applications
for asylum and petitions on behalf of battered spouses.524
The government can by regulation accomplish some changes which
would provide greater protection from removal for U.S. citizens.  DHS,
particularly law enforcement officers, should be required to screen indi-
viduals for possible citizenship claims and notify individuals who have a
U.S. parent of the terms and conditions for citizenship under U.S. law.
Regulations governing reinstatement of removal must provide for a hear-
ing before an immigration judge when a claim to citizenship is evident.
Furthermore, the government should rescind reinstatement orders issued
against a U.S.-citizen claimant.525  Department of Justice regulations
523. Removal of individuals who may be U.S. citizens is also expensive for the U.S.
government, costing at least $12,500 per person. Cave, supra note 380, at A1.  That does
not include the amount the government has spent settling lawsuits for removing U.S. citi-
zens. See KOHLI ET AL., supra note 3, at 17 n.43.
524. Affirmative asylum applications are filed with Asylum Offices where adjudica-
tors are trained in asylum law and the social and political conditions of the countries of
origin of asylum applicants.  Petitions under the immigration provisions of the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA) are filed with and adjudicated by the DHS, Vermont Service
Center “to ensure the appropriate and expeditious handling of all self-petitions filed by
battered spouses and children.” See CIS Issues Final Memorandum on VAWA Revoca-
tions, 88 INTERPRETER RELEASES 286, 287 (2011) (detailing the process which guarantees
that adjudicators are trained in domestic violence and are able to identify fraudulent
claims).
525. The government often argues that INA § 241(a)(5) mandates reinstatements of
prior deportation and removal orders, but DHS has cancelled reinstatement orders in cases
in which claims to citizenship have been made. See Minasyan v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1069,
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should require that immigration judges fully notify individuals in removal
proceedings of the terms and conditions for U.S. citizenship and provide
individuals with claims a full opportunity to present those claims.
Ultimately, full relief to U.S. citizens must come from Congress, and
Congress has forgotten about U.S. citizens.526  In its exercise of authority
to confer citizenship under principles of jus sanguinas, Congress has en-
acted an elaborate series of statutes for the transmission of citizenship to
the children born abroad to U.S. citizens.  But, Congress has failed to
provide the agencies charged with adjudicating claims to citizenship with
all the resources needed so that claims can be expeditiously and fairly
asserted.  DHS and DOS are consumed with enormous caseloads and de-
mands that hamper their ability to serve individuals with citizenship
claims.  Applicants must wait months or years for applications for certifi-
cates of citizenship or U.S. passports to be adjudicated.527  The DOJ is
inundated also with removal cases involving a population of largely de-
tained and unrepresented individuals.528
It is time to consider the appointment of counsel in removal proceed-
ings.529  Legislation to guarantee access to counsel would offset the limi-
tations of DHS and immigration courts in terms of providing full notice
1073 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that rescission of reinstatement orders should be auto-
matic when a claim to citizenship is presented instead of being a wholly discretionary DHS
function).
526. Benson, supra note 26, at 1451 n.186.
527. As of September 30, 2011, the Texas Service Center has listed that an N-600
Application for Certification of Citizenship was currently at a five months wait for process-
ing. Local USCIS Processing Times, VISAPRO (Oct. 18, 2011), https://www.visapro.com/
INS-Processing-Times.asp.  But, investigators for the Federal Public Defenders who assist
applicants for certificates of citizenship while they are in custody pending criminal charges
report that adjudications may take months or in excess of a year.  Interview with Maria
Rangel, supra note 326.
528. The EOIR is the DOJ entity that oversees the immigration courts. DONALD M.
KERWIN, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., REVISITING THE NEED FOR APPOINTED COUNSEL 1
(Apr. 2005), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/legalization-historical.pdf.
Within the EOIR system, “[t]he percentage of represented aliens whose proceedings were
completed during FY 2006 – FY 2010 ranged from [thirty-five] percent to [forty-three]
percent.” Id. In FY 2010, there was a total of 287,207 cases seen in the immigration court
system, and only 122,465 (42 percent) of these individuals had representation. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE YEARBOOK, supra note 366, at B6, G1.
529. See, e.g., Churgin, supra note 370, at 172 (arguing that despite long-standing re-
sistance to appointed counsel in immigration proceeding, as a matter of constitutional law
counsel may be required in certain exceptional cases). See also Editorial, “Immigrant De-
tainees Deserve Lawyers,” L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2011, available at http://www.latimes.com/
news/opinion/opinionla/la-ed-counsel-20111108,0,2305323.story (highlighting that the im-
migration detention system does not appoint lawyers to detainees, and that this includes
children and the mentally ill amongst those that cannot afford legal counsel, and noting
that this system is being challenged).
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of citizenship under U.S. nationality laws to individuals who do not know
they may have a claim.530  The number of acquired citizens discovered by
federal public defenders during criminal prosecutions demonstrates the
need for attorneys at the earlier removal stage.531  For individuals that
have challenging claims, the attorney can marshal the resources needed
to effectively present a claim.  Furthermore, an attorney can ensure that
the citizenship claimant pursues all avenues for relief, not only by
presenting a fully documented application to the agencies adjudicating
the claims but also by filing appeals to the AAU, the BIA, and federal
courts.532
Until 1996, Congress maintained levels of administrative and federal
court review of claims to United States citizenship to guarantee protec-
tion of this most precious of rights.533  Then, in its efforts to deal with
perceived crises in illegal immigration and crimes committed by non-citi-
zens, it dismantled some of the most basic avenues for review of removal
orders and authorized an expansive and wholly administrative reinstate-
ment of removal.  Congress should amend INA Section 241(a)(5) to limit
the authority of low-level DHS officials and ensure that all citizenship
claims are heard in INA Section 240 removal proceedings.  INA Section
360 should be extended to include review of citizenship claims which arise
in removal proceedings and Congress must reestablish habeas corpus pro-
ceedings for individuals who assert viable claims to citizenship but are
who unable to file a petition for review.  Until Congress restores avenues
for asserting claims to citizenship before immigration judges and for
530. See Family, supra note 360, at 568 (stating that “[t]o adjudicate a removal case
effectively, the system also needs lawyers”); Taylor, supra note 370, at 1666 (observing that
“there can be no doubt that attorneys influence the outcome of removal proceedings, espe-
cially in circumstances where an alien has a viable ground to contest deportation or is
eligible for some form of relief”).
531. See supra note 371.
532. Attorneys make a difference in the “labyrinthian, complex and confusing” re-
moval process facing U.S.-citizen claimants. See Medina, supra note 145, at 334 n.103 (ex-
plaining that there are a number of strategies that counsel can follow to assist a detained
individual with a claim to citizenship). See BALDINI-POTERMIN, supra note 225, at
§§ 5:11–5:15 (including a comprehensive guide for attorneys representing individuals in
removal proceedings).  In some cases counsel can successfully and almost immediately ob-
tain the client’s release. Id. Depending on the strength of evidence, DHS counsel may
agree to terminate the removal proceeding without further hearing. Id. If DHS does not
agree to terminate, counsel can file on behalf of the client an application for certificate of
citizenship, N-600, with CIS or an application for U.S. passport before the Department of
State, and seek a termination of the removal proceeding when the applications are ap-
proved. Id. Alternatively, counsel can present evidence of the citizenship claim to the
immigration judge as part of a motion to terminate.
533. See supra Part IV.
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review of claims in federal districts courts, U.S. citizens will continue to
be removed without full access to the means to assert and review their
claims.  The result marks “one more blight in our Nation’s history.”534
534. Hearing, supra note 8, at 1.
